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The Kyrgyz Republic (KR) is transforming its agricultural sector from the command system of
the Soviet era to market-oriented production and trade. Fundamental to this effort is farm
privatization and restructuring: dismantling the 442 large-scale state and collective farms that
in 1990 accounted for virtually all of the country’s agricultural output and replacing them with
smaller-scale farms managed by individuals, families, groups of families, and corporate farm
enterprises. Farm restructuring began in 1991, but progress was fitful until 1994, when the
Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF) declared its intent to transfer nearly all of the
country’s 1.5 million hectares of arable land to smallholders by 1995. Knowing that a land
reform effort of this magnitude entails legal, administrative, and economic hardships and
complications , the resolution of which will take years, MAF contracted the Land Tenure
Center (LTC) to prepare: (a) an assessment of the strengths and shortcomings of its land
reform work to date, and (b) a consolidation plan to help guide its efforts in coming years.
Funding for LTC’s involvement was provided by the World Bank, and LTC researchers were
resident in the KR from 6 February through 2 August 1995.
This report presents LTC’s findings and recommendations on the land tenure transition
and constitutes the assessment portion of LTC’s mandated output. The information contained
in this report has been used to prepare a second document, Land and Agrarian Reform in the
Kyrgyz Republic: Consolidation Plan, that proposes a set of actions to ensure that the reforms
are completed and produce a viable, market-oriented, agricultural sector.
Chapter 1 offers baseline geographic information on the KR, an account of the
macroeconomic environment in which reforms are taking place, a brief project history, and a
description of the research methods. Chapter 2 chronicles the legal and regulatory changes that
have driven land and agrarian reform in the KR since 1991 and evaluates this legislation for its
legal consistency, underlying economic assumptions, and broad policy implications. Chapter 3
employs national land statistics to describe changes in the agrarian structure that have resulted
from the legal and regulatory evolution during 1991–1995, including the number and size of
farms, land use, and related indicators of land tenure change and agrarian reform. Chapter 4
reviews the structure, function, and efficacy of administrative bodies that set and enforce land
and land reform policy, recommends administrative adjustments, and identifies land
administration tasks the state can eliminate—and others it will need to bolster—as the KR
completes its transition from command structures to market principles in agriculture. Finally,
Chapter 5 uses data obtained in structured surveys and case studies conducted by LTC on a 10
percent sample of former state and collective farms to describe at the farm level the successes
and shortcomings of reform measures to date; the chapter also makes recommendations for
new or altered land reform policies and procedures.Chapter 1
OVERVIEW
by
Peter Bloch and James Delehanty
I. GEOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND: AGRICULTURAL RESOURCE BASE
The distribution of agricultural activities in the Kyrgyz Republic (KR) can be found in figure
1.1. This map serves as an introduction to agricultural production in the country.
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Note, first, the extent of pastures. Of the republic’s total surface area of 20 million
hectares, 9 million hectares (45 percent) is pasture. Fully 85 percent of agricultural land is
pasture. The KR is high and mountainous, with crop production possible only in limited valley
areas. For this reason, most land under 1,500 meters above sea level (MASL) is cultivated.
Low-lying areas not under the plow are almost entirely winter pasture (shaded medium-gray
in figure 1.1). Winter pasture is grazed from November through March where snow cover
permits. Cut fodder augments winter pasture as necessary.
Summer pasture (shaded with a touch of gray) is more extensive. It comprises the
country’s vast high grasslands between 2,000 and 3,000 MASL and constitutes approximately
one-third of the country. Snow-covered during much of the year, the summer pasture zone is
used by herders during June, July, and August. Intermediate zones (between 1,500 and 2,000
MASL) are identified in figure 1.1 as spring-fall pasture, used in April and May, and again in
September and October.
In 1990, just before the beginning of reform, livestock and livestock products accounted
for 60 percent of the gross value of agricultural goods. Livestock numbers were as follows: 10
million sheep and goats, 1.2 million cattle, and 300,000 horses. Nearly all livestock were under
the control of large-scale state agricultural enterprises and collective farms. Livestock numbers
have declined somewhat since 1990, as has the contribution of the livestock sector to total
agricultural output (see chapters 3 and 5).
Cultivated land constitutes just 1.5 million hectares of the nation’s total land area of
20 million hectares. About half of the cropland is planted to grain. Figure 1.1 shows grain
                                               
1 Glavnoye upravlenie geodezii I kartografii, Atlas Sel’skogo Khoziajstva SSSR, Ministerstva Geologii I
Okhrany Nedr SSSR, Moskva, 1960, p. 265. Translations of the map legend and captions are literal but
accurate. Elsewhere in this document Chuya is transliterated as Chui.23
production is concentrated in the north, mainly in the Chui Valley
2 and also on the eastern
shores of Lake Issyk-Kul. Principal grains are winter wheat, spring barley, maize, winter
barley, and spring wheat. Average grain yields are equal to those of Ukraine due to the
relatively mild winters that permit fall planting and the predominance of irrigated production.
3
Nongrain crops that contribute substantially to the national economy include hay and—
especially in lowland areas of the southwest, where the weather is mildest—tobacco, cotton,
fruits, and vegetables. The most notable contrast in the agricultural geography of the country is
the predominance in the southwest (in the valley of the Fergana River and its tributaries) of
relatively small-scale production of horticultural and industrial crops, such as tobacco and
fruits, versus an emphasis on large-scale grain production in the north, especially in the Chui
Valley.
More than two-thirds of all cropland in the KR is irrigated. Irrigation water originates
almost entirely on the partly glaciated high slopes of the Tien Shan and lesser mountain
ranges.
4 Upkeep and management of the irrigation network under the new system of
decentralized, smallholder production, without heavy state subsidies, is a major unresolved
issue that will ultimately help determine the success or failure of land and agrarian reform.
Under current land reform legislation, the state retains control of pasture and other
nonarable land, while cropland and most of the nonland assets of the former state and
collective farms are being distributed to rural residents. This means that less than 10 percent of
the national territory is subject to privatization. As will be shown, managing access to
nondistributed land will be a critical issue as reforms proceed.
Frequent reference will be made in the following chapters to regional differences in
production and reform. Mainly these differences will expressed by oblast. Figure 1.2 shows the
location of the republic’s six oblasts.
II. MACROECONOMIC CONTEXT FOR LAND AND AGRARIAN REFORM
The economy of the KR has suffered since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Per capita gross
domestic product (GDP), estimated at US$680 in 1993, is one of the lowest in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Due to the relative success of its market reforms,
however, the KR was one of the few CIS members to experience the beginnings of economic
recovery in 1995. One of the most important elements of market reform was the control of
                                               
2 Figure 1.1 also shows that sugar beets were prominent in the Chui Valley during the 1960s. By the
1980s, however, poor agronomic practices and sugar beet diseases had caused the crop to give way almost
completely to wheat and barley. See World Bank, Agricultural Sector Review for the Kyrgyz Republic (1994,
p. 5).
3 World Bank, Agricultural Sector Review for the Kyrgyz Republic (1994, p. 5).
4 Nearly all the irrigation water used by neighboring republics, notably Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, also
flows from the interior of the KR.4
Figure 1.25
inflation and consequent currency stabilization. The annual rate of inflation peaked at over
1,000 percent in 1993, falling to 450 percent in 1994; by early 1995, the monthly rate had
dipped to 1.6 percent and the 12-month rate was below 50 percent. The national currency, the
som, was introduced in 1993. Within months, monetary policy had achieved a remarkable
degree of stability. The som stabilized against the dollar and other western currencies in 1995,
having appreciated in real terms in 1994. While real GDP continued to fall in 1994 and early
1995, the macroeconomic situation has finally become supportive of progress toward
economic growth and transformation.
Macroeconomic stability is a necessary, but far from sufficient, condition for
improvements in the performance of the agricultural sector. Other external factors such as the
breakup of the Soviet Union and the recently unreliable rainfall pattern have combined with
internal policy confusion to constrain the transition of agriculture to operation under private
market conditions.
Primary agriculture employs about one-third of the labor force and contributes a similar
share of GDP; an additional 10 percent of the labor force is involved in agroprocessing
industries. In the Soviet period, the KR supplied a wide range of high-quality agricultural
products, including wool and meat, cotton and silk, and fruits and vegetables; agricultural and
agroprocessed goods constituted half of the republic’s exports. Since 1990, output and exports
have declined as the complex trading system of the Soviet Union broke down. A fall in the
terms of trade for primary products, the loss of CIS markets, the reduction of transfer
payments from Moscow, and the instability of monetary policy all contributed to a shift in
production toward self-sufficiency.
In early 1994, as part of its overall market reform program, the government began to
liberalize the agricultural pricing and marketing system. State orders for procurement were
virtually eliminated, and prices were partially freed. Simultaneously, however, the availability
of credit to agriculture diminished partly due to huge interenterprise debt arrears that reduced
the liquidity of the financial system; interest rates skyrocketed, so farmers used fewer
purchased inputs. Thus there was no apparent supply response to the liberalization measures.
In 1995, the rate of interest had declined to more affordable levels (about 30 percent per year)
and institutional credit was made available in nearly sufficient quantities, but a severe drought
masked any evidence of improvements in productivity.
III. PROJECT AND RESEARCH METHODS
LTC research began in Bishkek in early February 1995 with planning meetings with officials in
the Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF) and other branches of government. Fieldwork
commenced on 10 February with a series of assessment visits and structured interviews with
oblast and rayon administrators, land reform officials, farm managers, farmers, farmworkers,
and others in three diverse regions: the Chui, Issyk-Kul, and Osh oblasts. These assessment
visits and interviews gave the LTC research team the background necessary to design more6
formal research procedures and protocols in three discrete areas: (1) the legal and
administrative process of land and agrarian reform; (2) the assessment and use of official
statistics documenting changes in agrarian structure during the reform period; and (3) the
sampling and questionnaire design for on-farm interviews with rural committee heads
responsible for implementing reforms at the farm level and heads of newly restructured farms.
The specifics of the work program are detailed below.
A. ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Building on the detailed assessments by the Rural Development Institute and EU-TACIS
consultants, LTC conducted a careful inventory and study of all the legislation and regulations
that have been issued since the reforms began. During March and April 1995, legal documents
and the details of land administration were obtained from officials in the MAF, the Ministry of
Justice, and other relevant agencies. The main difficulties concerned translation of the legal
texts into English and interpretation of occasionally obtuse and frequently contradictory laws,
decrees, and regulations. LTC determined that a narrow legal approach to assessment was
inadequate and added a socioeconomic point of view to its reading of the documents. LTC’s
analysis and recommendations concerning legislative issues are found in chapter 2.
B. RESEARCH ON EVOLUTION OF AGRARIAN STRUCTURE
LTC worked closely with the State Institute for Land Resources and Land Management
(Kyrgyzgiprozem, also known as Kyrgyzmamzherresurstary), the Republican Center for Land
and Agrarian Reform (CLAR), and the State Committee on Statistics (Goskomstat, now
known as the National Statistical Committee) to develop a consistent set of data to document
the progress of farm restructuring. In a country where state agencies take statistical
thoroughness much to heart, and where farm restructuring is the post-Soviet reform that
affects the largest number of people, it is surprising that official documentation of farm
reorganization is not adequate to allow easy assessment of the pace of change, nationally or
regionally. Ambiguities and shifts in the definition of land reform concepts (such as peasant
farm, private farm, cooperative farm, and reorganized enterprise) account for much of the
inherent confusion in official land reform statistics. As described in chapter 3, the only
methodological solution to this problem was to adopt a chronological approach to the
description of agrarian structure.
C. RESEARCH ON CURRENT STATUS OF REFORMS
In order to ascertain whether the current land administration system is appropriate for the new
requirements of the market economy, LTC assessed the roles and functions of the large
number of government agencies that are, in one way or another, responsible for the
administration of land and buildings. The analysis and recommendations concerning the
institutional aspects of land management are found in chapter 4.7
D. ASSESSMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF LAND ADMINISTRATION
LTC researchers studied the opinions and perspectives of the principal actors in the reform
process via a variety of field research techniques, including formal sample surveys and semi-
structured interviews. Based on a 10 percent random sample of the former state and collective
farms, LTC researchers administered questionnaires during April and May 1995 to 47 heads of
rural committees and 117 heads of new farm enterprises and interviewed 14 individual farmers.
They also interviewed 11 rayon akims and discussed the status of the reforms with oblast and
national officials. The presentation of the data and the policy recommendations that they
generated are found in chapter 5.
E. PLAN FOR NATIONAL LAND FUND (NLF)
In response to a request by the Republican CLAR, LTC drafted a proposal, plus draft
legislation and draft procedural forms, for the dissolution of the NLF and its distribution to the
population through a bidding process. The proposal and accompanying draft legislation
outlined a process intended, first and foremost, to be equitable but which also gave bidding
advantages to land-poor families intending to farm. As of now (September 1995), the KR has
announced no decision on the ultimate disposition of the NLF.
F. PLAN FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF REGISTRATION SYSTEM FOR IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
Based on experience in other countries and the realities of a market economy, LTC developed
a proposal for the Government of the KR to create a single system of immovable property
registration and thereby reinforce the security of rights of use, ownership, and other interests in
immovable property. This proposal was presented to the Office of the President in July 1995.
In the same month, the president delivered an order to the prime minister to establish a
working group to design the system and to draft the legislation necessary to its creation. As of
late July 1995, that working group was in the course of creation.
The results of the LTC/Republican CLAR work program were presented at a workshop
on 4–5 July 1995. On 6 July, three working groups met to sketch out a program for
consolidating the reforms based on the workshop presentations and the broad experiences of
the participants. The ideas generated at the workshop were invaluable in refining the ideas and
recommendations contained in this report and in preparing the consolidation plan.Chapter 2
LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS OF LAND REFORM AND FARM RESTRUCTURING IN
THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC: ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
by
Michael Roth and Larry Church
I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter gives an overview of the various laws, decrees, and regulations that have
provided the legal foundation for farm restructuring in the Kyrgyz Republic (KR) from 1991 to
1995. These sources govern the privatization of property and land and, in some cases,
introduce new institutions (for example, rural committees) to implement the reforms.
Knowledge of these legal underpinnings is essential to understanding the types of farm
enterprises that have emerged and the constraints that are acting to shape future restructuring.
Legal mandates on land reform and farm restructuring have changed several times since
1991. At least two initiatives have attempted to advance the reforms, each characterized by a
new and dynamic set of decrees and rules. Moreover, compliance with the various mandates
has not been uniform. Some former collective and state farms made changes on paper only.
Others did nothing in response to early decrees yet instigated real change on their farms under
the most recent reforms. This chapter describes the legislation underpinning the farm
restructuring program in the KR; then it assesses the economic soundness and legal
consistency of that legislation.
II. FARM RESTRUCTURING IN THE KR, 1991 THROUGH 1993
Three reasonably comprehensive laws created the legal framework for implementing the first
farm restructurings: the Law on Peasant Farm of the Kyrgyz Republic of 2 February 1991, the
Law of Kyrgyz Republic on Enterprises of 6 February 1991, and the Law of the Republic of
Kyrgyzstan on the Land Reform of 19 April 1991.
1 (See annex 2.1 for a chronological listing
of selected legislation from the inception of the reforms to the present.)
                                               
1 The authors had at their disposal English translations of the law on peasant farms and the law on land
reform. The decision was made to not translate the law on enterprises because of its dated content and length.10
A. FARM RESTRUCTURING
2
The Law on Land Reform envisaged two stages of restructuring (ARTICLE 25; see also ART. 2
of the President’s Decree of 10 December 1992 on Measures for Continuing Implementation
of the Land and Agrarian Reform). In the first stage (1991–1993), appropriate legislation and
land regulations would be worked out; a special Land Fund under the Local Council of
People’s Deputies
3 would be created for emerging private farmers, lessors, and farm
cooperatives; land tax and rent (lease) payment schedules would be developed; boundaries of
villages, cities, and districts would be demarcated; and collectives or state farms which were
deemed to be unprofitable or of low profitability would be reorganized. In subsequent stages,
land payment schedules would be corrected, a data bank on the land cadastre would be created
and monitored, land passports
4 for farmers and land users would be issued, leases would be
either issued or introduced, and compliance with land legislation and land management systems
would be maintained and monitored. Land reform implementation was made the responsibility
of the Committee on the Land Reform and Land Management of the Council of People’s
Deputies, with participation of appropriate ministries and entities.
A special land fund was to be established from inefficiently used lands identified by
inventory programs; land provided to agricultural industries but not utilized within one year;
land allocated to nonagricultural industries but not utilized within two years; land of
agricultural enterprises whose five-year performance was lower than norms established by
cadastral assessment; and agricultural lands taken out of circulation, transferred to less valuable
categories (other uses), or whose tenure had been terminated in compliance with the Land
Code (ART. 5).
5 Once land entered the fund, the Council of People’s Deputies was to
determine appropriate future actions, whether to continue use by existing owners, withhold
lands, redistribute land to new landowners and tenants, or introduce conservation programs on
degraded lands.
Inefficient collective farms, state farms, and other agricultural enterprises would be
reorganized into agricultural cooperatives, associations of peasant farms, and peasant farms, in
accordance with priorities established by the Cabinet of Ministers.
6 (This differs from later
rules that stipulate the restructuring of all such farms.) A land plot provided to a citizen(s) of a
                                               
2 Unless otherwise noted, information in this section pertains to the Land Reform Law of 19 April 1991.
3 Also known as Local Soviet of People’s Deputies.
4 These appear to have had in mind the land certificates discussed under subsection III, below.
5 The 11 October 1991 Decree on Emergency Measures on Ensuring Realization of KR Laws Regulating
Land and other Relations in Agriculture instructs oblast, rayon, municipal, and village Councils of People’s
Deputies to set up, by 1 February 1992, a land fund containing not less than 1.5 million hectares of agricultural
land. That land (no less than 50 percent irrigated) was to be given to village and town inhabitants before the
beginning of the 1992 spring field works.
6 District Councils were given until 1 February 1992 to withdraw land from unprofitable farms or farms of
low profitability (10 November 1991 Decree).11
peasant farm, personal subsidiary plot, house dacha, building site, and horticultural or livestock
breeding enterprise would be re-registered within the period 1991—1995 and the citizen(s)
provided with an ownership document. Such a document was to be issued by village,
settlement, town/city, or district Councils of People’s Deputies in accordance with plot
location. All land rights associated with the plot prior to land registration would be preserved
for a period of five years from the beginning of the reform; thereafter, all prior rights would be
extinguished in favor of the current holder (ART. 8, 1991 Law on Land Reform).
The Land Management Service of the Committee for Land Reform and Land Management
was made responsible (ART. 15) for annually providing land cadastre documentation,
systematic land monitoring, inspections, and issuance of “passports” to landowners and
tenants. Landowners and lessors were to be taxed annually according to tax rates established
by the Committee for Land Reform and Land Management for plot quality and location
(ART. 16). All development of scientific research, project research on land management, land
cadastre, and land monitoring necessary to implement the reforms was to be carried out with
funds from the KR budget, under the oversight of the Committee for Land Reform in
agreement with scientific divisions of the Kyrgyz department of VASKHNIL (All-Union
Academic Agricultural Scientific Research Institute), Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, and other
scientific subdivisions (ART. 17). The Land Management service of the Committee for Land
Reform and Land Management was put in charge of land use, land monitoring, land cadastre,
land management organization, topographical and geodesic mapping, and soils, botany,
agrochemical, and other land management research with financing from the KR budget
(ART. 18). Any land improvements, however, were to be carried out at the initiative of
landowners and tenants at their own expense (ART. 18).
B. PEASANT FARMING ENTERPRISES (PFE)
Under the Law on Peasant Farms, a peasant farm was defined as an independent farming
complex comprised of family members, relatives, and other individuals jointly operating the
farming unit (ART. 2). Establishment of such a farm was voluntary (ART. 6). Ownership was
restricted to one farm per family (married couple and underaged children), and the farm could
be inherited by persons designated by will (ART. 7). All transfers other than inheritance—
buying and selling, granting, mortgaging, unauthorized exchange or allotment—were strictly
prohibited (ART. 7). All members of the PFE were given rights of due compensation upon
exiting the enterprise, the amount to be determined according to labor and property share
assigned to the PFE during its organization (ART. 8). Terms of compensation had to be
established according to mutual agreement with all farm members, but the term for payment
could not exceed five years (ART. 8).
7 A land tax or rent could be levied on the PFE,
depending on land quality and location, at rates determined by law (ART. 17). Rights of
                                               
7 It is difficult to know what the architects of this policy had in mind: whether to ensure that the land
share was sold only to family members or to give other members right of first refusal to prevent unwanted
outsiders from acquiring land from the enterprise. In either case, rights of the individual landholder are greatly
circumscribed.12
ownership were to be forfeited in cases of voluntary withdrawal, failure to make necessary land
improvements within the designated period, and failure to pay land taxes and other charges on
time (ART. 20).
Under the law, any citizen of legal age (>18 years) could become the head of a PFE; and
in the event of sickness or retirement, the head was entitled to transfer landownership, rent-out
the farm, or assign all rights and duties to another PFE member. Land of former collectives
(and of state farms established on collective farms) was to be apportioned by shares according
to the labor contributions of the farmers during their work tenure with the collective farm. On
other state farms, land grants were to be assigned on a rental basis with rights of future
purchase taking into account the farmers’ personal income pursuant to the Law on Enterprises
of the KR (ART. 6). Maximum farm size allocated to a PFE was to be determined by the rayon
Councils of People’s Deputies according to soil fertility, public land reserve, population,
number of members, professional training and capacity—all aimed at ensuring optimal crop and
livestock efficiency (ART. 13).
The head of the PFE is the legal person responsible for representing all farm interests in
dealings with the state as well as all matters of registration, negotiating contracts, dealing with
property and other legal activities as may apply (ART. 3), and organizing production and
marketing (ART. 4; this article also forbids interference by the state except in cases of law
infringement). The right to ownership of all land and property (houses, buildings, livestock,
machinery, vehicles) and to farm profits (after taxes and other payments) is guaranteed under
ART. 7. Establishment of a PFE is contingent on a lease contract concluded with the local
Council of People’s Deputies (ART. 10). Terms are established in the lease contract; land
cannot be granted to the PFE for less than five years, but other conditions may apply.
Specifically, ART. 14 stipulates that the PFE must use the land for the intended purpose, must
achieve at least minimum productivity (in accordance with cadastral evaluation), must use
resource-conserving technologies, must keep the land free of chemical and radioactive
pollution, and must avoid any worsening of the ecology.
Land allotments are carried out on the basis of applications presented by the village. A
PFE is considered formed as soon as the rayon of Council of People’s Deputies so decides (or
the Cabinet of Ministers in the case of foreign citizens). While theoretically any citizen is
eligible, land is assigned on a competitive basis—unlike later reforms where all legal citizens
are made eligible. Preference is to be determined by length of farm experience, necessary
qualifications, and capability to manage the PFE. Those collective and state farms showing
higher land-use efficiency than the rayon average are exempt from the restructuring, for only
land of farms in the worst financial condition was to be withdrawn for PFEs. Land used for
scientific research and educational purposes was also excluded (ART. 11).
With consent of the PFE, people are entitled to move through the territory by vehicle; to
boat, bathe, and fish in its water reservoirs; and to place tents, make a fire, and camp, on
condition that nature is preserved in a pure ecological state (ART. 14). The right to use forests,
water reservoirs, and common minerals on or under PFE land belongs to the PFE (ART. 15).13
Owners also have to comply with labor covenants (ART. 21). A labor contract for family and
hired labor is required that lays out terms for length of the working day, days off, paid
holidays, wage rate, meals, and any other condition that may apply. Wage rates and official
vacation time could not be less than that for similarly qualified workers in state enterprises.
Hired labor contracts have to be registered with the corresponding Council of People’s
Deputies and the appropriate trade union. Working members over 14 years of age are entitled
to insurance and social security equal to that of workers and laborers (unclear whether in the
PFE or in comparable nonfarm enterprises), payable by the PFE into the state fund of social
insurance (ART. 22).
The PFE remained eligible to acquire farm machinery, spare parts, feed, fertilizers, farm
chemicals, building timbers, and fuel and lubricants through the state logistical support system
at the prices established for collective farms, livestock from agricultural enterprises at prices
fixed by bilateral agreement, and pedigree seeds and plants from agricultural organizations at
retail or wholesale prices as may apply. Gas and electricity for production needs continued to
be provided at the same tariffs as established for collective farms. Also, PFEs continued to
have access to state agroservice enterprises for farm machinery maintenance at wholesale
prices established for state and collective farms (ART. 24).
8
C. MEASURES TO COMBAT AGRARIAN DECLINE
Any restructuring that started as a result of the 1991 reforms had come to a halt by the spring
planting season (April) of 1992. The 10 December 1992 Presidential Decree, “On Measures
for Further Implementation of Land and Agrarian Reforms in the KR,” attempted to bring a
sense of urgency to the restructuring effort. A deepening crisis in food procurement had pinned
the fate of all political, economic, and social reform in the KR on a timely and successful
restructuring effort.
The presidential decree called for resumption of reform efforts, the allocation of land in
the National Land Fund (NLF) on a competitive basis to citizens for commodity farming, and
the appointment of competition committees to ensure implementation (ART. 1 and 2). These
were intended to alleviate the pending food crisis and to increase farm efficiency. The decree
advised that no limit be placed on the size of land parcels allocated to individuals exiting state
or collective farms (for purposes of setting up a private farm) but recommended that
enterprises provide every permanent member of a collective or state farm with a land share
(ART. 3). Pensioners, invalids, and workers in the social sphere (health and social workers,
teachers) living on the territory were also to be given rights to a share of land and property
(ART. 4). Rural committees (formed by the 13 January 1992 Presidential Decree) were given
the right to levy taxes (ART. 6). Consideration was given to reorganizing agroprocessing and
procurement enterprises into joint-stock companies (ART. 9). Producers were given rights to
                                               
8 Unlike the more recent restructurings in which enterprises (farms) are being established under dire
economic conditions (collapsing input and marketing services), farms created in the initial period had
considerable support in the form of assured contracts and markets.14
negotiate freely for the sale of produce (ART. 10), though state orders for grain, cotton,
tobacco, and wool for the 1993 season were left intact. Clinics, schools, and other public
infrastructure were to be passed as common property to members of operating collectives or to
local government, taking into account the opinions of village administrations and rural
committees (ART. 11). The Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF) was instructed to work
out methods for valuing the property of collective and state farms (ART. 12), while the MAF
and the state agency for inspection on land survey were charged with recommending farm
reorganizations and crop rotations (ART. 13). The Government of the KR was given a month
to confirm the program of land reforms (ART. 15), while heads of oblast and rayon
administrations
9 were charged with ensuring their implementation (ART. 16).
The restructuring effort continued to stagnate through the spring of 1994. A government
decree of 24 January 1994 highlighted the severity of the agricultural crisis, citing an 8 percent
decline in gross farm output between 1992 and 1993, an 8 percent decline in cattle numbers, a
12 percent decline in sheep and goats, and a 32 percent decline in pigs. Measures proposed to
stimulate agricultural production included calls for greater state control over agricultural
production and marketing, including fixed minimum procurement volumes and prices.
Government procurement agencies (MAF, the KR production association, and Tamak-ash)
were directed to conclude agreements with producers in all tenure categories within two
months. To assist procurement efforts, oblast and rayon administrators were instructed to
determine the optimal use of arable lands and the optimal number of livestock. The National
Bank and joint-stock commercial banks were instructed to settle within one month the issue of
supplying procurement and processing enterprises with credit sufficient to advance producers
25 percent of the cost of the minimum volume of purchases. The state committee for the
economy, MAF, the republican production association, and Tamak-ash were instructed to
introduce prices that took into account cost/price, objective conditions, and demand and
supply of the state in the market.
10
III. FARM RESTRUCTURING, 1994 TO PRESENT
The 1994 restructuring effort was both a continuation of early restructuring reforms and a
frontal assault on the majority of state farms or collectives which had ignored previous
restructuring edicts. Although the decrees and regulations authorizing this stage of the farm
restructuring were issued early in 1994, the preoccupation of farm enterprises with the 1994
cropping season (beginning in April) effectively delayed any earnest implementation until the
fall months.
                                               
9 Referred to as “local government administrations” in the English translations.
10 Producers are given full discretion to negotiate prices for commodities not included in minimum state
procurements, both within and outside the republic.15
A. VISION FOR LAND AND AGRARIAN REFORM
The 22 February 1994 Presidential Decree (Measures on Promoting Land and Agrarian
Reforms in Kyrgyz Republic) underscores government priorities to create effective market
conditions, improve farm profitability, instill market principles, and provide equal conditions
for the development of all types of farm enterprises. The right to a share of arable land, with
the exception of land reserved for the NLF and pastures, is reaffirmed for all people living and
working on the territories of collective and state farms (ART. 1). Any citizen or juridical person
of the KR has the right to sell, exchange, bequeath, mortgage, and/or lease the use-right
(ART. 2).
11 Such persons also have the right to organize joint-farming enterprises by pooling
land shares (ART. 5) and are granted 49 years of tenure with preferential rights of extension
upon termination (ART. 3). The decree reduced the NLF to 25 percent of all agricultural land,
except pastures (ART. 4). The government may buy land for the fund for redistribution from
citizens and juridical persons at the market price (ART. 8). Plots must be used only for
agricultural production (ART. 10). Maximum landholdings for one family may not exceed 20
hectares in zones of intensive agriculture, 25 hectares in semi-intensive zones,
12 and 30
hectares in mountainous pasturelands (ART. 11).
13 Citizens who obtained land before this
decree are entitled to keep holdings only within these limits; any excess land is to be returned
for distribution, with cash contribution paid according to levels set by government (ART. 12).
Pastureland cannot be redistributed but can be leased, with preference given to shepherds and
employees of livestock enterprises (ART. 13).
Under the presidential decree, state authorities are prohibited from interfering with
individual use rights; any infraction is subject to indemnification of farmers’ losses out of the
rayon budget (ART. 14). MAF is given power to promulgate rules regulating agrarian reform
and the privatization of agricultural enterprises, to coordinate and implement activities of
rayon administrations and rural committees on problems of land and agrarian reform, and to
control tax receipts and their use (ART. 17 and 19). Heads of rayon administrations are
charged with developing regional programs for farm reorganization, implementing the reforms
of all agricultural enterprises, and setting up rural committees and providing them with advice
and leadership (ART. 18). Consideration is to be given to increasing tax rates twentyfold, with
50 percent of collections going to the local budget and rural committees for social
infrastructure in the territory and the remainder directed to the republican budget for state
support of the reforms. However, this provision was repealed by decree on 27 February 1995;
only 25 percent of the tax collected now goes to local governments, and 75 percent goes to the
republic’s budget.
In order to minimize delays in implementation, regulations were to be issued (within two
weeks) on: distribution of land-use rights; the role of rural committees; the order of land
                                               
11 In 1994, the right of sale and exchange was restricted to members of the enterprise; beginning in
January 1995, this right was to be made possible to other citizens and juridical persons of the KR
12 Referred to as zones of average land-use intensity in the English translations.
13 However, ART. 20 stipulates that the MAF in agreement with local state administrations must establish
minimum sizes of plots of land for managing commodity farming.16
allocation from the NLF; the reorganization of agricultural enterprises; the reorganization of
pedigree, seed, and experimental farms; and proposed changes and additions to legal acts
proceeding from the presidential decree (ART. 22). Government Regulation No. 743 of
25 March 1994 called for prompt and immediate action on several fronts. In particular,
development and adoption of acts regulating the process of land and agrarian reform were to
be submitted by 1 October 1994. The MAF, together with each rayon administration, was
instructed to physically identify land for the fund and report within two months the rules for
land redistribution. Heads of rayon administrations were instructed to develop regional
programs for implementation before 1 July 1994 and to submit within a month proposals on
minimum size of land plots, taking into account natural and climatic conditions. Furthermore
within one month, the MAF, together with oblast administrations, was required to submit
proposals on orders to ascertain the land shares of citizens, grant certificates on rights of land
use, reorganize agricultural enterprises, and implement the NLF.
B. RURAL COMMITTEES AND LAND REFORM COMMISSION
Regulation No. 148 of 25 March 1994 attempts to clarify the roles of the MAF, local
authorities, and rural committees in the land reform program. Several deadlines have been
issued for completion of various steps in the process. The MAF was ordered to have a national
program in place by 1 June 1995. Local administrations were given until July 1995 to provide
rules on the organization and function of rural committees. Rural committees are to be
established on all collective and state farms as well as other agricultural enterprises but are
considered executive instruments of the rayon administrations. Their responsibilities are
substantial: secure and protect the constitutional rights of citizens; lend assistance in
establishing enterprises; monitor and enforce rational land use and environmental protection;
regulate land and water use; prepare land records; consider grievances and applications before
going to court; solve conflicts over economic matters; reallocate land in cases of land use
infractions; issue land and property shares; keep statistics on all economic activities according
to official procedures; and oversee the registration of newly organized enterprises.
14 Such
committees, depending on population and land-use intensity, would normally comprise
between three and seven members confirmed by the head of the rayon administration. The
chair is appointed by the rayon administration for a three-year period;
15 the deputy chair is also
appointed by the rayon administration but on the basis of the chair’s recommendation.
Operations are to be financed by the local community budget and also from the proceeds of
economic activities.
16
                                               
14 These responsibilities would appear to effectively ensure that the management of the former collective
or state farm (for example, directors, farm economists, agronomists) be appointed or elected to the rural
committee, despite risks that bad management or centralized planning will be perpetuated.
15 The chair of a collective or director of state farm is allowed to hold both positions simultaneously.
16 Incentives would seem to exist here to maintain the status quo (paying committees from the proceeds of
a collective-styled enterprise). Divestiture into peasant enterprises would dictate the need for a tax system or
market controls to capture revenue for local community budgets, both substantial measures requiring long time
horizons to effectively enforce. It can also be interpreted as a justification by rural committee heads for using17
As a result of difficulties experienced in implementing reforms, Regulation No. 3 of
23 January 1995, on the Rule of Commission for Implementation of Land Reform and
Reorganization of Agricultural Enterprises, created a new organ, the commission on land and
agrarian reform, to help realize reforms in the agrarian sector. Each commission, one for each
farm, is to include the head of the rural committee (the head of the commission), MAF
representatives, village kenesh (deputy heads), oblast and rayon representatives of centers of
agrarian and land reform, representatives of banking and statistical institutions, and
representatives of farms elected at a general meeting, the size not exceeding 15 persons.
Responsibilities of the commission are to analyze financial and economic activities, conduct
land inventories, value property, develop the reorganization plan, and generally implement the
reforms. These duties sound remarkably similar to those assigned to the rural committee,
though the new organization is presumably aimed at pulling together the decision-making and
planning of local interests under one umbrella group. From January 1995 onward, any division
of land and property shares is contingent on a reorganization plan prepared by the commission
(as opposed to rayon administrations) and adopted by the rayon administration and MAF.
C. NLF
Regulation No. 345 of 19 May 1994, Rules on NLF, identifies and reserves land for the
purposes of developing national entrepreneurship in agriculture
17 and organizing priority
enterprises. The fund legally should comprise 25 percent of all agricultural land in each rayon
of the KR and place it under MAF control. Sizes, boundaries, composition, ecology, and
economic value of fund land are to be identified in working documents prepared by rural
committees, rayon centers for land and agrarian reform, and Kyrgyzgiprozem.
18 Rayon offices
for land and agrarian reform are responsible for the land inventory. Such land, once in the fund,
is to be used for establishing state joint-stock stud farms, seed-producing farms, and
experimental enterprises on a lease basis, and for citizens migrating to become permanent
residents of a community.
19 Remaining NLF land not yet distributed is to be allocated to land
users by the rural committee, on the basis of lease agreements, for farm production only. MAF
Regulation No. 7, On NLF, of 8 February 1995, further clarifies that fund land may not be
subdivided without proposals of the rayon administration and approval of the MAF, but may
be temporarily leased on a competitive basis for profitable economic activities that benefit
enterprise members, help increase crop and livestock productivity, or expand employment
opportunities. Permission is further granted to give NLF land to inhabitants of the former farms
and employees of cultural, teaching, health, trade, and civil services. The remainder of the land
                                                                                                                                                  
the equipment of the former state and collective farms to cultivate NLF land to maintain profitability levels of
the former enterprise.
17 Some have interpreted this to mean reserving land for the indigenous Kyrgyz population, though this
provision appears to allow the allocation of land to a broader definition of “citizen.”
18 Kyrgyzmamzherresurstary in Kyrgyz.
19 Another undated translation, the source of which could not be verified, stipulates that fund land is to be
given to migrant citizens from inside the republic and abroad, the jobless, citizens working and living outside
the farm, and persons seeking residence in the area for purposes of establishing a commodity farm.18




Provisions on the reorganization of agricultural enterprises are covered under Regulation
No. 632 of 22 August 1994. The agrarian reform is made obligatory for all agricultural
enterprises regardless of type (SEC. 1). Free choice of farming unit, within the bounds of
legislation, and equal access of all growers to industrial and social services within the territory
of the farm is guaranteed (SEC. 2). Land share certificates are to be issued by rural committees
at a cost of 25 times the current land tax rate (possibly to be paid over time). The certificates
are to be registered at the local register of deeds. They may be sold, exchanged, inherited, and
pledged (ART. II and III). Collectives and state farms may be:
u divided into peasant farms with voluntary reconsolidation into associations and cooperative
societies allowed, but the maximum farm size held by any one family cannot exceed the
limits specified in table 2.1 (SEC. 3);
u reorganized in whole or part into a joint-stock company; or




 TABLE 2.1 Minimum and maximum holdings for peasant farm enterprises, 1994




 Zone of intensive farming  10  20
 Zone of semi-intensive farming  15  25




  Restructuring must be carried out in accordance with a regional program. Under SEC. 6,
restructuring must at a minimum contain: (1) accurate measurements and legal boundaries of
farms, their arable land use, national fund land, and settlements with personal plots (planned
for livestock grazing, hay-making, collective gardening and orchards); (2) a valuation of
industrial and social assets and their viability and analysis of industrial activity and financial-
economic status; (3) the size of population according to category, number of farmsteads, and
work force; (4) future land uses, possible forms of cooperation among new enterprises,
planning for social infrastructure, and forms of industrial service, storage, and processing; and
(5) the order of dividing land and property shares, definition of rights and responsibilities of the
                                               
20 While previously fund land was to be preserved for state stock and pedigree farms, for research and
teaching, and for migrants settling permanently in the area, these new regulations theoretically allow the
community to assign all fund land to local inhabitants as long as MAF approval is obtained.19
farming units being formed, details on the restructuring process, valuation of land and property
shares of workers seeking to leave the farm, and rights of succession, among other
responsibilities. Property valuation is to be carried out by the valuation board in accordance
with the formula specified in Joint Decree No. 58 of the Government and State Property Fund
of KR of 5 February 1993 (SEC. 9). The research plan is to be discussed at a general meeting
of collective members and, after approval by the rayon head, implemented by the rural
committee (SEC. 7 and 8). If a consensus research plan is achieved, certificates for land use
rights, land plots in kind, and property shares are to be given to juridical owners (SEC. 16).
21
 
  E. DEBTS
 Originally, debts incurred by agricultural enterprises before 1 October 1994 were to be paid
out of the money and property of the reorganized farm (SEC. 10, The Provisions On
Reorganization of Agricultural Farms). Any debt remaining was to be transferred to the newly
formed enterprises (after consideration by the Ministry of Finance, the MAF, and the state
committee for economy) and payable over 40 years at 0.75 percent interest annually with the
first repayments beginning on 1 January 2004 (SEC. 10). However, these terms have been
superseded by Regulation No. 42, On Debts of Reorganized State and Collective Farms, of 16
February 1995, which stipulates that the MAF is permitted to sell the property and livestock of
reorganized state farms to newly formed enterprises with repayment in equal parts over 10
years. However, 50 percent of the debt of reorganized state farm, and 75 percent of the debt of
reorganized collective farms must be passed on to newly created enterprises, with repayment in
equal parts over a 15-year period beginning 1 January 1997.
22
 
  F. PROPERTY SHARES
 Individual property shares of citizens are to be prorated according to the labor contributions of
all workers on a given farm (determined by multiplying the value of the entire property by the
“labor contribution” of each worker) (SEC. 11). The property value is defined as the gross
value less payment of farm debts in the case of state farms (perhaps all property in the case of
former collectives, though this interpretation is not made explicit). Labor contribution is
defined as the average annual salary of workers (cash and in-kind) for the most recent 10 years
multiplied by length of service on a given farm.
23 Citizens and juridical persons with certificates
                                               
 
21 If farm members cannot agree on a reorganization plan, then (after property shares are defined and land
use certificates issued) the local rayon administration and rural committee are entitled to grant land plots and
property shares to people having pooled the necessary land-use certificates (SEC. 14). This can be done without
the consent of farm members. No mention is given to the status of the remaining persons or to the land
remaining in the enterprise.
 
22 The remainder of the debt is assumed by the state. These provisions create an incentive on the part of
the state and collective farms to exaggerate the amount of their debts in order to increase the portion to be
covered by the state.
 
23 The average salary would increase with shorter tenure and whether an individual worked on the farm at
the time of restructuring. Average salary would be smaller for retirees. Whether the labor contribution would be
aided by tenure would depend on the level of price inflation and length of tenure with the farm.20
of land-use rights, whose pooled shares comply with established farm-size limits, are deemed
eligible for a “state act of land use right” without the consent of other members of the former
enterprise. Such act is to be issued by the rayon administration and formally registers the newly
formed enterprise (SEC. 12). Actual land allocation is to be carried out by the rayon land
management office along with the rural committee, giving due consideration to rational land
use, “compact” (unfragmented) land tenure, and the viability of existing irrigation systems
(SEC. 12). The choice of farm enterprise is voluntary except in the cases of declared
bankruptcies, which are carried out under the KR Law on Bankruptcy (SEC. 13).
 
  Social-cultural units, stores, workshops, garages, oil stations, and other forms of common
property (irrigation canals, drainage systems, pumping stations, wells, reservoirs, and sprinkler
systems) should be managed by the rural committee for those citizens with shares. Remaining
assets (buildings, livestock, fruit trees, fodder) are to be sold or divided among farm members
according to SEC. 9 and 11 (SEC. 17). Rural committees should promote the formation of
joint-stock companies to undertake the supply of technical services, farm goods, electrification,
mechanization of labor-intensive activities, improvement of meadows and pastures, and
services providing chemical and biological protection (SEC. 18). Rural committees may form
agroindustrial enterprises on a contractual basis to provide processing, construction, repairs,
land reclamation, maintenance and operation of irrigation systems, veterinary services,
marketing of agricultural produce, and any other services as may apply (SEC. 19). Agricultural
enterprises of special significance to government should be reorganized by the MAF and local
administrations into state joint-stock enterprises with land and property retained as needed to
carry out their respective functions (SEC. 20). These would include seed farms, pedigree farms,
livestock breeding stations, hippodromes, fruit nurseries, and educational and experimental
farms; their operations are to be continued on, or established with, land reserved or allotted
under the NLF on lease terms (SEC. 21). Divestiture of any such livestock breeding farms,
poultry farms, incubators, or greenhouses should take place within three years by sale or by
conversion into joint-stock companies (SEC. 22). Agrochemical, service, and veterinary
enterprises are convertible into state joint-stock societies with majority control held by the
MAF (SEC. 23).
 
  G. CONSTITUTIONAL LAND RIGHTS
 According to ART. 4 of the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic (5 May 1994), the land, its
subsoil, water, air space, fauna, and flora are the property of the state (SEC. 2). Although plots
of land may be given to citizens and their associations for private possession in accordance
with the law, the purchase and sale of land is strictly prohibited (SEC. 3). Nevertheless, the
republic “shall defend the right of its citizens and legal entities to own property” (SEC. 4).
 
  H. LAND SHARES AND CERTIFICATES
 The Provisions on the Order of Land Share Definitions to Citizens and Giving Out of
Certificates for Land Tenure Rights (no. 632) of 22 August 1994 defines the process of21
granting land shares, issuing certificates and rights of parties using that certificate as security
for credit. All land within the boundaries of collective farms, state farms, and other agricultural
enterprises—with exception of fund land, pastures, populated areas with private plots, forests,
and other reserves—is to be distributed to eligible interests. People eligible to obtain shares
include persons presently working and living on a given farm, those retired from or disabled by
work on a given farm, people born on a given farm working elsewhere who decide to come
back for permanent living, and people living on the farm but working in the spheres of health,
education, consumer services, commerce, culture, zoology, and farm supply services (SEC. 1).
Land shares are to be determined by the rural committee, with consideration for the number of
family members at the time of reorganization, and confirmed by the rayon administration.
Applications received after the reorganization will be handled as applications for fund land in
accordance with established priorities. Shares are to be allocated only once and are to be free
of charge (SEC. 2).
 
  Rural committees are responsible for issuing a formal certificate to citizens for land tenure
rights showing the names of family members, the size of each individual and family land share,
and the initial cost of the land in soms (SEC. 4).
24 Section 4 also clearly stipulates that this rate
is not the basis for government to use in selling land, suggesting instead that shares are set in
value terms for land quality (reflected in the tax rates) to ensure a more equitable distribution
of assets. The certificate must be registered in the land cadastre of the rayon land management
office before being issued to owners to become valid (SEC. 5). Certificate owners (SEC. 6) are
allowed to voluntarily pool their land shares into agricultural enterprises within the limits of
minimum and maximum farm sizes (set according to differences in irrigated arable land)
indicated in table 2.1.
25 People living in suburban areas and growing vegetables are exempt
from the minimum farm sizes. For those people who, prior to this decree, received individual
land shares that now exceed the average land-share sizes for a given farm, compensation must
be paid to the rural committees equal to the initial cost of a land-use right.
26 Also, the total
area of the farming enterprise must not exceed the maximum size limits in table 2.1; any excess
must be returned to the rural committee for redistribution (SEC. 12).
27
 
  With the consent of other family members, a holder can sell his or her certificate to other
members of the same farm and to citizens and juridical persons of the KR (transactions to
foreign citizens and juridical persons is prohibited under ART. 10) for purposes of agricultural
production. Former members of the collective farm are thus given preference over other
purchasers. When certified by the notary’s office in agreement with the rural committee and
rayon land management office, certificates may be legally bequeathed, sold, exchanged, and
                                               
 
24 Defined as the land tax rate increased by 25 times.
 
25 Rather than enabling pooling, as this provision would seem to suggest, small average shares per citizen
would effectively compel holders to consolidate shares whether they wanted to or not.
 
26 Compensation, payable on the excess only, must be paid by 1 January 1995.
 
27 Theoretically, it would appear that individuals paying compensation for larger than average land shares
to the rural committee could find their land appropriated if farm-size limits are exceeded.22
used as security (SEC. 7 to 9).
28 The rural committee is further authorized by the MAF to
allocate plots from the fund and distant pastures to “concrete” land users on lease terms for
provisional tenure (SEC. 13).
 
  Joint-stock commercial bankers serving the agricultural sector are holders of certificates in
pawn (SEC. 14). In the absence of market prices, the initial cost will serve as the collateral
value (SEC. 26). If the owner of the certificate fails to meet his or her financial commitments,
the security holder will automatically gain the right to use the certificate (SEC. 17).
29
 
  I. ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES (FARM MODELS)
 Regulation No. 1/20 and 1/1 of the National Committee on Statistics and the MAF of 4
January 1995 requires the re-registration of all economic enterprises (beginning 1 February
1995) according to the following definitions:
 
u Private farm. Farm operations are performed by the labor of members of one family (no
farm-size limits specified).
u Peasant farm. No definition, though farm operations are presumably performed by the
labor of two or more families. Maximum farm size cannot exceed 30 hectares in zones of
high and average crop intensity or mountainous zones suitable to livestock grazing.
u Agricultural cooperative. No definition. Farm sizes must fall within the range of 30–100
hectares in zones of high and average cropping intensity and 50–150 hectares in
mountainous zones suitable for livestock grazing.
u Collective farm (kolkhoz). No definition. Farm sizes on collective (nonstate) property must
exceed 100 hectares in zones of high and average cropping intensity and 150 hectares in
mountainous zones suitable to livestock grazing.
u State farm (goskhoz). Activity based on state property. Farm sizes on state property must
exceed 100 hectares in zones of high and average cropping intensity and 150 hectares in
mountainous zones suitable for livestock grazing.
While these categories were reportedly designed to systematize the registration of new
farming enterprises, the lack of definitions is conducive to both improper application and
erroneous interpretation. A number of more important questions arise. Because these
economic “subjects” are to cover the re-registration of all enterprises in the KR, do the
                                               
 
28 Without formal survey linking land shares to land plots on the ground, shares would exist on paper
only. Land share transactions (like company stock) entail the transfer of ownership rights to the profit or
production of a PFE (along with duties of the holder), not the transfer of actual land.
 
29 In case of foreclosure, it would appear from SEC. 6 that the financial institution would have to give first
priority of sale or use to former members of the collective before outside interests. No enabling provision is
made for sale to the highest bidder, though that would act to enhance the collateral value of the certificate.23
indicated farm-size limits supersede the previous regulations indicated in table 2.1? Is there no
limit on private farms?
30 Is there no minimum limit on peasant farms?
J. LAND TAXATION
Presidential decree No. 42 of 22 February 1995 on Measures for Improvement of the Tax
System in Agriculture formalizes a new tax system for all agricultural land in the KR to have
taken effect on 1 March 1995. Tax rates are calculated according to the following formula:
TL  =  B  x  Pf   x  0.041  x  C  x  K1  x  K2  x  K3
where, TL is the land tax in som/ha, B is the mark of honitet of soil quality, Pf is the price of
one mark in grain units, C is the cost of one centnare of grain unit (wheat), 0.041 is the
coefficient that shows the part of tax from normative yield, and K1, K2, and K3 are correction
factors for remoteness (location of land plots), height above sea level (except hayfields and
pastures), and economic efficiency. Tax rates (som/ha) are given in table 2.2 and parameter
values by oblast used in calculating tax rates are provided in annex 2.2. The problems
presented by filling in the numbers in this abstractly attractive formula seem likely to be very
serious, especially in light of the critical impact tax rates will have on land values and even the
economic viability of farms.
TABLE 2.2 Rates of land tax in oblasts of KR (som/ha)
Arable
Republic Irrigated Non-irrigated Perennials Hay fields Pastures
Republic 142.7 30.8 229.6 11.1 3.0
Osh 229.1 21.1 213.3   9.7 3.1
Djalal-Abad 274.3 27.9 283.3 13.3 5.3
Issyk-Kul 130.4 58.2 210.6 18.5 3.9
Naryn   38.6 15.8 182.0   5.7 1.1
Talas 113.9 23.9 121.4   4.6 2.4
Chui 123.8 33.4 262.0 11.0 3.6
From 1 March 1995, taxes were suspended on profit, use of roads, and the payment of
funds for the prevention and resolution of emergencies for those economic subjects who are
producers of agricultural goods. Of the taxes collected from agricultural lands, 25 percent is to
go to the local budget and rural committees for social development and 75 percent to the
                                               
30 The absence of limits would seem to contradict the orders on land shares, which stipulate that any farm
enterprise with size limits exceeding the limits in Table 2.1 is to have the excess returned for redistribution.24




A. OWNERSHIP CONCEPTS AND INSTITUTIONS
Outside observers are struck by the difficulty of understanding Kyrgyz law and arriving at
answers to legal questions with authority and confidence. The whole point of land reform and
the transition to a market economy is to encourage individual actors to participate with
enthusiasm by assuring them that, if they do, the consequences will be rewarding and legally
predictable. The transition to a market economy is always difficult and uneven, so considerable
allowances must be tolerated in the development of a new property system. Yet, observers are
also struck by the degree to which lack of careful planning, perhaps in a hurried response to
implement reforms, has resulted in confusion in the field.
1. Legal clarity. Land reform cannot be smoothly accomplished unless the laws
affecting it are simple, clear, and accessible. Because land reform involves many changes for
many people, there is always a danger that it will become mired in doubt and confusion. It is
vital that the basic laws of reform be clearly stated so that at least the law itself can be
understood by all. Individual property ownership can flourish only under a constitution that
allocates power in a clear fashion among all levels and branches of government. In order for
confidence in the system to be maintained, disputes over landownership and disagreements
between owners and government agencies must be reviewable by truly independent courts.
2. Legal certainty. The basic principles of landownership must be agreed on for a
reform program to succeed. In this respect, ART. 4 of the Constitution is worrisome, for it
states that, though private ownership is recognized, all land belongs to the state. Other laws
and decrees are similarly phrased. It would be a mistake to gloss over the significance of doubt
on this central point. Assuming there is a complete commitment to thoroughgoing land
privatization, it is essential that all concerned understand this. If the commitment to the full
process is uncertain, then it is inevitable that everything that follows will be compromised and
ambiguous. This would likely ensure that land reform could never really succeed. There should
be no ambiguity on fundamental principles. A clearly supportive interpretation of the
Constitution and law by government and the courts is necessary.
 
3. Body of the law. The current array of code provisions, land laws and decrees, rules
and regulations issued by various government bodies is almost impenetrable. One is not sure
one is reading the applicable law, and one cannot be certain that the subject of one law or
                                               
31 ART. 31 of the draft land code stipulates that land tax receipts and revenues collected as compensation
for agricultural and forestry protection losses shall be used for purposes of financing measures for land
protection, soil fertility improvement, land engineering works, state land cadastre, land monitoring, land
protection and use, and construction and maintenance of roads and infrastructure.25
decree is not also covered elsewhere. Thus, there appear to be contradictions among the
Constitution, Civil Code, and draft Land Code respecting transfers of private land. It is argued
by some that such contradictions are allowable because the Civil Code and Land Act are both
in draft form. They are nonetheless being implemented, at least in principle; therefore, the legal
contradictions and economic restrictions in the law provide a very precarious basis. Outsiders
will have a greater problem in this respect than those who actually work within the system. On
the other hand, when trained lawyers cannot understand the basic law thoroughly, this should
be a warning sign for the many farmers and nonlaw-trained officials who will have to
administer the program. The problem can only get worse as more and more rules are enacted
as the reform process matures.
4. Constitutional structure. A part of the legal uncertainty in the KR stems from the
general newness of its democratic system. To some degree, this is not a solvable problem—the
Constitution will take decades to evolve into its more or less permanent form. It is appropriate
to point out, however, that land reform and private landownership as an institution depend on
a fixed and protective constitutional order. Security of tenure is the most fundamental feature
of landownership. To preserve that security, an independent judicial system is indispensable. So
is a viable legislature and a restrained executive as well as a clear demarcation of local and
national authority. These are all matters well beyond the scope of an evaluation of a specific
land reform effort; but, without them, the effort in the end may simply fail.
5. Private ownership. Land reform usually proceeds from the premise that the land
belongs to the people on it, not to larger groups, wealthy oligarchs, or governmental or
political bodies. There will always be various restrictions on ownership and use, and there will
be taxes and other obligations imposed on owners. However, the central assumption of
ownership is critical. Some of the basic law seems ambiguous on this point. Thus, ART. 4 of
the Constitution, ART. 148, SEC. 3, of the Civil Code, and ART. 2 of the draft Land Code are
disquieting. So are restrictions on who can own land, such as excluding foreigners (and foreign
corporations or corporations with partial foreign ownership); or exempting some categories of
valuable agricultural land from private control; or limiting the duration of ownership, especially
for so short a period as 49 years; or limiting the maximum or minimum size of privately held
plots; or authorizing complete forfeiture of landownership rights, without compensation, if the
owner has failed to meet the state’s expectations with respect to the use of his land; or limiting
strictly the use to which the owner can put his or her land, such as only “rational” use or only
agricultural use. The cumulative effect of these provisions could be very negative.
There are many burdens on ownership scattered throughout the law. When they become
too many, they may chill the desire for ownership. Generally, the original transfer of ownership
seems to be free, though Decree 632 of 22 August 1994 casts some doubt on this, for it
identifies an “initial cost,” set at 25 times the tax rate, for the right to use land (even if it adds
that this cost need not actually be levied at the time of the original transfer). More broadly,
there are potentially high, and progressive, land tax impositions, especially under the
27 February 1995 decree, which will be intimidating to many putative owners. There are also
severe environmental burdens, for example, under ART. 21, 69, 70, and 84 of the November26
1994 draft Land Code. Finally, new owners are made liable for 50 percent of the existing debt
of state farms, and 75 percent of the debt of collective farms. Given all the present difficulties
with financing, with obtaining agricultural machines and equipment, with transporting and
marketing produce, with weather risks, and all the burdens just noted, how eager will today’s
farmers be to become tomorrow’s owners?
With these issues in mind, a number of concrete recommendations (R) are offered.
R2.1 Some of the restrictions on ownership noted above need to be removed or moderated if
real private property is to succeed. There are too many limitations and obligations now in
place to be certain of long-range success in expanding private property ownership.
 
R2.2 Consistency and coherence are needed throughout the entire body of legislation and
regulations. Until such compatibility is achieved, there should be a pause in the rapid
pace of new orders, decrees, and other regulations that add to the ever-lengthening list
of restrictions and burdens imposed on new landowners.
 
R2.3 Create one, single Land Law that covers the entire field of ownership. When additions
are needed, they could be worked into the organization of this single draft (and any
provisions modified could be repealed and removed). A person trying to figure out what
the law is could then be confident that she or he had all of it in hand in a form that was
complete and automatically up-to-date.
 
R2.4 Put process rules in a separate but equally complete and up-to-date collection.
 
R2.5 Create a comprehensive “definitions section” with a single, universally applicable
definition for every esoteric term in the land law, so that all readers start with the same
understanding of the law.
 
R2.6 Spell out the hierarchy of authority to interpret and apply the Land Law as precisely as
possible. It is especially important that local officials, who may be bewildered by the
whole process of reform, know what their power is and what the limits on that power
may be. The same may be said for the courts.
 
R2.7 Publish an explanatory treatise describing in general terms the purpose and process of
land reform. Such a text would not be legally binding and could afford to be much
simpler, more straightforward, and more understandable than the official “law” itself.
This would help ensure that nonlawyers could work with the system and may be of great
help to lawyers, judges, and government officials as well.
6. Expanded ownership concepts. The long-term development of private property
ownership would be enhanced if a whole variety of ownership interests was recognized.
Restricting ownership to the life of an owner, for example, can impede development
possibilities and slow the transfer of property. It took centuries for sophisticated notions of27
future property rights, concepts of joint and common tenancy, condominium and cooperative
ownership schemes, and ideas of ownership in trust for the benefit of others to develop in the
West. The KR might be able to accomplish similar legislation with the stroke of a pen.
7. Land registration. It is vital that a comprehensive system of land and title
registration be set up and locally administered. Individual ownership of land usually connotes
that an owner has “title” to the property. Title ownership carries certain obligations, such as
the duty to pay taxes on the land. The principal attribute of title is that it is freely transferable
to others. In most systems recognizing individual ownership, title is transferred by delivery of a
formal deed to the property. However, before parting with the purchase price for the deed,
most buyers want to know with certainty that the seller actually owns it and that the property
is without encumbrances. The principal function of title registration is to provide proof of the
owner’s interest in the property to the satisfaction of buyers, lessees, mortgagees, and others.
The method of registration is easy enough—all transactions respecting the property (or
respecting the owner of the property) are officially recorded and kept at a locally accessible
place, so they can be checked before any future commitments are made. In addition:
R2.8 Registration should be local, because most buyers, lenders, and others interested in the
title status of the property will be local themselves. Central registration by the state, as
called for in ART. 15, may serve as a useful backup but should never be relied on as the
sole place of registration.
 
R2.9 Registration forms, including deeds, mortgages, and evidence of title, should be
uniform throughout the country, but they should be kept as simple as possible, so local
registrars will be able to tell easily whether documents are recordable. (It is not obvious
that the formality of notarization should be required, as in ART. 14 and 26 of the 1994
Land Code). Buyers, lenders, and others should be able quickly to review all the
recorded documents respecting the property or the owner.
 
R2.10 Buyers, lenders, and others who rely on the recorded status of property should be
protected against unrecorded and unrevealed interests. It is not necessary in the first
years of the farm reorganization program to have a complete system of registration in
place, because the original title from the government to the first private owner will be
relatively certain. As time passes, however, it will become vital that a thorough and
efficient system be implemented.
B. OTHER PERIPHERAL LEGAL ISSUES
There are several other peripheral areas of law that will need attention before the process of
land reform can be complete.
1. Water rights. Water rights law will be vital to the growth of a private property
system on land, whether agricultural, residential, or commercial. Some water rights legislation
has been adopted but consideration might be given to basic institutions respecting the28
ownership of water. To the extent that ownership is allowed to private persons, riparian,
appropriation, reasonable-use systems, or other forms of ownership are possible. Cooperative
ownership and shared ownership with the public may also be important, particularly respecting
existing and future irrigation supplies. At some point, it will probably be necessary to spell out
ownership of ground water.
2. Common pasture. It is important to spell out precisely what pasture rights may
attend landownership, particularly respecting seasonal common pasture grounds. Because
private landowners will have different pasturing incentives than the former public owners, a
new sort of environmental control may be necessary to prevent overgrazing.
3. Land finance. Private ownership of land depends on the availability of financing,
both for the purchase of the land and for operations on it. It will not be possible suddenly to
create a full-blown system of private and public finance; however, early legal institutions
should anticipate and facilitate the growth of such a system. In addition, thought should be
given to the terms of mortgages and other financing arrangements, including the precise
dimensions of the security interest of a lender. Consideration should be given to owner-
borrowers, too, respecting their tenure security. Thus, they should be given an opportunity to
cure missed payments and given careful protection at any sale of their property forced by
creditors. It might be advisable to provide special protection for the spouses and families of
owners through homestead exemption laws and possibly even through marital property laws.
Clear legal rules are also needed respecting financing arrangements for personal property,
particularly for implements used in agricultural production. Laws should be in place not just to
protect the security of lenders in such circumstances but also to facilitate co-ownership of farm
implements by private owners or by private and public owners.
4.  Easements. In addition to the array of property interests suggested above, easements
can be a useful property device. (So can negative easements, or private restrictive covenants
on the land.) In particular, if large public estates are broken up, it might be important to
recognize an automatic easement of necessity to ensure access to interior plots.
5. Takings. A carefully constructed law of eminent domain is another basic requirement
of a successful private property system. All societies recognize the need for some public
regulation and control over private land, but it is equally obvious that untrammeled public
authority to take over private land without paying for it will seriously undermine any
ownership system. The United States is currently in the midst of a profound national debate on
questions of where to draw the line between a “taking” and a mere “regulation.” A lot of
trouble and confusion might be avoided if an attempt is made now to set rough guidelines on
this issue through legislation. It would be important also to specify firmly that under no
circumstances can private property be taken at all, even if compensation is offered for the
taking, unless it is for a “public” purpose—that is, once privatized, a plot cannot be reallocated
to a different private owner. (ART. 22 and 23 of the Land Code are reassuring on this point. It
is not clear, however, that land can be taken only for public use, and the compensation
sometimes contemplated—the provision of an “equally valuable” land plot to the dispossessed29
owner—may not always be adequate. Also no provision is made for re-reimbursement of an
owner’s legal and other transactions costs that may attend a contested taking.) Above all,
however, the easy forfeiture provisions of Chapter VIII, ART. 34–39 of the present draft Land
Code should be reconsidered.
6. Adverse possession. Particularly for the first several years or more after the
introduction of a private property system, there may be inevitable confusion about the
ownership of some land. This is likely even if a comprehensive record scheme is instituted. A
partial antidote for some of this confusion might be to codify rules respecting adverse
possession. In light of a desire to ensure that private owners use their property rather than
merely speculate on it, it might make sense to allow a short adverse use period (ten or even
five years) to be sufficient as against newly endowed property owners.
7. Nuisance law. In a similar vein, it might be helpful if a basic nuisance law were
enacted. It is not likely that nuisance laws will ever be a complete substitute for full regulatory
environmental protection, but there are instances when they can serve a valuable role in solving
disputes over land use. If the principles of nuisance law were recognized, this might obviate, or
at least diminish, the necessity for some of the drastic remedies suggested in the draft Land
Code for environmental misdeeds. (These remedies include heavy fines in ART. 84 and, as
noted, possible land confiscation under ART. 34.)
In summary, the follow specific recommendations are proposed:
R2.11 Publish comprehensive laws respecting easements (especially easements of necessity
for interior plots created upon original land distribution); respecting negative easements
or private restrictive covenants on land use; respecting intestate succession of land and
other property and the rules for bequeathing the same, including possible protections
for spouses and other members of landowners’ families; respecting water rights;
respecting common pasture rights; and respecting the ownership of natural resources
below the land surface.
 
R2.12 Distribute rules facilitating the availability of credit, with or without government
guarantees or assistance. Here will be needed laws respecting the conditions of lending;
of the security lenders can count on, and of the protections against forfeiture and ruin
that borrowers can rely on.
 




Law has many implications for economic behavior, the agrarian structure that emerges in the
agricultural sector, and resource use. The following comments relate to some of the possible
economic consequences of the land reform process to date, with particular reference to the
draft Land Code. Eleven areas of the law are considered.
1. Lease conditions. According to the draft Land Code, land rights are segregated into
common land use, which may be granted to all legal and physical persons, and special land use,
which includes the right of life inheritance (permanent or temporary) and must be confirmed by
a state act or certificate confirming the lease agreement (ART. 5). Land plots held by the state
by lease for special land use have wide flexibility (ART. 6.1), but the duration of rights is
limited. Land granted for permanent use (no fixed term of lease) would be granted to state,
cooperatives, public enterprises, joint-ventures, and other such legal entities (ART. 6.2). Land
for temporary use may be short-term (up to five years) and long-term (up to 49 years) to
citizens (and foreign legal persons) who hold land shares for farming. Terms may be extended
by the granting body but prolongation cannot exceed the earlier fixed term (ART. 6.3 and 6.4).
These provisions raise a number of concerns and recommendations:
R2.14 Offering unlimited term leases to cooperatives and joint ventures will end to bias
landownership in agriculture to cooperative forms of management, contradictory to
intended aims of stimulating peasant farm expansion. The distinction between
permanent and temporary leases should be either eliminated or made clear that
permanent leases apply to public institutions only.
 
R2.15 There appears to be little justification for the distinction between short- and long-term
leases. The leasehold policy requires government to become a landlord and to bear the
costs of negotiating and monitoring contracts. Such costs may be acceptable for long-
term leases in which the turnover is low, but, as indicated in chapter 5, rural
committees are renting out land from the NLF on the basis of annual rentals.
Considering international experience, such leasing policies will ultimately result in
excessive management costs. It is thus advised that government redistribute all public
lands as long-term leaseholds or freeholds as soon as possible; by placing land in the
hands of individual landholders, it essentially will be transferring annual leasing
functions to the private sector.
 
R2.16 The fact that renewals cannot exceed the original lease term is overly restrictive
(especially if the registry is trapped into 5-year leases). As discussed below, the term of
49 years is probably restrictive for most long-term investments.
                                               
32 This section draws heavily on the 1994 draft Land Code of the KR. While not promulgated, its content
fairly well reflects the current policy position of the government of the KR.31
2. Philosophy of property ownership. State issuance of long-term usufruct through
leaseholds is the hallmark of land policy in many countries where state ownership is strongly
endorsed. In contrast, the hallmark land policy in a private market system is the ability and
capacity to hold, freely transfer, and use property in freehold, supported by constitutional
guarantees. In such a system, the state collects necessary revenues from taxes levied on land,
income, and other sources rather than collecting revenues for “rent.” Excessive land
concentration is controlled by making landholders pay proportionally higher taxes per unit of
land area as total farm size increases. This essential distinction is blurred under the present
Constitution and other laws of the KR. New constitutional amendments under consideration
which permit private ownership of land and property would permit development of a freehold
system that, if adopted, could allow government to focus its work on truly public functions of
land registration, taxation, and regulation, while allowing the private sector greater autonomy
and responsibility for land rentals. Experience from around the world continues to show that
leasehold systems (especially systems where government simultaneously leases and taxes the
land, controls transfers, and enforces onerous land use regulations) are expensive to maintain.
Inevitably such governments either are unable to bear the costs of the system or fail the task of
efficiently managing the land. Government’s reluctance to fully divest itself of land
management functions is perhaps understandable given the former history of centralized
planning; yet there is concern that government will not be able to bear all the costs of land
management that it has set for itself.
3. Lease duration. The current term of 49 years, while suitable for some land-use
decisions, is not adequate for longer-term investments such as the construction of buildings or
the installation of irrigation facilities. Nor does it respond to farmer concerns about the ability
to bequeath land to spouse and children.
R2.17 If new constitutional amendments permitting private property are passed, government
should consider adopting a freehold system to reduce costs and to allow greater focus
on other critical areas of regulation and taxation.
 
R2.18 If it is not possible to establish freehold ownership, two steps would help alleviate
some of the problems caused by the 49-year term: (a) the term should be lengthened to
99 years or longer; and (b) the lease should be made automatically (even perpetually)
renewable or renewable on the written request of the landowner.
The objective is to make it difficult or impossible for the government to take back the land
except for purposes of justified eminent domain. While land-use regulations stipulating
minimum safeguards against environmental protection are justified, any such controls
stipulating minimum levels of land-use efficiency will be impossible for the government to
monitor or enforce in the courts over the longer term and will further risk undermining the land
price and security of use rights.
4. Mortgages and land price. As long as renewability is in doubt, leases make poor
instruments to support mortgages. The key measure of land value, the negotiated price that the32
buyer is willing to pay and the seller is willing to accept to part with the land parcel, is
complicated if there is any risk that government can appropriate the land after the lease term or
earlier or if land market restrictions significantly impede or increase the costs of land transfers.
The price a buyer would pay for the land would naturally decline as the 49-year term was used
up, creating the opportunity for severe dislocations in the land price and tenure insecurity.
Procedures used by government to reallocate land also need to be carefully studied. If no
purchase price is charged, the landholder has an incentive to seek credit then abscond with
funds at little or no cost. The mortgage value of property will be very much in doubt.
5. Termination of leases. Under the draft Land Code, it is relatively easy for owners to
lose property altogether, if they do not use the land for agriculture (ART. 3). They may also be
fined if the land is not “rationally” used (SEC. 5 of ART. 84). Environmental obligations are
also heavy. This could chill the incentive to become an owner; it could also dampen the
enthusiasm of lenders to extend credit to new owners desperately in need of financing to help
pay for land acquisition costs, rental obligations, taxes, machinery, seed, and the myriad other
expenses likely to beset them as agricultural entrepreneurs.
6. Land use rights. In some respects, the draft Land Code is suitably expansive.
Owners may independently farm the land; utilize mineral, water, and natural resources for
farming operations; make ponds, water reservoirs, and irrigation structures; alienate the
property or exchange it for another plot; mortgage the land; lease it; use it to form shareholder
societies, partnerships, and cooperatives; and bequeath it (ART. 20). But the draft Land Code
is also restrictive. For example, an owner must restore, even improve, soil fertility and protect
against plant diseases, weeds, bushes, and other pests; must undertake timely crop rotation;
and must protect against all sorts of erosion and pollution (ART. 21, SEC. 1, and ART. 70 and
71).
33 Some of these provisions substitute the judgment of government for that of the owner as
to how best to use the land, thus undermining one of the strongest economic reasons for
moving to a market system. Unless the costs for such obligations are borne by the public, they
could prove impossibly heavy for new owners.
7. Land categorization. ARTICLE 4 of the draft Land Code specifies seven allowable
land-use categories—agricultural purpose land, municipal land, other nonagricultural land,
special or protected territories, forestry fund land, water fund land, and land reserve (including
the national and special funds and the land redistribution fund) (SEC. 1). SECTION 2, stating
that these lands shall be used in accordance with their approved purpose, and that transfers
from one category to another shall be done in accordance with land-use plans approved by
government bodies, risks imposing onerous costs on landholders and undermining the
fundamental principles of private landownership. It will become difficult for government to
enforce land use as small enterprises increase in number. In the case of fund land, it is doubtful
                                               
33 Under ART. 70, the land user or lessee is required to restore and improve soil fertility, protect the land
against erosion and pollution of all types, protect the land from plant diseases, weeds, bushes, and pests,
recultivate and restore spoiled lands, undertake timely crop rotation, and conserve the topsoil during
construction works. Allowable limits for concentration of chemicals, bacteria, parasites, radioactive substances,
and other harmful elements are to be spelled out in the regulations (ART. 71).33
whether lessors have adequate land rights to make improvements; moreover, state control over
leasing and reallocating land is perpetuated.
8. Land use restrictions (breach of lease). Rights to land may be terminated when land
is not used according to its intended purpose, when breaches are not corrected in the
designated time frame, and when more than 50 percent of agricultural land stays unused for
three years (ART. 34). Furthermore, for agricultural land not used for its intended purpose for
more than one year, the local self-governing body, after fining the user, may demand that the
plot be leased out for up to five years to any person it recommends (ART. 39). Such
restrictions appear excessive in two regards. First, the distinction between acceptable and
unacceptable land use is not always clear (for example, fallow versus idle land). Second, in the
case of residential and commercial property, the landholder’s sizable investment in property is
at risk of being undermined by acts beyond the owner’s control—economic downturn,
oversupply of residential and office space, and so forth. Both of these provisions are difficult to
discern and enforce in a court of law and will require substantial enforcement costs. Yet land
engineering in ART. 76 of the draft Land Code clearly has land-use enforcement in mind:
rational land use is to be planned in all sections of the economy, land used according to its
approved purpose is to be insured, and measures for cultivating new and existing lands are to
be designed (SEC. 2). Such planning by administrators runs the risk of increasing demands on
the state budget for enforcement, while obstructing land transfers to the highest and best value
by administrators who make wrong decisions or fail to approve conversions in a timely fashion.
R2.19 The numerous references to land-use controls and state planning throughout the draft
Land Law strongly reflect the continuance of a centralized planning mentality in
government agencies dealing with land. The many tasks established for land
engineering should be substantially toned down and financial programs created to
provide farmers with incentives to carry out appropriate conservation and land-use
measures. The restrictions on private land use and ownership rights are substantial.
Many if not most of the land-use restrictions under which leases may be revoked should
be eliminated. Finally, government should carefully consider tax policy and land market
policy as alternatives to regulatory controls in encouraging efficient land use.
 
R2.20 Land in agriculture will decline in value as the uncertainty over lease renewal increases
or as land-use restrictions become more onerous. Government is advised to keep land
restrictions to a minimum and to make leases revocable only under exceptional
circumstances.
 
R2.21 A clear termination date for permanently redistributing land in the NLF should be set,
after which remaining land should be auctioned off or distributed to disadvantaged
populations. Clear guidelines should be set and widely advertised for distributing such
land, particularly to people living outside the domain of the rural committee. In order to
handle the possibility that demand far exceeds the supply of land available, the
government will wish to set minimum qualifications for bids and may also wish to give34
priority to resident households.
34 While the date for termination of the land fund is
debatable, a three-to-five-year time horizon would seem appropriate.
 
R2.22 Land shares may be initially assigned to individuals with or without a price attached.
Current policy calling for the land cost to be 25 times the existing tax rate seems
excessive given the present high rate of inflation, high nominal interest rates, and the
fact that many farmers in rural areas consider tax rates excessive compared with their
currently depressed levels of farm profitability. There are several policy options: (1)
lower tax rates in rural areas; (2) lower the land cost from the current factor of 25 to a
more appropriate level (7–15)
35; or (3) redistribute any landholdings after the initial
distributions by auction to allow prices to be set by the land market.
 
R2.23 Any future redistributions of land after the initial apportioning of land shares should be
sold to land acquirers either at prices determined in auctions or by other appropriate
assessments.
9. Maximum and minimum size limits. Maximum limits on farm size, while perhaps
necessary for encouraging the breakup of the former state and collective farms and for long-
run equity concerns, may also discourage the most efficient farms from reaching their optimum
size. This optimum will vary from farmer to farmer and is dependent on which crops are
grown. (A vegetable or poultry farm might fit within current limits, but a wheat or cattle farm
probably would not.) Further, scale efficiency is dynamic; optimal farm size will vary upward
and downward in response to market prices, changes in technology, and the income gap
between rural and urban employment. The ability of government to monitor and change
maximum size limits flexibly to meet such factors is doubtful.
There are no evident benefits to a minimum farm size. The reasons most frequently used to
justify such minimum limits—lumpy inputs (such as buildings and tractor fleets) or minimizing
demands on land registration systems—can be otherwise dealt with through alternative policies
(through equipment rental services or shared ownership of equipment, for example; or through
group land registrations). Meanwhile, the costs of limiting minimum size are considerable: they
limit the ability of households to freely dispose of land, they reduce the number of potential
land buyers,
 and they force the consolidation of multiple households into peasant farm
                                               
 
34 As seen in chapter 5, many heads of rural committees and many heads of farm enterprises report an
excess supply of labor. Demand for labor on newly formed farms will increase with improvements in land-use
intensity and the substitution of labor for capital-intensive technology. Yet as land market restrictions ease, the
demand of individual families for land will probably increase as well; those demands will be revealed first and
foremost in the bidding for annual land rentals and applications for leases of NLF.
 
35 A number of methods exist for determining the land value: (1) pegging value to market price; (2)
carrying out auctions in different localities of the country and pegging the land value to prices set by the
auction rate; (3) using replacement value of investments in the land; or (4) determining land profitability
adjusted by the real cost of capital. The mortgage value of land will vary inversely with nominal interest rates.
Hence, any factor used to convert tax rates into the land prices should be adjusted semi-annually or annually
depending on interest rate fluctuations.35
enterprises when smaller farms might be easier to manage.
36 Government’s relaxation of the
minimum when the situation commands, as recently happened in Osh oblast, reinforces the
perception of government as whimsical, imposing policy ad-hoc.
10. Taxes. It is often possible to achieve desired economic goals more smoothly through
carefully tailored tax incentives than by direct command and control regulation. Thus, the
government’s concern about equity and the prevention of fragmentation could be handled by a
well-designed tax system. If such system were made progressive, based on farm size and land
value (pegged to market prices or a simple land-quality index), this would inhibit speculation
without greatly interfering with an owner’s aspirations about the land. If the experience of
other countries is a useful guide, however, the tax system should not be too complex. It is
possible that the tax rates based on soil quality and market factors of 27 February 1995 Decree
on Land Taxation are too complex to enforce at the peasant farm level and will not adequately
capture changes in land price from urban and commercial uses in the longer term. Ideally, the
tax system ought to be based on tax rates carefully calculated from projected rayon
expenditures and a tax based on land market values pegged to real estate prices. Unfortunately,
price formation in the land market is weak, and it is unlikely that such a system will be possible
for years to come.
11. Debt. The state’s shifting of past debts of collectives and state farms risks becoming a
significant constraint to the development of newly formed enterprises, whether private farms,
peasant farms, or agricultural cooperatives. Even with a two-year grace period, such a policy is
bound to be counterproductive in initiating private enterprise, particularly given the current
agricultural crisis and given that much of the debt will not be seen by the farmers as of their
making. Some debts were due to outstanding “accounts receivable,” if the former state or
collective farm was not paid for its sales before the old system broke down. Other debt was
created by mismanagement or extravagance on the part of the old farms’ managers, who may
or may not be members of the new enterprises. The consequences of starting out in debt are
serious. The new enterprises will thereby be made less creditworthy at precisely the time of
their greatest financial need. Banks will be reluctant enough to lend to farmers on the security
of 49-year leases; added debt obligations of the farmers will only increase this reluctance. It
might thus be both unjust and unfortunate to saddle the new enterprises with this debt—
enough so, possibly, as to seriously threaten the pace of reform. It is clear that more thought
needs to be given to this difficult problem, for the government does not have the resources to
pay the debts either.
R2.24 It is extremely doubtful whether government can regulate size controls without
creating land-use inefficiency. Minimum farm-size limits should be eliminated for all
categories of farming operation (one exception may be minimum lot sizes in urban
areas.)
 
                                               
36 See, for example, ART. 45 (draft Land Law) which states that when the right to an agricultural use plot
is inherited by several heirs, the plot cannot be subdivided if any subdivision is smaller in size than minimal
plot sizes established by law; in such cases it is to be inherited as common property.36
R2.25 Maximum limits on farm size do not appear to be a serious concern of rural farms at
present, but, because of the dynamics of scale economies, problems could emerge in the
future. It is thus advised that the maximum farm-size limits be increased (perhaps by 50
percent)
37 to ensure they do not overly constrain farm profitability (they will
nonetheless control for excessive land accumulation). However, such ceilings should
have a well-defined termination date (5 years) or their termination made contingent on
a careful review of the land market’s performance in valuing land and property and the
progress being made in implementing a progressively based land-tax system.
 
R2.26 If the government wishes to proceed with the current plan of assigning debt to newly
formed enterprises, then it should make sure that the interest rate assigned is
sufficiently low so as not to seriously compromise farm profitability and that the grace
period is long enough to endeavor enterprises and reforms to get off to a healthy start.
 
R2.27 Tax values in most market economies are determined by tax rates applied to market
value of property. Because property assessments are made difficult by lack of price
formation in the real estate market, the KR government has designed a system based on
land productivity and soil quality indicators, adjusted for market location. The tax
formula as now designed is probably more complex than is needed but probably can be
adapted to local areas if rayon administrations are granted flexibility. However, rayon
governments rather than national government should determine the tax rates in
accordance with local conditions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Overall, the policies formulated by the government over the past year have greatly improved
the chance for successful land and agrarian reform, but improvements are needed. The first,
and most obvious, is that several of the restrictions on ownership noted above will need to be
removed, or at least moderated, if real property privatization is to succeed. There are too many
limitations and obligations now in place to be certain of long-range success.
Second, some of the subsidiary law suggested above should be developed and, after
careful review, integrated into the basic, central Land Code. In particular, it is critical that a
comprehensive, locally based, land registration system be set up. There should also be prompt
consideration of development of the law in such areas as co-ownership, condominium, leasing,
and credit security.
What may most be needed now is consistency and coherence in the whole program. By
now farms and government officials are equally uncertain of which decrees and rules apply, in
which order to implement them, and how long their provisions will remain unchanged. It is
thus possible that a thorough assessment of the program should be undertaken and a mid-
                                               
 
37 Actual maximums should be determined by rigorous research on farm- size efficiency.37
course evaluation made. In the meantime, it might be appropriate for there to be a pause in the
rapid pace of new, sometimes seemingly ad hoc administrative regulation, so that government
and the public can become familiar with the program. All the basic institutions of
landownership should be thoroughly and confidently in place as the program proceeds toward
implementation.38
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28 May 1987 Decree No. 307 of the Central Committee of the KCP and
Council of KSSR Ministers, On Measures for Increasing
Pasture Productivity
yes
2 Feb. 1991 Law on Peasant Farms  yes yes
19 Apr. 1991 Changes and Additions to the Law of KR on Peasant Farms yes yes
6 Feb. 1991 Law of KR on Enterprises in Republic of Kyrgyzstan yes
19 Apr. 1991 Law of KR, On The Land Reform. yes yes
1 June 1991 Land Code yes
6 July 1991 On Ratification of the Regulations, Terms and Procedures
(Decree No. 268 of the Cabinet of Ministers) for Droving
Livestock on the Territory of the KR
yes
31 Aug. 1991 Law of KR on Changes and Additions to the Land Code of
the Republic of Kyrgyzstan
yes yes
19 Apr. 1991 Law of KR on Land Reform yes yes
19 Apr. 1991 Decree of the President of KR on Measures for
Implementation of the Land Reform in the KR
6 July 1991 Regulations, Terms and Procedures for Droving Livestock
on the Territory of the KR, Decree No. 268
yes
10 Nov. 1991 Presidential Decree, On Emergency Measures for Ensuring
Realization of KR Laws Regulating Land and Other
Relations in Agriculture
yes yes
10 Dec. 1992 Decree of the President of KR, On Measures for Continuing
Implementation of Land and Agrarian Reform in the KR
yes yes
5 May 1993 Constitution of the KR, Adopted at the 12th Session of the
Supreme Soviet of the Kyrgyz Republic
yes yes
n.d. Regulations Governing the Provision and Use of Close and
Distant Pastures in the KR
yes39
24 Jan. 1994 Decree No. 30 of the Prime Minister, On Production
Stimulation and Agricultural Product Sales in 1994
yes
10 Feb. 1994 Presidential Decree, On Emergency Measures for
Strengthening State and Financial Discipline
yes
22 Feb. 1994 Presidential Decree, On Measures for Enhancement of the
Land and Agrarian Reform in the KR
yes yes
4 May 1994 Regulation on Order of Water Resource Distribution and
Exploitation of Economy Net of Water Users, No. 284, and
attached rules
yes yes
8 June 1994 Ministry of Justice, Charter of the Agrarian Alliance yes
19 Aug. 1994 Draft Land Code of the Kyrgyz Republic yes
22 Aug. 1994 Rule on Implementation of Land and Agrarian Reform,
No. 632
yes yes
22 Aug. 1994 Rule on Reorganization of Agricultural Enterprises,
No. 632
yes yes
22 Aug. 1994 Rule on Order of Finding Out the Land Share of Citizens
and Giving Certificate of Land Use, No. 632
yes yes
4 Oct. 1994 On Adoption of the List of Seed and Pedigree Agricultural
Enterprises of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan., No. 745
yes
4 Nov. 1994 Memo from the Rural Development Institute (Prosterman
and Rolfes) to Minister Talgarbekov of Agriculture and
Food on Vital Issues Affecting Agrarian Reform in KR
23 Nov. 1994 President Akaev’s Speech at the Meeting of Heads of Local
Self-Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan
yes yes
Nov. 1994 Draft Land Code of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan yes
7 Dec. 1994 Proposals on Changes and Additions to Constitution of the
Republic of Kyrgyzstan
yes yes
6 Jan. 1995 Program of Land and Agrarian Reform for the KR for
1995–1996, No. 5
yes
-- 22 Feb. 1994, On Measures for Enhancement of the
    Land and Agrarian Reform in the KR
yes yes
-- 25 Mar. 1994, No. 743, Regulation of KR on Top
    Priority Measures for Enhancement of Land and
yes yes40
    Agrarian Reform in the KR
-- 25 Mar. 1994, No. 148, Rule on Rural Committees for
    Land and Agrarian Reform in the KR
yes yes
-- 19 May 1994, No. 345, Regulation on Adoption of Rule
    of National Fund
yes yes
-- 19 Mar. 1994, No. 345. Rule on NLF yes yes
-- 22 Aug. 1994, No. 632, Rule on Implementation of Land
    and Agrarian Reform
yes yes
-- 22 Aug. 1994, No. 632, Rule on Reorganization of
    Agricultural Enterprises
yes yes
-- 22 Aug. 1994, No. 632, Rule on Order of Finding Out
   the Land share of Citizens and Giving Certificate of Land
    Use
yes yes
-- 4 Jan. 1995, No. 1/20 and 1/1, Regulation of the Board
    of National Committee on Statistics and the Board of the
   MOAF of KR, On Re-Registration of Economic Subjects
    in Agriculture.
yes yes
-- 4 Jan. 1995, Attachment to No. 1/20 and 1/1, Criteria
    for Finding Out Names of Economic Subjects in
    Agriculture.
yes yes
-- 23 Jan. 1995, No. 3, Regulation of the Management of
    Land and Agrarian Reform within the Ministry of
    Agriculture and Food of KR, On Commission for
    Implementation of Land Reform and Reorganization of
    Agricultural Enterprises
yes yes
 -- 23 Jan. 1995, Attachment to No. 3, Rule on
    Commission for Implementation of Land Reform and
    Reorganization of Agricultural Enterprises.
yes yes
 -- 25 Jan. 1995, No. 4, (no name). yes
 -- 26 Jan. 1995. No. 5, Rule on Reorganization of Seed,
     Pedigree, and Experimental Enterprises of KR
yes
 -- 8 Feb. 1995, No. 7, Regulation on Management of Land
     and Agrarian Reform with the MOAF of KR on
     NLF.
yes yes
 -- 16 Feb. 1995, No. 42, Regulation of KR, On Debts of
     Reorganized State and Collective Farms.
yes yes
18 Jan. 1995 Memo from Rural Development Institute (Prosterman,
Rolfes, Hanstad, and Mitchell) to Talgarbekov,
Oskonbaev, Kasimov, and Dorosh; Comments on the Draft
Land Code of KR
yes
22 Feb. 1995 Decree of the President of KR, On Measures for
Improvement of the Tax System in Agriculture, No. 42.
yes yes41
ANNEX 2.2
PARAMETERS FOR ESTIMATING THE LAND TAX
Table A2.1: Mark of honitet of soil and use rate of land tax
Mark of soil Rate of tax (som/ha)
honitet Tillage (field)
Irrigated Nonirrigated Perennials Hay fields
0-20 90 42 353 19
21-30 91-136 43-64 354-530 20-30
31-40 137-183 65-75 531-707 31-41
41-50 184-228 86-106 708-884 51-60
51-60 229-274 107-128 885-1,060 52-62
61-70 275-320 129-149 1,061-1,237 63-72
71-80 321-365 150-172 1,238-1,414 73-82
81-90 366-410 173-193 1,415-1,591 83-93
91-100 411-458 194-214 1,592-1,768 94-105
Table A2.2: Correction coefficients to rate of land tax to tillage
On the location of plot (K1) On height above sea level (K2)
Destination to
market (km)







0-20 1.00 0.95 0-1,000 1.00
21-40 0.95 0.90 1,000-1,500 0.90
41-60 0.90 0.85 1,501-2,000 0.80
61-80 0.85 0.80 2,001-2,500 0.70
81-100 0.80 0.75 2,501-3,000 0.60
101-120 0.75 0.70 3,001 0.50
121-140 0.70 0.65
141 0.65 0.60
Table A2.3: Correction factors of economic efficiency at oblasts according to types
of agricultural land usage
Tillage
Republic/oblast Irrigated Nonirrigated Perennials Hay fields Pastures
Republic 1.56 0.81 0.67 0.44 0.45
   Osh 2.49 0.58 0.57 0.37 0.42
   Jalal-Abad 2.65 0.84 0.54 0.51 0.53
   Issyk-kul 1.47 1.12 0.77 0.66 0.57
   Naryn 0.71 0.79 - 0.27 0.28
   Talas 1.28 0.56 0.40 0.25 0.38
   Chui 1.15 0.85 0. 0.49 0.48Chapter 3
AGRARIAN STRUCTURE
by
James Delehanty and Katie Rasmussen
I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the organization of agricultural production in the Kyrgyz Republic (KR)
before and during the land reforms of 1991–1995. It has been compiled using statistics from
the Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF), the State Statistical Committee, the State
Institute for Land Resources and Land Engineering, and Land Tenure Center (LTC) research.
1
The main intent of this chapter is to document the effects on agrarian structure of the legal
evolution described in chapter 2.
II. AGRARIAN STRUCTURE BEFORE 1991
A. LAND USE AND PRODUCTION
Agriculture was the Kyrgyz Republic’s leading sector during the late Soviet period, generating
half of the republic’s exports and one-third of its GNP. Livestock and livestock products,
especially meat, dairy products, and wool, were the major outputs, accounting for 60 percent
of the gross value of agricultural goods. The importance of the livestock sector is reflected in
land-use statistics: 45 percent of the land area of Kyrgyz Republic—9 million hectares—was
classified as pasture. Eight percent was arable, 5 percent was forest, and 33 percent was
classified as unused or unusable (mainly mountain) land (table 3.1).
                                               
1 The chapter is based primarily on official statistics, with results of LTC farm-level research used to fill
data gaps. As noted in chapter 1, official documentation of farm reorganization is not adequate to allow easy
assessment of the pace of change, nationally or regionally. Reasons for the data problems that the KR has
inadvertently created are discussed in chapter 4. We have tried to be careful in our descriptions of enterprise
types and our use of various official typologies. Others contemplating use of official land reform data are
warned that the material is initially confusing. Faulty conclusions are easily drawn from incorrect inferences
about what one or another agency means at any given time by concepts such as peasant farm, association of
peasant farms, or reorganized enterprise. Despite these difficulties, we wish to show that it is possible to
draw useful, judicious interpretations from the official data.44
TABLE 3.1   Land use in the KR (000 ha)
Land category (thousands of ha. in:) 1 January 1991 1 January 1995
Annual crops 1,295.7 1,297.7




Land around houses 97.6 151.0
Collective gardens 4.4 4.4
Collective orchards 2.0 8.2
Land under amelioration and fertility restoration 6.7 13.6
Forest 1,123.3 1,042.0
Scrub and brush area
a 106.5 454.8
Swamps 8.6 6.2
Land covered by water bodies
b 867.3 874.7
Land under roads and livestock paths 121.9 113.2
Streets, public squares, and yards 49.6 62.3





Total area 19,994.9 19,994.4
a. Includes area not considered part of State Forest Fund, shelterbelts, other protective
vegetation, other protected areas, and scrub and brush growing on land designated as
agricultural land.
b. Includes land under rivers, streams, seas, lakes, reservoirs, ponds, artificial water bodies,
canals, collectors, and drainage arteries.
c. Includes land under exploration for “useful materials,” under torforazrabotkax, and under
construction sites and other such structures.
d. Includes sands, ovragov, glaciers, other unused land, cliffs, and osiypi.
SOURCE: State Inspectorate on Land Resources and Engineering
Major food- and feed-grains, in order of sown area, were spring barley, winter wheat,
maize, winter barley, and spring wheat. Nearly all grain production was irrigated. Other
important annual crops included potatoes, vegetables, and sugar beets. Hayfields constituted
approximately 15 percent of cropland. In the more temperate southwest, industrial and
horticultural crops dominated production, especially cotton and tobacco, but also fruits,
vegetables, and nuts (table 3.2).45
TABLE 3.2   Sown area in the KR, 1990–1994 (000 ha)
Crop 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Grains, total 537.4 556.5 576.5 623.8 585.6
   of which:  wheat 193.6 193.6 248.4 338.3 333.1
                   barley 266.4 290.1 263.5 235.5 206.7
                   maize 65.7 62.3 54.7 40.7 36.6
                   rice 1.2 1.8 1.9 2.5 3.0
Cotton fiber 29.7 25.9 21.5 20.3 26.5
Sugarbeets 0.1 0.8 6.3 11.7 9.8
Tobacco 19.1 19.9 20.8 22.2 18.9
Potatoes 25.2 22.5 27.2 26.6 34.2
Vegetables 20.7 19.5 22.2 14.9 22.4
Berries 47.7 46.6 46.6 44.1 48.5
Grapes 9.2 8.9 8.4 8.1 8.4
Feed crops, total 641.4 620 575.6 519.2 515.8
   of which: hay 188.5 185.6 188.6 183.8 200.0
                 green fodder 156.5 159.8 150.9 135.5 117.5
Total for major crops 1,330.5 1,320.6 1,305.1 1,290.9 1,270.1
SOURCE: State Statistical Committee
B. FARM TYPES
During the Soviet period, almost all cropland and pasture was held by state and collective
farms.
2 In 1990, Soviet Kyrgyz Republic’s 263 state farms contained 8.1 million hectares of the
republic’s 19.9 million hectare total (table 3.3). The average state farm comprised 30,798
hectares, including pasture.
3 Collective farms numbered 179 in 1990 and covered 7.2 million
hectares (table 3.3). Their average size was 40,223 hectares, including pasture.
4
                                               
2 Other types of state agricultural enterprises—research farms, experimental farms, subsidiary farms of
industrial enterprises, and others—accounted for just 4 percent of agricultural land.
3 Eighty-five percent of all agricultural land in Kyrgyz Republic was classified as pasture.
4 State farms are best thought of as “factories in the field,” or the rural equivalents of urban factories.
They are owned and managed by the state; workers are salaried and paid from the state budget. Collective
farms traditionally were considered profit-sharing cooperatives, with workers’ pay dependent on farm
profitability (as defined in Soviet terms). However, by the 1990s, collective farm workers were given salaries,
and the differences between state and collective farms had all but disappeared.46
TABLE 3.3   Distribution of land resources in the KR, 1 January 1991
No. of enterprises Total area (ha)
Collective farms 179 7,183,800
Agricultural cooperatives 0 0
Interfarm agricultural enterprises 7 2,600
State agricultural enterprises 1,134 8,838,700
-- Sovkhozes 263 8,145,500
-- State agricultural research institutes 57 522,400
-- Subsidiary enterprises 743 83,100
-- Other enterprises 71 87,600
Other agricultural enterprises 0 0
Peasant farms 8 1,200
Land excess 30 1,440,000
Forestry enterprises 61 1,072,300
Urban land/rural settlements 75 58,500
Land of industry, transport, defense, and communications
3,740 904,100
Nature protection, recreation, and historical/cultural
147 40,700
Land use under hydro-engineering 777 97,000
Totals
a
Land used by the KR 6,158 19,638,900
Land used outside the boundaries of the KR
114 870,500
Land used in the KR by other countries
4 1,226,200
Land used within the boundaries of the KR
6,048 19,994,500
aFigures may not add due to rounding
Interfarm Enterprises: Entities that performed services for a group of state or collective farms in a single region. For example,
livestock fattening stations in each rayon were considered interfarm enterprises. Their function was to
collect young livestock from each farm and to transport them via rail to a feed station where they were kept
and fattened for 1-2 months until the buyer came to collect them. Seed stations, another example of
interfarm enterprises, would provide seeds to all farmers in the region.
State Agricultural Enterprises: State farms (sovkhozes), training farms and research institutes, subsidiary farms of industrial
enterprises, specialized farms such as elite seed farms, breeding farms and experimental farms
of research institutes.
Other Agricultural Enterprises: Includes joint-stock companies.
Peasant Farms: Includes single family farms as well as associations of peasant farms.
Excess Land: Land that is difficult or impossible to use, for example, high steep pasture, glaciers, cliffs, and other areas that
are difficult to access.
SOURCE: State Inspectorate on Land Resources and Engineering
C. RURAL POPULATION
A very large share of Kyrgyz Republic’s 4.5 million people—63 percent—live in rural areas.
The rural population is unevenly distributed among regions. The southern part of the country,
Djalal-Abad and Osh oblasts, has a considerably higher population density than the rest of the47
republic, mainly for historical and agroecological reasons.
5 Table 3.4 shows cultivated land per
person and irrigated land per person in each of Kyrgyz Republic’s six oblasts. The
land/population ratio is three to four times higher in Issyk-Kul, Naryn, Talas, and Chui oblasts
than in Djalal-Abad and Osh. In other words, Djalal-Abad and Osh have three to four times
more people per farmed hectare than the rest of the country.



















Djalal-Abad 2,791.9 159.1 96.7 820.5 0.19 0.12
Issyk-Kul 4,390.7 187.8 136.8 418.5 0.45 0.33
Naryn 4,411.8 133.0 110.9 261.7 0.51 0.42
Osh 4,208.1 259.2 129.2 1,408.5 0.18 0.09
Talas 1,443.9 120.0 88.9 202.4 0.59 0.44
Chui 2,428.8 446.9 273.1 745.5 0.60 0.37
Kyrgyz Republic 19,674.8 1,306.0 835.6 3857.1 0.34 0.22
a. Land in annual crops
b. Irrigated land in annual crops
c. Residents of agricultural enterprises
SOURCE: State Inspectorate on Land Resources and Engineering
Under the Soviet system, most rural residents lived in villages on the state and collective
farms. Nucleated settlement was the norm: the typical state or collective farm contained one to
three distinct villages, all of whose residents were numbered among the farm inhabitants.
According to research results reported in later chapters, state and collective farms supported
an average of over 6,500 residents before land reform, of which an average of 2,500 were
working-age adults. Most of the rest were children and pensioners.
Not all working-age farm residents were employees of the farm. On average, half the
resident working-age adults were employed off the farm, typically in nearby industrial
enterprises or cities.
6 Moreover, many farm employees were engaged in activities other than
agricultural production. According to research results presented in later chapters, 19 percent of
the working-age population employed on state and collective farms worked in the farm
                                               
5 In addition to their more temperate climate, Djalal-Abad and Osh are adjacent to the Fergana Valley,
which, unlike the rest of Kyrgyz Republic, had a long history of sedentary agriculture before the arrival of
Russians in the middle of the nineteenth century.
6 This figure derives from LTC research results presented in chapter 5. The average is skewed somewhat
by the very large percentage of off-farm workers on a few sample farms near cities.48
administration or in the social sphere, as farm managers, cooks, shopkeepers, doctors,
teachers, and the like.
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III. PROCESS OF FARM RESTRUCTURING, 1991–1995
Chapter 2 details the legal history of farm restructuring from 1991 to 1995; however, since this
assessment of the impacts of legal change on the agrarian structure of the country depends on a
clear idea of the meaning of various types of farm enterprises as defined in the evolving law, a
brief review of farm types is called for. Particular attention is given to categories employed
during the 1991–1993 period. Subsequent changes will be addressed in turn.
A. FARM TYPES, 1991–1993
1. Peasant farms
Peasant farms were defined during the early reform period as private entities. They could be
either single or multiple-family farms. Early decrees, in 1991, led to the creation of voluntarily-
formed peasant farms on a fraction of the territory of many state and collective farms.
However, by late 1992, the opportunity seemed to be open to convert entire state or collective
farms, or large parts of them, into peasant farms. Although legally possible, this did not
happen. A small number of families on state and collective farms targeted for restructuring
during the 1991–1993 period opted to take private parcels and farm independently, but
nowhere during this period was an entire state or collective farm divided entirely (or even
largely) into fully independent peasant enterprises.
It is important to note, however, that on some farms during this period, certain families
(sometimes all families) were allocated paper land shares which theoretically corresponded to
individual plots of land. Rarely under these circumstances were these paper land shares tied to
specific land parcels. Even where they were, families rarely worked their own land. After
obtaining their shares, families were registered as peasant farms, but in most cases the entire
enterprise continued to be run as before. Peasant farms of this type flouted the legal definition
of a peasant farm as stipulated in the February and April 1991 laws, but no apparent attempt
was made to enforce adherence to those laws.
In summary, the peasant farm category during 1991–1993 comprised a small number of
voluntarily formed, private enterprises as well as an undetermined number of prescriptively
created, registered peasant farms that actually were legal fictions.
                                               
7 Kyrgyz Republic differs from other former Soviet republics such as Russia in that on the eve of
restructuring, schools and medical facilities on the territories of farms were financed by the rayon
administration rather than by the farm itself.49
2. Associations of peasant farms
By late 1992, provisions allowed for the formation of associations of peasant farms. These
would be voluntary unions of farmers possessing geographically demarcated plots, with
management democratically determined.
8 This category seems to have been devised, at least in
part, in pragmatic acknowledgment of the fact that registered peasant farmers on prescriptively
reorganized state and collective farms often were working cooperatively, typically under old
management structures. Most of the associations of peasant farms formed during 1992 and
1993 were very large. They were, essentially, the former state or collective farm, renamed.
Others were medium-scale enterprises, comprising 1,000 or so hectares, but even here the old
farm-management structure typically was kept intact, in practice though not in name, with
multiple medium-scale associations of peasant farms functioning as a single large-scale unit,
managed by the old guard. Fully devolved, medium- or small-scale associations of peasant
farms were rare.
3. Joint-stock companies
Joint-stock companies were to be corporate entities, with assets of the former state or
collective farm held by the company, shares in the company held by residents, and management
determined by the shareholders. This form was commonly used on farms privatized by the
State Property Committee during 1991 and 1992. One reason this option often was chosen
initially is that it was an easy matter to rename a state or collective farm a joint-stock company.
Little management restructuring was required. In fact, joint-stock companies almost always
used the management shell of the former state or collective farm. There sometimes was
election of officers and management. Even when this step was carried out, it was typically a
pro forma endorsement of former management structures.
4. Agricultural production cooperatives
Cooperatives implied a form of collective management over large parcels, typically the entire
territory of the former state or collective farm. Occasionally when the cooperative form was
chosen, the former farm was divided into two or three cooperatives, still very large.
9 In a
cooperative, shares in farm assets were to be assigned to farm residents, but (as in a joint-stock
company) the farm would not be physically divided into family parcels. The basis of the new
enterprise was the voluntary pooling of shares and cooperative production using these assets.
Members theoretically would be responsible for management, but management procedures for
cooperatives were unspecified and ambiguous. As was the case in associations of peasant
farms and joint-stock companies, management in practice tended to rest with officials of the
former state or collective farm. The conditions and responsibilities of rank-and-file members
tended to change very little.
                                               
8 Geographic demarcation of separate family plots often was a fiction, however. On this general subject
see D. Van Atta (1994, p. 177).
9 This division was commonly done along village lines or along the boundaries of former farm enterprise
as they existed prior to Khruschev’s agglomeration program of the 1960s.50
To a large degree all types of restructured enterprises retained effective access to the state
supply and marketing apparatus during the 1991–1993 period, even though, in theory, input
provisioning and marketing were now the responsibility of the new enterprise, not the state.
Likewise, while the debt of the former farm was in principle transferred to the new joint-stock
company, association of peasant farms, or cooperative, it is likely that rank-and-file members,
accustomed to state subsidies, assumed that they would never be held accountable for those
debts.
10
As may be inferred from the descriptions offered above, there was, in practical terms, little
difference in the organizational structure and management of cooperatives, joint-stock
companies, and associations of peasant farms. All three types resembled in their management
the centralized form of the state and collective farms. Managers frequently reregistered farms
under new names (changing, for example, from an association of peasant farms to a joint-stock
company), not after any on-farm reorganization but because of some perceived advantage
following an announced government shift in state policy toward one or another type (a practice
that continues in 1995).
B. AGRARIAN STRUCTURE FOLLOWING 1991–1993 REFORMS
Table 3.5 shows, by oblast and for the country as a whole, the percentage of arable land held
by various types of enterprises, as of 1 January 1993.
11 Eight percent of arable land in Kyrgyz
Republic came under the broad designation peasant farms.
12 This figure seems to suggest
considerable progress in farm restructuring during 1991 and 1992, especially given that just
one year earlier (1 January 1992, no table) only 0.9 percent of arable land was controlled by
peasant farms. Furthermore, as table 3.6 shows, the average peasant farm was fairly small,
containing just 18 arable hectares. Additional data advise interpretive caution, however. If
peasant farm-size calculations are based on total land area held by peasant enterprises,
including pasture, the area under peasant farms as of 1 January 1993 was 1.77 million hectares,
yielding a very high average farm size of 294 hectares. Furthermore, in some oblasts the
average size of peasant farms calculated this way was extremely high: notably, 7,638 hectares
in Djalal-Abad, and 749 hectares in Naryn. The meaning of these additional data is clear:
included in the peasant farm category were a certain number of associations of peasant farms,
which, as noted, were peasant farms in name only.
13 While the number of associations of
                                               
10 Research results reported in chapter 5 suggest that a few cooperatives formed during this period were
actually smaller-scale, cooperatively managed enterprises. This shows that real restructuring was possible
where there was enthusiasm for it. It also points to the analytical conundrum faced by officials and outsiders
trying to gauge the pace of reform: a registered cooperative might or might not have been effectively
restructured, and official statistics provide no way of telling the difference.
11 Total (rather than arable) landholdings also would be a reasonable comparative measure for this date,
but during 1994 and 1995, pasture was no longer subject to restructuring; it remained the property of the state.
For consistency among tables 3.5, 3.8 (1 January 1994), and 3.10 (1 January 1995), arable was deemed the
preferable measure.
12 Note that the State Inspectorate on Land Resources and Engineering did not, at this time, keep separate
figures for peasant farms and associations of peasant farms. All were recorded in the peasant-farm category.
13 Large pasture holdings in the peasant-farm category are almost entirely attributable to the inclusion in
the category of associations of peasant farms. Few private farmers were given extensive pasture. Associations of51
peasant farms may not have been very high, their inclusion inflated landholdings in the peasant
farm category (see especially Djalal-Abad). Without them, the data in table 3.6 would show
smaller peasant farms (as apparently was the norm in Chui), but the percentage of land in the
peasant-farm category would be considerably less than the impressive 8 percent shown in
table 3.5.
Table 3.5   Percent of arable land held by various types of enterprise, 1 January 1993
Djalal-Abad Issyk-Kul Naryn Osh Talas Chui
Kyrgyz
Republic
Total arable land held by all
agricultural enterprises (ha): 155,000 179,300 156,300 261,300 120,600 411,700 1,284,300
Percent of total held by:
-- Associations of peasant farms,
peasant farms, and private
farms 12 6 21 3 6 7 8
--   Cooperatives 3 10 17 22 5 15 13
--   Collective farms 40 32 16 29 47 33 32
--   State farms 43 39 34 42 34 32 37
--   Other
a 1 13 12 4 9 14 9
a 
Includes state agricultural research institutes, subsidiary agricultural enterprises, other state agricultural enterprises, and joint-stock
companies.
 Totals may not add to 100% due to rounding.
SOURCE: State Inspectorate on Land Resources and Engineering
TABLE 3.6   Number and mean arable land of peasant farms by oblast, 1 January 1993




Mean arable of peasant
farms (ha)
Djalal-Abad 18,000 78 231
Issyk-Kul 10,000 457 22
Naryn 33,200 983 34
Osh 8,900 261 34
Talas 6,900 177 40
Chui 29,900 4,070 7
Kyrgyz Republic 106,900 6,026 18
SOURCE: State Inspectorate on Land Resources and Engineering
                                                                                                                                                  
peasant farms created during this round of restructuring probably were especially pasture rich. The focus of
prescriptive restructuring was on unprofitable and less profitable state and collective farms; these tended to be
enterprises that did not contain rich cropland and specialized instead on grazing. This interpretation also helps
explain the small average size of peasant farms in Chui oblast, Kyrgyz Republic’s breadbasket. Few if any
associations of peasant farms were created in this well-off region; the peasant farms that did exist appear to
have been small, voluntary private farms.52
Table 3.5 shows that 13 percent of arable land as of 1 January 1993 was in cooperatives.
The figure one year earlier was 1 percent. As noted, cooperatives could be small-, medium-, or
large-scale farms, but overall the tendency during this period was for cooperatives to be the
functional equivalent of former state or collective farms. This is partly confirmed by figures on
the size of cooperatives (table 3.7). Massive cooperatives, as seen in Issyk-Kul and Naryn,
represent the entire land area, including pasture, of former state and collective farms. Even
where cooperatives were comparatively small, as in Talas, they probably did not represent
significant devolution from large-scale forms of management. (Calculating only arable land, the
Kyrgyz Republic mean was 752 hectares.
14)
TABLE 3.7   Number and mean size of cooperatives by oblast, 1 January 1993
Oblast Total area (ha) No. of cooperatives Mean total size (ha)
Djalal-Abad 39,500 7 5,643
Issyk-Kul 347,200 2 173,600
Naryn 1,261,900 35 35,054
Osh 1,041,000 124 8,395
Talas 38,300 14 2,736
Chui 254,200 32 7,944
Kyrgyz Republic
a 2,982,100 228 13,079
a Kyrgyz Republic figures do not sum in the original data
SOURCE: State Inspectorate on Land Resources and Engineering
As for joint-stock companies and other nonstate, noncollective farms, table 3.5 shows that
they held a total of 9 percent of arable land on 1 January 1993. Joint-stock companies
accounted for about half of that.
C. AGRARIAN STRUCTURE FOLLOWING LEGAL STAGNATION IN 1993
Figures on enterprise types as of 1 January 1994 are evidence of the limited progress made
during the first three years of reform (table 3.8). Comparison of tables 3.8 and 3.5 shows that
the pace of change was especially slow during 1993. Thirteen percent of Kyrgyz Republic’s
arable land was in the peasant farm category on 1 January 1994.
15 However, much of this land
was controlled by large associations of peasant farms, which typically were simply renamed
state and collective farms. The MAF by this date determined that associations of peasant farms
numbered 123. Without figures on their landholdings, it is impossible to calculate the
                                               
14 For Djalal-Abad, the arable mean was 571; Issyk-Kul, 8,850; Naryn, 771; Osh, 462; Talas, 500; and
Chui, 1,868. Total landholdings, rather than just arable, are presented in the table because cooperatives during
this period normally encompassed all land of the former enterprise, including pasture.
15 The average arable holding of farms in the peasant farm class remained 18 hectares [no table].53
percentage of the peasant-farm category they comprised, but if we assume that the average
association of peasant farms controlled 800 arable hectares (which was the figure one year
later), then associations of peasant farms held 57 percent of arable land in the peasant-farm
class, and the percentage of Kyrgyz Republic’s total arable held by fully devolved peasant and
private farms was 6 percent rather than 13 percent.
16
TABLE 3.8   Percent of arable land held by various types of enterprise, 1 January 1994
Djalal-Abad Issyk-Kul Naryn Osh Talas Chui
Kyrgyz
Republic
Total arable land held by all
agricultural enterprises (ha): 155,800 190,300 157,800 258,300 120,100 416,000 1,298,300
Percent of total held by:
--  Associations of peasant
farms, peasant farms, and
private farms 21 13 33 4 8 10 13
--  Cooperatives 3 17 3 15 4 7 9
--  Collective farms 37 31 22 38 45 36 35
--  State farms 36 28 30 35 35 26 31
--  Other
a 3 11 13 9 7 20 12
a Includes state agricultural research institutes, subsidiary agricultural enterprises, other state agricultural enterprises, and joint-stock
companies.
 Totals may not add to 100% due to rounding.
SOURCE: State Inspectorate on Land Resources and Engineering
Meanwhile, the cooperative class had shrunk since 1993, to 9 percent of arable land,
apparently because of shifts into associations of peasant farms and other enterprise types (see
especially figures for Naryn). There were still 174 registered state farms and 206 registered
collective farms as of 1 January 1994 (State Inspectorate on Land Resources and Engineering).
Altogether they continued to control a total of 66 percent of the arable land in Kyrgyz
Republic (down just 3 percent from one year earlier). This situation, especially the lack of
formal mechanisms for systematically converting state and collective farms into small-scale
farms under new management, led the government to halt the reform effort temporarily in
1993, realizing that changes in the process were needed.
D. RENEWAL OF REFORMS AND NEW DEFINITIONS OF
ENTERPRISE TYPES, 1994–1995
When the farm restructuring program resumed in early 1994, responsibility for implementation
was transferred from the State Property Committee to the MAF. As noted in chapter 2, the
Presidential Decree of 22 February 1994, along with several subsequent rules and orders issued
                                               
16 Following this logic, the average arable holding of a fully devolved peasant or private farm as of this
date would be 8 hectares.54
by the ministry, focused on liquidating all state, collective, and specialized farms and replacing
them with smaller-scale agricultural enterprises. Under the new program, most existing large-
scale agricultural enterprises were to distribute shares of their land to all rural residents and
nonland assets to their workers, who would then pool their land and property shares to form
new, smaller (10–150 hectare) enterprises. (On farm-size categories and limits, see chapter 2.)
The goal of the MAF was to liquidate most state and collective farms by June 1995,
including the specialized seed and breed farms previously exempt from the government’s
restructuring program. In their place would be single-family individual farms (a legacy of the
first stage of reform, hitherto called peasant farms), peasant farm enterprises (multi-family
farms), and cooperatives, associations of peasant farms, and joint-stock companies, all larger
forms of reorganized farms sanctioned by 1991 and 1992 decrees and supported as well by the
decrees of 1994.
17
IV. AGRARIAN STRUCTURE, JULY 1995
Table 3.9 shows the distribution of land among various enterprise types as of 1 January 1995.
At that time, there were still 138 registered collective farms and 137 state farms. The number
of cooperatives was 198, representing a decline from 206 one year earlier, and 228 two years
earlier.
18 The number of peasant farms had risen to 13,608. One year earlier the figure had been
9,764, and two years earlier it had been 6,026.
19
The rise in the number of peasant farms during 1993 and 1994 may be taken as a sign of
significant progress in farm restructuring because growth in this category, especially during
1994, was due almost entirely to the formation of multi-family peasant farms created as
households pooled their land and property shares to create small enterprises to meet minimum
                                               
17 This new farm typology, introduced in January 1995, defined farm categories as follows: Individual
Farm—single-family farm; Peasant Farm Enterprise—a multi-family entity with landholdings of up to 30
hectares in intensive and semi-intensive zones and up to 50 hectares in other areas; Agricultural
Cooperative—an entity with landholdings of 30–100 hectares in intensive and semi-intensive zones or 50–150
hectares in other areas; Collective Farm—an entity operating under collective (nonstate) ownership, with
landholdings of more than 100 hectares in intensive and semi-intensive zones or more than 150 hectares in
other areas; State Farm—a state-owned entity with landholdings of more than 100 hectares in intensive and
semi-intensive zones, or more than 150 hectares in other areas. Considerable re-registration will be required
under this typology. For instance, a 1,500-hectare agricultural cooperative will be reregistered as a collective; a
multi-family peasant farm with 75 hectares will now be recorded as a cooperative.
18 This decline is not especially meaningful. Throughout this process there has been considerable shifting
about in the self-definition of new enterprises; a collective farm might become a cooperative, then an
association of peasant farms, then a joint-stock company as members or management perceive a political
advantage in a new label.
19 The high number of hectares recorded under the peasant farm category results from the inclusion of
associations of peasant farms, which held pasture, and from the assignment to smaller-scale private and peasant
farms, by statisticians, of a share of the pasture of the enterprise out of which they were created. The latter is a
statistical fiction, carried out so the numbers would sum correctly.55
farm-size requirements.
20 Of the 13,799 peasant farms recorded in a separate register by the
State Inspectorate (compare with table 3.9), 13,346 of them were private or small-scale
peasant farms, and just 191 were associations of peasant farms.
21
TABLE 3.9   Distribution of land resources in the KR, 1 January 1995
No. of enterprises Total area held by enterprises (ha)
All collective farms 138 3,274,600
Agricultural cooperatives 198 1,869,700
Interfarm agricultural enterprises 20 578,800
State agricultural enterprises 985 4,037,800
-- Sovkhozes 137 3,272,500
-- State agricultural research institutes 83 448,300
-- Subsidiary enterprises 677 225,300
-- Other enterprises 83 103,500
Other agricultural enterprises 194 692,500
Peasant farms 13,608 4,789,200
Land excess -- 
b
2,209,600
Forestry enterprises -- 
b
1,068,500
Urban land/rural settlements -- 
b
101,300













Land used by the KR -- 
b
19,675,100
Land used outside administrative boundaries of
the KR -- 
b
630,900




Land used within administrative boundaries of
the KR -- 
b
19,994,500
aFigures may not add due to rounding
b No data available
Interfarm Enterprises: Entities which performed services for a group of state or collective farms in a single region. For example,
livestock fattening stations in each rayon were considered interfarm enterprises. Their function was to
collect young livestock from each farm and to transport them via rail to a feed station where they were kept
and fattened for 1-2 months until the buyer came to collect them. Seed stations, another example of
interfarm enterprises, would provide seeds to all farmers in the region.
State Agricultural Enterprises: State farms (sovkhozes), training farms and research institutes, subsidiary farms of industrial
enterprises, specialized farms such as elite seed farms, breeding farms, and experimental farms
of research institutes.
Other Agricultural Enterprises: Includes joint-stock companies.
Peasant Farms: Includes single family farms as well as associations of peasant farms.
Excess Land: Land which is difficult or impossible to use, for example, high steep pasture, glaciers, cliffs, and other areas that
are difficult to access.
SOURCE: State Inspectorate on Land Resources and Engineering
                                               
20 In 1994, the Ministry of Agriculture set a minimum farm size limit of 10 hectares. for all commodity-
producing farms in Kyrgyz Republic.
21 By 1994, the State Inspectorate had begun recording private and peasant farms in one category and
associations of peasant farms in another. There were 1,287 private and small-scale peasant farms and 36
associations of peasant farms in Djalal-Abad; 973 and 20 in Issyk-Kul; 1,765 and 81 in Naryn; 1,086 and 0 in
Osh; 623 and 35 in Talas; and 6,892 and 19 in Chui.56
Furthermore, as table 3.10 shows, private farms and small-scale peasant farms now
comprised, together, 12 percent of arable land in the Kyrgyz Republic (associations of peasant
farms were by this time recorded separately). If estimates for private and peasant farms for the
previous year are correct, 12 percent represents a doubling in the arable landholdings of small-
scale farms in one year.




Kul Naryn Osh Talas Chui
Kyrgyz
Republic
Total arable land held by all
agricultural enterprises (ha): 157,700 187,800 131,900 257,500 119,600 447,700 1,302,200
Percent of total held by:
--  Peasant farms and private
farms
21 4 24 19 5 7 12
-- Associations of peasant farms 14 14 31 0 9 12 12
--  Cooperatives 6 24 7 10 12 7 11
--  Collective farms 11 28 7 30 39 26 25
--  State farms 10 22 17 28 28 26 23
--  Other
a 38 8 14 13 7 21 17
a Includes state agricultural research institutes, subsidiary agricultural enterprises, other state agricultural enterprises, and joint-
stock companies.
 Totals may not add to 100% due to rounding.
SOURCE: State Inspectorate on Land Resources and Engineering
The State Committee on Land Resources and Engineering contends that it only records
enterprises once they have taken physical possession of an identifiable parcel of land, so these
data appear to represent a fair picture of regional variation in progress toward creating small-
scale enterprises. Particular progress appears to have been made in Osh. One year earlier just 4
percent of arable land in Osh was in the peasant-farm class (and this included any associations
of peasant farms); by 1 January 1995, the figure for small-scale private and peasant farms was
19 percent.
22 More generally, Djalal-Abad, Naryn, and Osh showed a significantly higher
percentage of arable land in small-scale enterprises than Issyk-Kul, Talas, and Chui.
State and collective farms together still controlled 48 percent of arable land in the Kyrgyz
Republic on 1 January 1995, with figures highest in Talas (67 percent), Osh (58 percent), Chui
(52 percent), and Issyk-Kul (50 percent). Associations of peasant farms held 12 percent of
Kyrgyz Republic’s arable, with a high of 31 percent in Naryn. The republic-wide figure for
cooperatives was 11 percent, with Issyk-Kul highest at 24 percent. The high number of “other”
enterprises in Djalal-Abad appears to reflect conversion to joint-stock companies.
Table 3.11 shows the average size of the arable holdings of the different enterprise types
as of 1 January 1995. In some oblasts, notably Osh and Djalal-Abad, private and peasant farms
                                               
22 Note that by 1994 there was an oblast-wide prohibition against associations of peasant farms in Osh.57
remained relatively large. Since individual land shares in the south are generally quite small,
many families would have had to pool land shares to achieve the farm sizes reported.
23 Thus, it
is likely that such farms consist of many families and support hundreds of individuals.
24
Elsewhere, notably in Chui, Issyk-Kul, and Talas, private and peasant farms—at least their
arable holdings—were quite small. All other enterprise types—associations of peasant farms,
cooperatives, collective farms, and state farms—still showed large arable holdings throughout
the country.




Kul Naryn Osh Talas Chui
Kyrgyz
Republic
Peasant farms and private farms 26 8 18 27 9 5 12
Associations of peasant farms 628 1,330 509 - 309 2,714 800
Cooperatives 443 2,295 440 448 763 550 699
Collective farms 1,989 3,729 1,860 1,424 2,747 3,053 1,790
State farms 1,250 2,382 1,833 2,077 3,700 2,269 2,201
Other
a 355 127 433 143 130 354 240
a 
Includes state agricultural research institutes, subsidiary agricultural enterprises, other state agricultural enterprises, and joint-stock
companies.
SOURCE: State Inspectorate on Land Resources and Engineering
Given that the new farm typology introduced by the Ministry of Agriculture and State
Statistical Committee is likely to become the standard in coming years, it is useful to consider
statistics for 1 January 1995 compiled in the new manner by the MAF (table 3.12). The
ministry itself is skeptical of the veracity of the numbers, because the field staff that compiled
the data often were unsure how to classify farms and lacked clear guidelines. For instance, all
small-scale farms in Chui were classified as peasant farms, though it is likely that at least a few,
if not many, of them are single-family entities that should have been recorded under the
individual farm category.
                                               
23 The high population density in the southern oblasts resulted in small individual land shares in
comparison with northern oblasts. Household land shares in the south are commonly less than 1 hectare,
whereas in Chui and Issyk Kul, individual land shares are as high as 1.5 hectares.
24 On this subject, see chapter 5. LTC research during the first half of 1995 suggests that many of the
more recently formed peasant enterprises in Osh are considerably smaller; in fact, many disregard the legal 10-
hectare minimum.58
TABLE 3.12   Number and type of agricultural enterprises (new typology), 1 January 1995
Djalal-
Abad Issyk-Kul Naryn Osh Talas Chui
Kyrgyz
Republic
  Individual Farms 490 63 7,990 0 1,534 0 10,077
  Peasant Farms 1,427 225 1,324 2,014 0 7,002 11,989
  Agricultural Cooperatives 40 19 18 43 21 40 181
  Collective Enterprises 40 2 0 10 0 14 66
  State Enterprises 7 1 12 0 17 20 57
SOURCE: MAF
During early 1995, the Republican Center for Land and Agrarian Reform undertook a
vigorous effort aimed at dismantling all state and collective farms by the middle of the year. By
1 April, the State Statistical Committee and the State Institute on Land Resources and
Engineering counted 86 remaining collective farms and 81 remaining state farms, a drop from
139 and 137, respectively, just three months earlier. The number of small-scale private and
peasant farms had risen from 13,346 on 1 January to 24,152. Interviews in rural areas during
this period support the view that this was, in fact, a period of rapid change, with land shares
and physical parcels of former large-scale enterprises allocated to residents and a great many
small-scale peasant farms formed in time for planting, especially in the southwest. Elsewhere,
notably in Chui and in scattered rayons throughout the country (including some rayons in the
southwest), changes were more cosmetic, and the 1995 spring planting season saw production
still organized on a large scale. In fact, it must be assumed that the clear majority of Kyrgyz
Republic’s farmers, probably more than 75 percent, still were organized in large-scale
enterprises during the 1995 crop year. That percentage is likely to decline considerably in 1996
as the 1995 recipients of land parcels make arrangements for the creation of small farms and
smaller-scale production.
By July, unofficial assessments in the MAF held that fewer than 100 state and collective
farms remained in operation. Disappointment over the pace of reform continued in the
ministry, however, even during this active period, based largely on the conviction that some
officials—including certain akims and the directors of many former large-scale enterprises—
were at best reluctant reformers. While state and collective farms were being disbanded and, in
certain regions such as Osh, the number of small-scale enterprises was growing rapidly, many
of the intermediate enterprises—cooperatives, associations of peasant farms, and joint-stock
companies—were judged as being no different from the former state and collective farms.
Large enterprises, or their shells, still held well over two-thirds of Kyrgyz Republic’s arable
land in mid-1995, and it was hard to imagine some of them disappearing soon. The challenge
ahead was to extend to these enterprises the devolutionary principles that had been adopted on
a much smaller subset of farms, but the way was not clear. This concern in the ministry, and
elsewhere in government, was not just ideological: whatever uncertainties the small-farm
sector faces, the viability of vestigial centralized enterprises without the state support
structures that previously sustained them is even more doubtful.59
V. FARM LABOR AND OUTPUT DURING RESTRUCTURING PERIOD
It is too early to judge the impact of land reform and farm restructuring on the demographic
profile of the rural Kyrgyz Republic and the productivity of the agricultural sector. The
greatest changes are still ahead. As for changes that have occurred, it is not yet possible to
determine which of them can be attributed to land reform and which can be attributed to the
general crisis of Kyrgyz Republic’s macroeconomic transformation. A few pointers are
available, however.
A. FARM LABOR
The capacity of restructured farms to absorb at least a large part of the rural labor force is a
major unanswered question. It cannot be completely answered now, but table 3.13 offers
certain hints. It shows that, as of 1 January 1994, small-scale peasant and private farms
employed an average of 4.6 workers. In section III, it was estimated that on that date the
average small-scale peasant or private farm controlled 6 hectares of arable land. The data are
rough, but these figures yield a ratio of 0.76 arable hectares per worker on small-scale farms.
Table 3.13 records an average of 1,120 workers on state and collective farms. Given that the
average state or collective farm controlled 2,249 arable hectares on 1 January 1994, the
estimated number of arable hectares per worker on state farms and collectives calculates out at
just over two. Table 3.13 also gives figures for other large-scale enterprises, notably
cooperatives and associations of peasant farms. If associations of peasant farms had an average
of 800 hectares of arable land on 1 January 1994 (which they did one year later, see table
3.11), their ratio comes to 1.7 hectare per worker. The ratio for agricultural cooperatives (with
an average of 752 arable hectares on 1 January 1994) is anomalously low: less than 0.2 hectare
per worker.
25 Nonetheless, and despite the fragility of the data, we see evidence in these
numbers that smaller-scale enterprises require or permit fewer workers per hectare; as farm
restructuring proceeds, the trend is likely to be toward a smaller work force in agriculture.
26
                                               
25 We have no ready explanation for this anomaly: it may be statistical error, or it may reflect the
recording elsewhere of service and administration workers previously attached to the state farms and collectives
from which cooperatives were formed.
26 As noted in section I, state and collective farms employed many nonagricultural workers, some of whom
certainly will be absorbed in service and administrative capacities henceforth defined as outside the sphere of
agriculture.60




Kul Naryn Osh Talas Chui
Kyrgyz
Republic
Peasant and private farms 6.3 3.2 5.2 8.3 3.9 3.5 4.6
Associations of peasant farms 51 933 997 ---
a 172 988 475
Cooperatives 35 50  60 276 87 55 121







Small state enterprises 25 ---
a ---
a ---







a  No data available
SOURCE: MAF and State Statistical Committee
The effect of the reforms on farm population levels and rural-urban migration is one of the
great uncertainties in this process. It is tempting to predict that an eventual rural exodus will
occur, especially in densely settled areas such as Osh and Djalal-Abad. However, depending on
the direction the reforms take in grain-growing regions in coming years, particularly in terms of
the allocation and upkeep of large-scale machinery, sparsely settled areas could shed labor
more quickly than densely settled areas because the latter, which are more horticultural, may
have a greater capacity to absorb labor.
B. CROP PRODUCTION
Crop yields have declined during the restructuring period, with a particularly sharp drop
between 1993 and 1994 (table 3.14). Grains, potatoes, and vegetables showed especially
precipitous declines. There are multiple explanations for declining yields, including reduced
access to fertilizers, pesticides, farm machinery, and other inputs; reduced attention to
maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure; and, certainly, the breakup of many production-
efficient large-scale farms. It is an article of faith among government reformers that smaller-
scale production can yield returns equal to or better than those realized by large-scale
agricultural enterprises. Granting that the very sharp declines seen during the early 1990s owe
largely to the economic transition itself, and that yields may rebound as farmers settle into new
modes of production and markets mature, there is a need for land reform realism as well. For
instance, small-scale grain farming, without subsidized irrigation and guaranteed delivery of
inputs, is unlikely ever to produce at the level of the former farms. Small-scale farming in some
zones has production advantages. Elsewhere, it may have nonproduction advantages that more
than offset reduced output. But overall it would be a mistake for reformers to allow their
commitment to the ideology of devolution to interfere with a natural evolution toward optimal
scales of production. In many parts of the country, the economy eventually will require the
consolidation of farms to an efficient scale.61
TABLE 3.14   Crop yields in the KR, 1990-94 (centnares/hectare)
Crop 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Grains, total 29.3 26 27.8 25.6 18.1
   of which: wheat 26.4 22.4 27.3 26.2 18.3
                  barley 23.7 20.6 23.6 21.6 15
                  maize 61.8 58.5 51.3 45.2 35.3
                  rice 17.9 15.5 14.7 11.1 14.2
Cotton fiber 27.3 24.5 24.4 24.2 20.2
Sugarbeets 168.5 155.7 213.3 188.2 116.2
Tobacco 21.6 21.2 20.8 21.9 19.2
Potatoes 136 137 124 108 90
Vegetables 196 180 154 140 115
Berries 41.2 25.9 35.4 14.2 20.1
Grapes 63.2 45.3 50.6 15.9 25.6






   of which: hay 58.2 53.1 53.1 51.3 42.8
                 green fodder 229.3 204.1 219.7 200 163.9
aNo data available
SOURCE: State Statistical Committee
C. LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION
Livestock numbers show an even greater decline during the restructuring period (table 3.15).
There are four parts to this process. First, reduced shipments of imported feed, especially to
supplement limited winter pasture, forced a general reduction in herd size, especially sheep and
cattle, after 1991. Second, prices for livestock products, especially wool, declined precipitously
during the early 1990s, partly because of loss of markets and processing facilities associated
with the collapse of the USSR. Livestock holders reacted by cutting livestock numbers. Third,
many former state and collective farms responded to the 1994 requirement that they distribute
shares in farm property by dealing first with livestock, which, unlike agricultural equipment and
buildings, are reasonably divisible. Many cash-strapped, newly independent farmers, recipients
of the distribution, disposed of these uncertain assets quickly. Fourth, the transfer of a large
part of the Kyrgyz Republic’s livestock into the private sector no doubt caused significant
undercounting. One assumes, for instance, that statistically invisible poultry make up some of
the difference between reported 1989 and 1994 numbers.
There is no reason that livestock numbers should not rebound, especially with greater
internal production of winter fodder and export market development. Perhaps the major
unanswered question in the livestock sector is that of smallholder access to pasture. Kyrgyz
Republic’s 9 million hectares of pasture remain in the hands of the state with access controlled
by the rural committees. Full redevelopment of the livestock sector will require almost as much
attention to tenure over pasture as tenure over cropland has received.62
TABLE 3.15   Livestock inventories in the KR, 1989–1994 (000 head)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Cattle 1,214.3 1,205.2 1,190 1,122.4 1,062.3 920.1
  of which: milk cows 507.4 506.1 518.6 514.7 511.2 480.9
Horses 310 312.6 320.5 313 322 299
Sheep and goats 10,483 9,972.5 9,524.9 8,741.5 7,322.3 5,076.4
Poultry 15,206.7 13,914.6 13,571.2 10,420.5 6,916.5 2,208.4
SOURCE: State Statistical Committee
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I. LAND ADMINISTRATION
Under the current system, the state retains ownership of land and much other immovable
property (buildings, irrigation infrastructure, roads, and the like) and has a broad range of
administrative responsibilities to ensure appropriate use. The government agencies that had the
authority for immovable property management under the Soviet system still exist and retain
much of their earlier mandate; to these agencies have been added several new structures,
notably the State Property Committee and local institutions specifically created to implement
the reforms.
Even if private ownership of land and other immovable property is permitted in the future,
the state will still own a large amount of land: pastures, forests, hydroelectric installations, and
various public areas such as nature reserves and national parks. Private ownership does not
mean the owners can do anything they want on their land; instead a person holds or “owns”
rights that are protected by the state's laws and police powers or by the customs and norms of
the people. The state may retain certain rights to private property, such as:
1) the right to acquire private immovable property for public purposes;
2) the right to acquire ownership when the private owner dies and has no heirs;
3) the right to impose taxation on the owners of private property;
4) the right to forbid private owners to build on or otherwise modify certain immovable
property;
5) the right to deprive private owners of certain uses of the immovable property, such as the
application of toxic pesticides or the creation of a rubbish dump; and
6) the right to expropriate private owners who do not use the property to satisfy legally
defined social functions.
This section will outline the existing responsibilities of the state and the organizations that
are supposed to assume these responsibilities and then will present ideas about a reorganization
of these functions to reflect the requirements of the emerging market economy. The second
section will provide details on the current system of immovable property registration and make
recommendations about an appropriate system for the future.64
A. EXISTING RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE STATE
Currently, state agencies are responsible for virtually all aspects of land administration. Among
the responsibilities of the various offices are: design of land and agrarian reforms; initial
allocations of land and other immovable property to users; design of a legal and regulatory
framework for the land market; registration of interests in land and other immovable property;
surveying and mapping; immovable property taxation; dispute resolution; land-use planning
and zoning; and administration of leases and appropriate uses of state-owned land, including
the National Land Fund and pasture land.
Of these responsibilities, the first two are temporary. The others are not, and government
will continue to provide these services even after land is privately owned.
B. AGENCIES INVOLVED WITH LAND ISSUES
The land and agrarian reforms under way in the Kyrgyz Republic (KR) involve a multiplicity of
agencies at all levels of government, with the Office of the President being the prime mover for
overall policy. Authority for land management and administration is divided among various
ministries, state committees, and agencies at the national level, the respective branches of these
organizations at the oblast and rayon levels, and the rural committees and town councils at
farm and village levels. Separate agencies exist for administration and monitoring of rural and
urban land. New entities have been created specifically to realize the goals of the reform
program. Some of these entities are considered temporary.
The complex institutional landscape for land management is shown in Chart 4.1. The chart
differentiates three aspects of management: land and agrarian reform implementation; land
legislation and policy; and land administration. The responsibilities of each of the institutions
shown in the chart are given below and are also discussed in terms of their legal basis in
chapter 2. It should be noted that—as is true in all graphical representations of administrative
relationships—there is a great deal of simplification required in order that the picture be clear.
As the discussion below should indicate, however, the chart captures the essence of the current
situation and also points to the most fundamental issues needing to be resolved.
1. Agencies responsible for land legislation and policy
Office of President. The Office of the President includes both legal personnel and
agricultural specialists who are involved in formulating policy and drafting or commenting on
drafts of legislation. With particular attention to land and agrarian reform, the president’s legal
advisers are in the process of conducting a review of all legislation, checking for consistency
and clarity. The president is responsible for signing all laws adopted by parliament and for
issuing decrees for interim implementation of reforms prior to parliamentary action.6566
Administration of Government. The government, consisting of the offices of the
prime minister, the presidium, and the cabinet of ministers, has both legal personnel and
agricultural specialists who are involved in formulating policy and drafting or commenting on
drafts of legislation. The prime minister issues government orders and regulations, and
nominates candidates for ministerial positions.
Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh). The bicameral national legislature is responsible for
considering and adopting all laws, and for confirming the ministerial nominees of the prime
minister. This is especially important for the land and agrarian reform program at the present
time, because parliament has to date refused several times to confirm the nomination of the
Acting Minister of Agriculture, Bekbolot Talgarbekov, who has been the leading architect and
advocate of the reforms within the government.
Ministry of Justice. No legislation on land or property issues can be introduced to the
parliament without initially being reviewed by the Ministry of Justice. It also administers the
judicial system of national, oblast and rayon courts. In addition, the Ministry of Justice
controls the system of notaries at the rayon and oblast levels. Notaries provide legal witness to
all land and property transactions, charging fees for the service that are to be contributed to the
rayon budget. All newly-formed farm enterprises must have the official stamp of a notary to
validate the papers registering them as a legal entity. Notaries are paid by the rayon budget,
and methodology and instructions are received from the Ministry of Justice.
Ministry of Agriculture and Food. The MAF is responsible for all aspects of agricultural
production and marketing (both crops and livestock), including, since February 1994, the land
and agrarian reform program. Until November 1994, it conducted the reforms from a Division
of Land Reform and Water Resources. Its role in policy and legislative formation consists of
technical input to the government’s and the President’s overall vision of agricultural and land-
related issues.
2. Agencies responsible for land and agrarian reform implementation
a. National level institutions and legal subsidiaries
Republican Center for Land and Agrarian Reform (CLAR). The Republican CLAR, a
division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF), was created to implement the reforms
based on the president’s 1994 decrees. The Republican CLAR is supposed to have a staff of
about thirty, but several of the positions are still vacant. It is headed by a general director and
has two divisions: land reform and agrarian reform. Tasks of the Republican CLAR include:
¤ assisting farms in determining land and property shares;
¤ explaining to farm workers and rural inhabitants the goals of the land reform program and
their own rights and options in the reorganization of state and collective farms; and
¤ monitoring the progress of farm reorganization and conflict resolution during the course of
reform implementation.
 
  The rayon-level offices conduct the practical work in land and agrarian reform. This
includes “explanatory work,” where on-farm seminars are held to inform the farm population67
of their options, rights, and responsibilities resulting from the land reform. The rayon CLARs
also assist in inventorying property, surveying the landholdings of state and collective farms
prior to reorganization, determining land and property shares, and surveying landholdings of
newly-formed enterprises. The function of the oblast-level CLARs is to coordinate the work of
rayon-level offices. They are to assist the rayon-level offices with the reorganization plans for
the state and collective farms. Until recently the rayon and oblast CLARs were under the
control of the rayon and oblast administrations, but now they are directly subordinate to the
Republican CLAR in order to ensure better coordination and consistency of reform efforts.
 
  The CLAR apparatus does not currently have a clear, logical hierarchy of tasks. On-farm
implementation of the reforms should be performed by the rayon centers with support from
oblast CLARs. Rayons should take on additional tasks of assisting farms in preparing business
plans and maintaining a log, record, or database on farm restructuring. Rayon CLARs should
have a staff of at least three, with some training in agronomy, economics, land law, farm
management, and land surveying/engineering/registration (the latter at least until registration
offices are established). Oblast CLARs should lend expert advice to rayon CLARs. Oblast
staff should include specialists in land law, agricultural economics, farm management,
tax/finance, and marketing. The Republican CLAR should focus on policy instead of
implementation; it would then be better able to analyze data on farm restructuring from rayon
and oblast centers with a view to policy formulation and correction.
 
  b. Institutions at rayon level
 
 Rayon administration. The rayon administration finances all organs at rayon level, although
many of those agencies receive instructions from their national level counterparts. The akim is
the executive of the rayon administration, appointed by the president for period of four years.
The president has right to remove the akim at any time. The akim is responsible for facilitating
implementation of land and agrarian reform in that rayon and has the authority to appoint the
heads of the Rural Committees.
 
  Council of people’s deputies. The council of people’s deputies is the rayon parliament
and is elected every four years. It should decide all questions regarding land but has frequently
delegated these functions to the rayon akim.
 
  Rayon land commission. The rayon land commission is overseen by the rayon council
of people’s deputies. It reviews all applications submitted by legal entities for use rights on a
specific land parcel. Land shareholders who have pooled their shares to form a legal entity
must apply for a parcel of land through the local Rural Committee. The Rural Committee
proposes a certain parcel of land to the enterprise (generally, the parcel proposed is at the
request of the enterprise; if a conflict arises or there are many applicants for the same parcel,
the situation is resolved by lottery) and passes the application to the Land Commission for
examination. If approved, the application is passed on to the rayon akim for final approval,
upon which the registration of the legal entity begins.
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  c. Local-level institutions
 
 Rural committee. Rural committees were formed on the territory of each state or collective
farm. They are supposed to have three to seven members. The chair is appointed by the rayon
akim for three years and usually is the director of the former state or collective farm. The
committee is financed by the rayon budget. The Rural Committee is a legal entity and has a
bank account. It is responsible for:
¤ implementing land and agrarian reforms on its territory according to a plan worked out by
the Commission on Land and Agrarian Reform and approved by the bodies mentioned
above;
¤ providing infrastructure for newly formed enterprises;
¤ assisting the enterprises in marketing their produce;
¤ monitoring use of land and water, and ensuring that users’ activities do not harm the land;
¤ resolving disputes about land distribution;
¤ keeping land categorization records (holdings of each land-user on territory) and
forwarding these to the rayon administration at least once a year; and
¤ providing accounting, statistical, land and operational records to the rayon administration
on the activities of each land-user on its territory once per year.
 
  Commission on land and agrarian reform. This commission exists for each former
state or collective farm. Its membership, of not more than 15 persons, must include
representatives of the former state or collective farm, the head of rural committee, the head of
the relevant Rural Council, a representative of the Ministry of Agriculture, representatives of
oblast and rayon CLARs, and representatives of rayon financial institutions. Its duties are to:
¤ analyze financial and productive activities of former state and collective farms;
¤ conduct property inventory and appraisal;
¤ determine land and property share per person; and
¤ work up a plan for reorganization of the farm-a plan that is subject to approval by a
general meeting of the former state or collective farm members, the rayon department of
agriculture, and the akim.
 
  Rural council. The rural council is the council of deputies at the village level, responsible
for implementing all decisions of rayon, oblast, and national parliamentary bodies. Elections
are held once every four years, as they are for the rayon, oblast, and national parliaments. The
rural council reports to the inhabitants of its village the amount owed for taxes on land around
houses and livestock. It is responsible for land administration on the territory of the village. It
reports annually to rayon-level Statistical Committee, Kyrgyzgiprozem (survey/registration),
and Bureau of Technical Inventory offices on population figures, area of land in yards and
gardens, and records of registered construction projects on the territory of the village. It
manages and administers the passport (propisk) regime of village.
 
  Town council. The town council replicates the duties of the rural council for urban areas.
Some town councils are subordinate to the oblast parliament, some to the rayon council of
deputies, and one, Bishkek, to the national parliament.
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  3. Agencies responsible for land administration
 
  a. Agricultural sector
 
 State Institute for Land Resources and Land Management (Kyrgyzgiprozem).
Kyrgyzgiprozem (Kyrgyzmamzherresurstary in Kyrgyz) is responsible for maintaining an
inventory of land resources for the KR. It compiles an annual inventory of land resources with
detailed figures on landholdings of each agricultural land user. Every five years, a cadastre is
prepared on the basis of the annual reports. During the Soviet period such detailed record-
keeping was possible with a total of only about 500 agricultural users (state, collective, and
specialized farms) in the republic. The farm reorganization program has raised that number to
over 24,000 units as of mid-1995. Coupled with the 75 percent decrease in staffing at
Kyrgyzgiprozem since the early 1990s, the likelihood that such detailed land categorization can
and will continue is small.
 
  The institute has a cartographic division that prepares the base maps of state and collective
farms from air photos. Several divisions have been eliminated in the past few years, including a
water resources division and one that prepared production plans for collective and state farms.
The main task of the institute now is to catalog the holdings of agricultural users and maintain
an inventory of the country’s land resources.
 
  Rayon-level offices survey landholdings of state and collective farms and of new farm
enterprises formed during reorganization. For the annual land register, the office collects from
the rural committee heads a record of landholdings of all enterprises existing on the territories
of the former state or collective farms.
 
  Institute of Pastures and Forage. This institute is subordinate to the MAF. It is
responsible for estimating the carrying capacity of pasture lands and informing local authorities
about appropriate stocking rates. The Pasture Inspection Service, part of the institute, has an
unclear role in monitoring and inspection of pasture management.
 
  State Committee on Environmental Protection (Goskompriroda). Goskompriroda is
responsible for the management of forest lands, including those on the territories of the former
state and collective farms. The Forest Department is responsible for the State Forest Fund,
which covers about 15 percent of the KR’s territory. Only about 4 percent of the country is
forested; the rest, degraded or completely deforested, is used as pasture.
 
  b. Urban sector
 
 State Committee on Architecture and Construction (Gosstroi). Gosstroi exists at the
national level with affiliates in the oblasts and rayons. It is the state agency for city and
regional planning. It has responsibility for privatizing apartments and other urban properties.
As the MAF has done for rural reforms, Gosstroi has devised most of the decrees and
regulations, and proposed the laws that have laid the foundation for urban land reform. The
head of Gosstroi has the status of minister, as is true of all state committee heads.70
 
  Architectura. Subordinate to Gosstroi, the Architectura serves town, city, and regional
planning functions. Rayon offices are its lowest level; they are subordinate to oblast level
offices. Architectura registers urban owners and users of immovable property and reports this
information to the rayon tax office. It must report on its records to rayon land engineering
service for compilation of the annual “land register” prepared by Kyrgyzgiprozem in Bishkek.
 
  State Committee of Communal Affairs. Formerly a ministry, the State Committee of
Communal Affairs is responsible for the coordination of local government activities. Its
responsibility for land administration is limited to its oversight of the Bureaus of Technical
Inventory.
 
  Bureau of Technical Inventory (BTI). BTI concentrates all information on immovable
property, such as location, area, and owner of property. It maintains an archive for all
blueprints, construction plans of houses, apartments, and other immovable property. It has
offices at rayon and oblast level, subordinate at national level to the State Committee of
Communal Affairs. BTI is financed by rayon and oblast budgets. Its methodology and
instructions are received from Bishkek.
 
  c. Economy-wide
 
  Ministry of Finance- -Tax office. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for tax-rate
determination, assessment, and collection, including land tax. The rayon tax office, where most
taxes are collected, is indirectly subordinate to the rayon akim, and directly subordinate to the
oblast tax office.
 
  State Property Committee (Goskomimushestva or GKI). GKI was responsible for all
privatization efforts until February 1994, when a presidential decree transferred responsibility
for the conduct of land and reform to the Ministry of Agriculture. There remains some
ambiguity about which agency is responsible for privatization and restructuring of
agroindustrial enterprises. GKI currently manages privatization of industrial and commercial
enterprises. It organizes auctions of immovable property belonging to former state-owned
enterprises and has conducted auctions of immovable farm property as well. GKI is included in
the property appraisal process at the farm level.
 
  State Statistical Committee (Goskomstat), now known as the National Statistics
Committee. Goskomstat collects statistical information from all departments. Regarding land
and immovable property, it records registration of all legal entities for industrial, agricultural,
and other enterprises. It records land users according to category. It has a department of
registrar where all land users are listed according to category (agriculture, industry, nature
reserves, etc.). Goskomstat serves a type of zoning function for land users. Its influence resides
in its legal authority to require all agencies to report the kind of information it requires. This
was important in the days of central planning, but in the current system there is no need for the
same amount of detail.
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  4.  Summary
 
 As Chart 4.1 shows, there are a large number of agencies with partial, but overlapping,
responsibilities for land management. As is appropriate, the two principal institutions with
direct authority to implement the reforms (the CLAR structure and the Rural Committees) are
temporary organizations, designed to disappear when land distribution and farm restructuring
are complete. The problem is that one of them, the Rural Committee, is the focal point not only
of on-the-ground implementation of the reforms but also of the ongoing administration of land
and property assets. The chart demonstrates that the links between the reform process on one
hand and legal, policy, and administrative agencies on the other converge on the Rural
Committee at the local level. There is no such linkage with the CLAR apparatus, especially
since the recent reorganization that made the rayon CLARs independent of the rayon
administration.
 
  C. INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LAND ADMINISTRATION
  IN MARKET ECONOMY
 The market economy and the very much larger number of identifiable land users than in the
past will require modifications of the institutional arrangements for land administration. The
reform process has already created new institutions, while none of the old ones have
disappeared (although some have lost significant numbers of staff). There is a need for
redefinition of the responsibilities of all of the agencies listed above to reflect their new role as
regulators of market activities rather than agents of the command economy. There is probably
also the need for the creation of a new department, whose location is yet to be determined, to
supervise the immovable property registration process. Furthermore, environmental issues and
demographic pressures, especially rural to urban migration, will require a new approach to land
use planning. It is imperative to begin planning now for the management system that will be in
place once the initial wave of privatization and restructuring has been completed. Specific
recommendations are given below.
 
 R4.1 Clarification of responsibilities for land and agrarian reform. The key issues here
involve the overlapping responsibilities of several agencies at the rayon and local levels.
The CLARs and the Commission on Land and Agrarian Reform on one hand, and the
rayon administration and the Rural Committees on the other, appear to have
competitive mandates to implement the reforms. The rayon Land Commission and the
various Councils of People’s Deputies also are involved in certain aspects of the reform
process. There are simply too many institutions involved, and the potential exists not
only for duplication of efforts (already in evidence) but also for conflicts in approach
that paralyze the reform process. The CLAR apparatus down to the farm-level
Commission must be given full authority to implement land distribution and farm
restructuring and to disappear when the reforms are complete. The role of the Rural
Committees should be seriously reconsidered; a temporary institution should not be
given such a large number of tasks that will continue to be necessary after the reforms.
Because there will be no need for institutions at the former farm level once all land has72
been redistributed and farms restructured, some of the Rural Committee’s tasks should
be transferred to rayon level and some to the village level.
 
 R4.2 Reassessment of ongoing land administration responsibilities. There should be a
reassessment of current land administration agencies and their fulfillment of their
current mandates in four areas: (1) land taxation; (2) dispute resolution; (3) land use
planning and zoning; and (4) administration of publicly-owned land.
 
 The assessment should identify superfluous, missing, and overlapping responsibilities.
When required, new administrative systems should be designed for each of the four
subject areas. Experience from other countries undergoing similar reforms will
undoubtedly prove helpful. New legislation, training, and technical assistance will be
required to implement the new systems. The appropriate governmental level for each
task should be specified. (It is felt at this stage that oblast-level institutions will not
have important responsibilities in any of the subject areas.)
 
 R4.3  Land taxation. The objective of reform in this area is the conversion of the land tax
from a technical coefficient base to a value base, as markets increasingly give evidence
of land values. The land taxation system should be improved at two levels: (a) the
rayon tax offices which are responsible for collection; and (b) the national level, where
policy is formulated. At the rayon level, the most likely need is to upgrade the office
staff’s skills both in valuation/appraisal and in accounting. Material support in the form
of office equipment, supplies, and transport may also be required. At the national level,
both the economic skills needed for land tax policy formulation and the administrative
skills needed for implementation will most likely need to be upgraded.
 
 R4.4 Dispute resolution. The objective of reform in dispute resolution is to ensure equitable
and rapid handling of land conflicts, including boundary disputes, inheritance
disagreements, and conflicts over subdivision or amalgamation of land parcels. This will
enable the KR to avoid the problems of overcrowded civil court dockets, lengthy
delays, and unfair rulings that too many countries experience in land-related cases. The
main requirement is training of local and rayon level officials in the details of land
legislation in the KR and methods of dispute resolution. Additionally, there is a need to
review national-level policy and legislation about dispute resolution procedures and
recourse, as well as about schedules of costs, fines, and awards to which the parties to
the disputes will be subject.
 
 R4.5 Land use planning and zoning. The objective of reform in land use planning and
zoning is to enhance the capacity of government institutions to guide individuals and
communities in making appropriate decisions about land use. The freedom of
movement and market pressures stimulated by the new economic system will create
demands to convert land from one use to another, for example, from agricultural to
residential uses. The market system cannot be seen as a license to use land without any
government oversight.
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 To address these issues coherently will require a rethinking of the procedures of
acquiring, analyzing, and utilizing information about land use. It will also require
upgrading both of the human and material resources of the agencies that will be
responsible for land use planning and zoning.
 
 At the central level, a land planning agency would require: technical expertise in
economic, demographic, and geographical analysis; and administrative capacity for
administration of standards and training of local personnel.
 
 At the local level, the agencies will require city and regional planners capable of
formulating land use plans and assessing and approving proposals for land use changes.
Especially in rayons undergoing urbanization pressures, the agencies must be able to
work closely with town Architectura offices to ensure that new construction takes
place on land where urban growth is most appropriate. Their staff must be adequate in
both quantity and quality to be able to respond effectively to the need for changes,
instead of being an administrative roadblock to reasonable economic development. Not
all rayons will need the same level of staffing, but even the most stable, remote, and
underpopulated rayons will need access to specialized personnel at particular times.
Thus the institutional structure should have a component of on-loan technical personnel
who can provide services on an as needed basis.
 
 Administrative training will be required in: (a) how land use planning and zoning are
done in other places; (b) how to make decisions, especially how to exercise appropriate
discretion without the exercise of arbitrary authority; (c) reasons for and ways of
obtaining meaningful citizen participation; (d) how to keep appropriate records, and
how these records are to be used in the decision-making process; and e) the
relationship of enforcement to laws/rules/plans.
 
 Technical training will be required in applications of demographic models and analysis
(population models and housing demand) and in Geographical Information Systems
(GIS, whether computerized or manual) to assess land capability and capacity,
ownership patterns, and environmental issues.
 
 R4.6 Administration of publicly owned land. The objective of reform in public land
administration is to enable the government to manage the land resources to which it
retains ownership efficiently and rationally. Under the current system of 49-year leases
of agricultural land, the reforms will dramatically increase the government’s
management load. Instead of the relatively simple task of monitoring several hundred
state and collective farms, it will have to administer the leases of tens of thousands of
farm enterprises, and eventually perhaps hundreds of thousands. As the enterprises
inevitably transform themselves through fragmentation and merger, the government
must be able to keep track of the changes in order to ensure that the appropriate
enterprises are responsible for the land. Even if the government decides to convert the
agricultural leaseholds into private ownership, the state may continue to retain control
of two important components of agricultural land: the National Land Fund and74
pastures; together these amount to over 40 percent of the national territory. Beyond
these, rural lands in forests and protected areas will require management attention.
 
 The administrative structure will require reassessment and reform at the national
level—developing and implementing coherent and streamlined land administration
policies and fee schedules for land leases—and at the rayon level-increasing the
capability of local administrators to implement the policies.
 
 II. IMMOVABLE PROPERTY TITLING AND REGISTRATION
 
 The transition to a market-oriented economy necessarily involves the clarification of private
rights to land and other immovable property. The definition of these private rights in the KR
has been evolving. For now, the state retains ownership of the land but devolves, via 49-year
inheritable grants to private individuals, families, and legal entities, the right to exclude others
from access to the land and to transfer use rights to others though sale, lease, mortgage, and
inheritance. The state retains the right to repossess land that is not used by private holders
according to law. Since a large portion of the “bundle of rights” to land is being transferred to
private entities, a system for recording, displaying, and protecting these rights is imperative,
especially in light of the anticipated emergence of dynamic land markets.
 
  At present, there is no single, unified system for registering and recording ownership rights
on all types of immovable property. There are separate systems for recording information
about some ownership rights on urban properties and about the quantity and quality of
landholdings in rural areas. These systems are inadequate to meet the demand for land and
property transfer, leasing, and mortgaging that is expected to emerge as an immovable
property market develops. Developing a registration system to record all immovable property
interests is crucial in facilitating the development of a market in immovable property and the
market economy in general.
 
  A. URBAN NEEDS
 The current urban development environment of the KR gives evidence of a need to invest now
in the creation of a registration infrastructure. With more than 165,000 apartment units
privatized since 1992, a brisk market in sale/purchase of apartments has developed. Based on
preliminary compilations contained in the real estate market data base assembled by the
International City/County Management Association’s Bishkek office, approximately 2,700
units changed hands in the period between 1 July 1994 and 1 May 1995. If this embryonic
market is to flourish, the property interests which are being exchanged in these transactions
must be stable and clear. With the likely emergence of a mortgage law in the near future,
registration will become a critical element in collateralized lending. Furthermore, if the much
hoped for advent of a significant increase in investment (both domestic and foreign) is actually
to occur, it will of necessity be preceded by a level of confidence on the part of investors that
can be achieved only with a sound, credible registration system.75
 
  The capacity to efficiently register the wide variety of property interests that will
continuously evolve in a market environment is an essential "utility" for sound urban
development. A sound and functional system will be characterized by:
¤ consistent laws and regulations that apply to all types and phases of real estate activity,
both urban and rural;
¤ property rights that are clearly defined and well-protected by a uniform, integrated system
of property/land registration that is fully operational;
¤ technology support for registration and related activities that is appropriate to current
capacities and needs; a clear, well-planned “migration path” must be an integral part of the
overall registration strategy;
¤ trading and exchange of properties that is efficient, rapid, and cheap;
¤ a good balance of owner and tenant rights; and
¤ differentiation of the responsibilities of central and local governments with every function
carried out at the lowest possible level.
 
  There are a number of important needs in the urban environment that cannot be met in the
absence of a sound registration system. If urban governments are to accept the greater role in
service provision that is advocated by those who are dismantling the centralized structures
which characterized the command economy, cities must be given improved systems of
municipal finance. One of the most logical local options for revenue generation to meet these
new service needs is some form of property tax. A functioning registration system is an
essential foundation for municipal property tax administration. Further, in a market economy in
which the state is divested of much of its ownership of assets, the registration of easements and
rights-of-way for municipal and other utility and transportation functions is essential. In
addition, there are other lesser but still important uses of the registration utility in urban
infrastructure management.
 
  B. RURAL NEEDS
 As of July 1995 land markets in rural areas are undeveloped. There is no great clamoring for
land sale, purchase, or rental in most areas because the implications of privatization are just
beginning to be understood and most rural dwellers still are deciding what they want to do
with their land. Furthermore, lack of agricultural credit makes mortgaging and collateral issues
moot at present. This quiet period is likely to end by the beginning of the 1996 planting season.
More and more rural residents will decide to sell or rent their land shares or parcels, while
some enterprises will seek economies of scale by enlarging their holdings through land
purchase or lease. Land Tenure Center research carried out in 1995 shows why this is so:
¤ All residents of most former state and collective farms received land, but a great many are
unlikely ever to farm. Administrators, social service workers, technicians, and persons
employed full-time off the farm constitute more than 50 percent of the working-age
population of many former state and collective farms. When pensioners are added to those
who received land but are not now farmers, it is obvious that land transfer of one kind or
another will be extremely common in the near future.76
¤ In heavily populated oblasts such as Osh and Djalal-Abad, the land shares allocated to
individuals often are less than 0.05 hectare. Even when a nuclear family pools its individual
shares, the family total is frequently less than 0.25 hectare. Groups of families are
consolidating their holdings to achieve a plot that is farmable and/or meets the government-
mandated minimum farm size. But it is clear that under these conditions large numbers of
rural dwellers can have no effective role in agriculture in the future: neither their labor nor
their management input will be needed, and they will soon be seeking to sell or lease their
shares or parcels.
 
  Meanwhile, credit markets will have to emerge in rural areas if agriculture is to prosper.
Therefore, farmers will very soon need land titles secure enough to satisfy lenders’ collateral
requirements. In regions where land privatization has been embraced fully and small-scale
agriculture is emerging, new landholders are acutely aware that to obtain credit they will need
secure title. It may be especially helpful to begin pilot land registration projects in areas where
there is high enthusiasm for private farming and market relations, and where farmers seem to
understand intrinsically the functioning of agricultural credit and finance.
 
  A land registration system cannot be put into place overnight. However, current
conditions suggest that it would be extremely helpful if the details of an emerging system were
understood in rural areas of the KR by early 1996, and if work had begun to operationalize a
simple but workable system in pilot regions selected on the basis of pressing need.
 
  C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BASIC PRINCIPLES OF
  IMMOVABLE PROPERTY REGISTRATION SYSTEM
 R4.7  All types of immovable property, land and fixed structures, urban and rural,
should be included in a single registry. There are two principal justifications for this
idea: first, efficiency—a single system will be more cost-effective and easier to monitor
and to finance, and, second, flexibility—it will be much easier for immovable property
to move from one type of use to another, agricultural land to residential use, for
example, since much of it inevitably will as cities expand.
 
 R4.8  Ownership and other interests listed in the registry should be considered legally
valid. The importance of secure rights to the operation of a market economy cannot be
overemphasized. In some countries, such as the United States, the documents recorded
in the registry are not considered legally valid but merely as evidence about the history
of the immovable property’s title. In order to give security to market participants,
therefore, the US system requires the involvement of title insurance companies and real
estate lawyers. This considerably raises the costs of each market transaction (as do
notaries in the KR and other countries without operational registries). Poor countries
cannot afford such luxuries, and therefore it is preferable that the state guarantee that
the interests listed in the registry are legally valid.
 
 R4.9 The system should be parcel-based, with each parcel having a unique identifying
number. A parcel-based system, as opposed to an owner’s name-based system, is77
much easier to access by individuals seeking information about potential market
transactions or by government agencies in pursuit of their land administration duties.
The requirement for a unique identifying number is more technical and eliminates the
possibility of confusion in parcel identification.
 
 R4.10 The system should be decentralized. The appropriate location for the immovable
property registry is the rayon, which is of the appropriate scale to handle both paper
and computerized records. Paper documents, that is, maps and titles, should be stored
at the rayon registry. There is no need for oblast-level or national-level document
storage as long as adequate security is built into the storage system in the registry
offices. Information on the number and type of registry transactions may, if required for
other governmental purposes, be transmitted to higher levels in summary form.
 
 R4.11 Information included should be limited to parcel descriptions, ownership, and
other interests in the immovable property. The information contained in the registry
must not be complicated by extraneous elements such as land quality indices, tax
records (except if there is a lien placed on the parcel due to nonpayment of taxes), or
detailed information about the owners and other interest holders. The immovable
property registry should have one simple task: to serve as the recorder of ownership
and other interests in immovable property. Users of the system will therefore have
access only to the information they need in order to reassure themselves of the validity
of the rights to the parcel and not to information that would preferably be confidential
or superfluous.
 
 R4.12 Access to records should be open to the public. The purpose of the registry is to be a
public repository about immovable property ownership and other interests. Potential or
actual market participants must therefore be able to consult the documents and/or
computerized records in order to prepare their offers to buy or to sell, to lease, to
bequeath, to subdivide, or to amalgamate.
 
 R4.13 The system should be self-financing after initial registration. The registry is a
public service provided to land market participants (including the government in some
cases). Because it facilitates transactions by being the legal guarantor of interests in
immovable property, it serves to reduce transactions costs for the participants. Since
the benefits of the system are primarily private, users of the registry should pay for the
services it provides. A relatively modest fee schedule will enable the registry at least to
recover its operating and equipment amortization costs. Some rayons with a large
volume of high-value transactions may generate large surpluses, and others, with less
activity and lower property values, may experience deficits. The important goal,
however, is for the system as a whole to break even. There is one caution, however: the
fees charged by the registry must be affordable, so that market participants are not
deterred from using it.
 
 See Annex 4.1 for a demonstration of the calculations required to determine if self-
financing is possible.78
 ANNEX 4.1
 FEASIBILITY OF A SELF-FINANCING
 IMMOVABLE PROPERTY REGISTRATION SYSTEM
 
 In the absence of a land market, it is not possible to use actual figures to justify the feasibility of a self-
financed immovable property registration system. Hypothetical but realistic examples can, however,
shed light on the situation. The information required is the volume of transactions, their average value,
and the costs of operating the registration system. It is then possible to compare the average cost per
transaction to a reasonable fee schedule.
 
 1. Volume of transactions
 
 This information is the most speculative, because there is no experience with immovable property
markets in the KR. Experience in countries with mature immovable property markets suggests,
however, that there will be registrable transactions (sales, long-term leases, inheritance transfers,
mortgages, liens) on from 10-50 percent of all immovable property parcels per year. In the KR, there
are currently 165,000 privatized apartments, at least 30,000 identifiable private farm enterprises, and an
unknown number of privately owned residences, plus the multitude of commercial real estate and
government-owned land and buildings. One can conservatively estimate the number of parcels that the
registration system would have to record at the present moment at 250,000. If individualization of rights
to agricultural land continues to grow, as it is likely to do, there is a potential for many more parcels: if
each rural family held two parcels, a house plot or apartment and one agricultural plot, their total would
be nearly 1,000,000 parcels. Similarly, if each urban family held one parcel, a residence, their total
would be nearly 400,000 parcels. In reality, rural families may hold more than two (a hayfield and an
orchard, for example), and urban families may have dachas or other holdings. In Albania, a country that
individualized residential and agricultural properties completely after the fall of communism, there are
approximately the same number of identifiable parcels as there are people—not families—in the
country: 3 million. It is advisable, however, to underestimate than to overestimate the potential volume
of transactions. The figure of 250,000 parcels is therefore the base for further calculations.
 
  It is equally difficult to predict the percentage of parcels over which there will be transactions in a
given year. In the first years of operation, the volume of transactions might be low because people have
not yet gained confidence in the system, or it might be high, at least temporarily, as people make
transactions that they have postponed in the past due to the absence of tenure security. Again being
conservative, we can estimate the volume of transactions to have a range of 10,000-50,000 per year on
the existing number of parcels (and many more as the number of parcels grows).
 
 2.  Value of transactions
 
 This is important to calculate because the fee structure of the registry should include value-based
charges. The justification for this is that the essential service provided by the registry’s guarantee of
ownership and other interests is economic because the value of the immovable property is protected by
the state.
 
  Again there is little information about real estate values in the KR. For residential property, the
range is probably from about US$5,000 to well over US$100,000. For agricultural land, one can
estimate value based on the land’s productivity; land served by functional irrigation systems can
produce crops with an annual value of US$200–500 per hectare which, if capitalized at 10 percent,79
yields an estimate of land values at US$2,000–5,000 per hectare. If the average parcel on which there is
a transaction is 5 hectares, the value of the parcel would thus be US$10,000–50,000.
 
 3. Costs of operation of the registry
 
 Calculations conducted in the preparation of the Consolidation Plan suggest that the full cost of
operating the registration system will be on the order of US$3 million per year, including salaries,
material supplies, and amortization of equipment. Most of these costs are the salaries of the local
registration and survey officials ($1.8 million per year), which in the Consolidation Plan calculations
were set at private market levels rather than official government pay scales. Depending on the future
status of the registration system, the salary costs could in fact be much lower than assumed here.
 
 4. Costs of operation of the registry per transaction
 
 Volume of transactions per year  10,000  20,000  30,000  40,000  50,000
 Cost of registry per transaction  $300  $150  $100  $75  $60
 
 
 5. Potential fee schedule for the registry
 
 Cost recovery would be best served by two fees: one that is fixed per transaction, and the other that
varies with value of the transaction. In Dane County, Wisconsin (USA), the fixed fee per transaction is
US$10, and the variable fee is US$3 per US$1,000 (0.3 percent). These fees are very modest, especially
when compared to the much larger fees currently charged by notaries (3–5 percent of the declared value
of a transaction; such a fee either discourages use of the system or gives incentives to the transactors to
understate the value of the transaction). This yields the following table of registration fees per
transaction:
 
 Transaction value  $5,000  $10,000  $20,000  $50,000  $100,000
 Registration fees  $25  $40  $70  $160  $310
 
 6. Conditions for self-financing
 
 Thus the registry could break even if there were 20,000 transactions per year with an average value of
$50,000, or 40,000 transactions per year with an average value of $20,000.
 
 Given the speculative assessments given above, it is felt that there is no reason why the system could not
become self-financing within a year or two of establishment. 
 
 Chapter 5
 DIMENSIONS OF FARM RESTRUCTURING IN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC:










 The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the progress of the restructuring effort, its regional
variability, and the procedures used to redistribute land and property (nonland assets). The
analysis is based on field data gathered from case-study research and statistical surveys of
heads of rural committees and newly formed enterprises. Section II of this chapter explains the
research methodology employed and the sampling frame for choosing respondents. Section III
provides a statistical profile of the former state and collective farms in the sample, describing
their human resources and land and capital assets as they existed prior to 1991. The
organization of rural committees is the focus of section IV, followed by section V, which
assesses the progress achieved in the two major farm reorganizations to date—the initial
program, 1991 to 1993, and the second phase, in 1994 and 1995. Section VI describes the
characteristics of newly formed enterprises created out of the restructuring efforts, in
particular, their family structure, their land resources, the characteristics of the enterprise head,
and the decision-making structure. In section VII, data are presented on three key aspects of
landownership: land rights, land transfers, and land boundaries. Section VIII deals with
property ownership among new farming enterprises, focusing on livestock, buildings and
equipment, and the nature and scale of the debt burden transferred to the enterprises from the
former state and collective farms. Rankings of the severity of selected agricultural problems
facing the agricultural sector are analyzed in section IX. Finally, section X presents data that
assess the overall performance of the farm reorganization program to date from the
perspectives of rural committee heads and newly formed enterprise heads.
 
 II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
  A. STUDY OBJECTIVES
 To date, apart from consultant reports based primarily on anecdotal evidence and nonsys-
tematic interviews, no studies have been located that analyze the scope and depth of processes
used by rural committees to implement the reforms in the Kyrgyz Republic. Systematized82
knowledge is also lacking on the desires of households for private ownership of land and
property, on their aspirations as farmers, and on the constraints they perceive on operating in
the new market system. The research described here was undertaken in the spring of 1995. A
number of general questions guided the field research:
 
u Status of farm restructuring. What progress has been made in implementing the
reforms in different regions? Specifically, what processes have been used in farm
restructuring, how much variation has there been, how have land and property shares
been calculated and divided, and what are the key factors either promoting or inhibiting
the reforms regionally? What factors have led to the creation of private versus multiple-
family peasant farms, and what impact has the pooling of land and property shares
across households to form peasant enterprises had on individuals’ access to land?
 
u Governance. What modes of governance and levels of democracy are associated with
the establishment and operation of rural committees and the management of newly
formed enterprises? Are household interests being represented adequately in the
privatization effort?
 
u Nature, assurance, and transferability of land rights. What land rights are held by
various groups on newly formed enterprises? What is the quality of those rights,
especially their transferability, and are those rights different for land shares than for
physical land parcels? Can individual households freely enter and exit enterprises, and
do they expect to receive fair and just compensation for the sale and/or rental of their
property?
 
u National land fund. To what extent have rural committees set aside land for the
national land fund, and in what amounts? How is such land being used? If rented, upon
what terms and conditions?
 
u Capital assets and farm debt. To what extent are indivisible inputs (buildings,
tractors) curtailing land privatization or forcing households into farming models not to
their liking? To what extent have changes in farm assets led to problems of distress
sales, capital consumption, or corruption associated with the divestiture? Have the debt
burden and its impending transfer to new farm enterprises retarded the pace of
restructuring?
 
u Market linkages. To what extent have failures in capital and input supply and in
commodity markets hindered recovery and growth in the agricultural sector?
B. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLING FRAME
Preliminary visits to rural committees in February and March 1995 provided researchers with
an understanding of the rich variety of processes that have emerged for the distribution of land
and property in the Kyrgyz Republic. Based on these preliminary visits, a three-phase research
approach was designed to examine the restructuring process. A one-round questionnaire was83
developed and administered to heads of rural committees (RC questionnaire), which are
responsible for implementing the reforms on the former state or collective farms. A second
questionnaire was administered to heads of newly formed enterprises (EH questionnaire),
including cooperatives, peasant associations, peasant farms, and private farms. The RC
questionnaire emphasized rural committee organization and the redistribution process for land
and property shares. The EH questionnaire focused on the outcome of the land and property
distributions, their equity, the land rights they conferred, the decision-making processes in the
newly formed enterprises, and the constraints perceived in operating in the new market system.
Neither the RC nor the EH questionnaire, by nature of the sampling frame, satisfactorily
solicited the opinions and views of individuals and families within newly formed enterprises. A
third research instrument, household case-study interviews, was therefore used to assess the
potential demand for private ownership of land and property at the household level and to
evaluate constraints perceived by families in the move toward a market economy. Case-study
interviews were also held with rayon akims. As the chief government officials responsible for
administration and economic coordination within each rayon, the akims oversee the activities
of all rural committees within their jurisdiction and are better positioned to comment on the
accomplishments and constraints of the reform effort as they pertain to the broader economic
development of their rayons.
Thus, using several research approaches, the research sought to clarify the views of the
key agents responsible for implementing the farm reorganization program, including (from
most to least centralized level within the rayon) the rayon akim, the rural committee, the heads
of newly formed enterprises, and finally, families within enterprises.
C. SAMPLING FRAME
Names of all former state and collective farms were obtained from the Land Register of the
State Inspectorate on Land Engineering along with information on the rayon in which they
were located. Approximately 10 percent of the former state and collective farms that existed in
each oblast prior to the 1991 restructurings was selected randomly for interviews.
1 If the
number of farms randomly selected in a given oblast fell below five, additional farms were
added so that a minimum of five was obtained. For each sample farm, enumerators were
instructed to administer the RC questionnaire to the head of the rural committee and the EH
questionnaire to between one and three heads of newly formed enterprises.
D. INTERVIEWING PROCEDURES
The RC questionnaire was to be administered to the head of the rural committee who
sometimes but not always was the former director of the state or collective farm. If the rural
committee head was unavailable, enumerators were instructed to speak, first, with his or her
                                               
1 Of the roughly 450 state and collective farms that existed prior to 1991, 47 were selected for
interviewing. The sampling percentage is in fact higher than 10 percent, since 30 or so pedigree seed and stock
farms were until recently exempt from the restructuring effort. A slightly larger sample would have been
desirable, but limited resources and the 6-month time frame from preliminary planning to final submission
limited the scope of  field research.84
deputy, or else with the economist of the former state or collective farm or another
knowledgeable person. If the farm had essentially not reorganized, so that one person (often
the head of the former state or collective farm) remained the head of the rural committee and
also the head of the only enterprise on the former state or collective farm, enumerators were
instructed to administer the RC questionnaire to the farm economist, and the EH questionnaire
to the enterprise/rural committee head.
As noted above, the EH questionnaire was administered to the heads of between one and
three restructured farm enterprises formed out of the former state or collective farm. These
were commonly heads of peasant (multiple family) farms, but in some cases they were private
farmers, heads of peasant associations, or heads of cooperatives.
2 Upon visiting the rural
committee head, the respondent was first asked for the names of the heads of all the newly
formed enterprises on the territory of the former state or collective farm. Enterprise heads
were randomly selected for interviewing according to the following quotas: one sample
enterprise if the former state or collective farm was comprised of between one and five new
enterprises; two sample enterprises if there were between six and ten new enterprises; and
three sample enterprises if there were more than ten enterprises. If the head of one of the
chosen enterprises was unavailable, enumerators were instructed to interview his or her deputy
or draw another farm name randomly from the pool.
In addition to the statistical surveys, semi-structured interviews were to be conducted with
households in 20–25 newly formed enterprises. These interviews were intended to provide
insight into the views of rank-and-file members, which may differ considerably from the views
of enterprise heads. Interviews were conducted only on farms included in the above sampling
frame during the farm visits on which the enumerators administered the questionnaires. Special
care was taken to interview a variety of household members, including men and women,
younger and older adults, pensioners, service workers, and production workers. While it was
difficult to keep enterprise heads or household heads from choosing informants, every attempt
was made to ensure a good cross-section of enterprise members. However, in practice female
respondents were often surrounded by other family members or by their husbands, and in these
cases women tended to defer to their brothers or spouses.
All survey instruments were produced in Russian. Questions were administered to
respondents in the language (either Russian or Kyrgyz) in which they felt most comfortable.
Most of the enumerators could communicate in both languages, but special effort was made to
match the language skills of the research team with the language of the respondent.
                                               
2 Several different classification systems have been used during the restructuring period. For the sake of
simplicity, the survey contained only 3 categories, which correspond more or less to the official categories used
in 1994 and early 1995: private farm, defined as a single- family farm operating independently; peasant farm,
defined as a multi-family farm operating independently; and cooperatives/associations of peasant farms, defined
as large, communally operated farms. While cooperatives tend to be smaller than associations of peasant farms,
both of these models basically represent a miniaturization of the former state or collective farm and continue to
operate along old principles. For more discussion and a history of the classification system, see chapters 2
and 3.85
E. RESEARCH TEAMS
Four students, two women and two men, from the land engineering faculty of Scriabin
Agricultural Academy assisted with the data gathering. Two other women, currently
unemployed but with prior experience on the farms (and one with an advanced degree), were
selected from a pool of candidates to facilitate, coordinate, and manage the logistics of the
interviews. One to three researchers from the University of Wisconsin team visited the farms
along with the students, primarily to conduct interviews with households and with rayon
akims. The teams traveled in two cars within an oblast; depending on the location of the farms,
they either visited one farm and worked together, or they carried out interviews on two farms
simultaneously.
F. CAVEATS
Two unique characteristics of the farm reorganization program in the Kyrgyz Republic have
fundamental implications for the interpretation of research findings.
First, a rich variety of paths are being pursued in the restructuring effort. Some former
state and collective farms have distributed land only once to newly formed enterprises.
However, others did an initial distribution in 1991 or 1992, then recombined, then split into
two or more cooperatives, then split again into peasant farms. Basic questions about paths or
roots of restructuring and about changes in resource holdings and in land-use management did
not always lead to easy answers or tabulations.
3 This problem is compounded by the lack of
clear definitions and divisions between private farms, peasant farms, associations of peasant
farms, and cooperatives. While good data were collected, readers should nonetheless be aware
of the difficulties involved in collecting and tabulating data about types and numbers of farms
amid the uncertainties created during the transitional period.
Second, the vast majority of farms began a restructuring effort (some for the second time)
in the fall of 1994, and that effort continued through the spring of 1995. Hence, the surveys
and case studies were being implemented during a time of significant structural change in the
farm sector. The survey responses show some definite trends in the restructuring, yet there are
two underlying weaknesses—farmers did not always understand various processes or elements
of the restructuring program, which sometimes resulted in confused responses, and many
responses were being given amidst considerable change and uncertainty. While the authors
remain impressed with the internal consistency of the data and the extent to which the
empirical findings have been validated in reviews with knowledgeable observers,
4 the research
                                               
3 Fortunately for the survey exercise, the management of the former state and collective farms kept
detailed records on all aspects of farm operations, and the rural committees are continuing this tradition. The
fact that the director and farm economist on the former farms generally hold leadership positions on the present
rural committees greatly facilitated data recall.
4 For example, the research findings were presented at a workshop (4–6 July 1995) for a group of 30–60
(depending on the day) international policy advisors and knowledgeable Kyrgyz public officials and observers.
Aside from a few disagreements about the policy implications of the research findings, no objections to the
results were raised. Instead, there was widespread agreement that the research adequately captures the nature of
the farm restructuring process and current problems.86
might have been more revealing, and certainly more stable, if the survey had been implemented
one or two years in the future.
G. CHARACTERISTICS OF SURVEY SAMPLE
Due to time constraints, the field research was limited primarily to a 2-month period, April and
May 1995. The research team administered the RC questionnaires to 47 rural committee heads
and the EH questionnaire to 117 peasant farm enterprise heads, carried out in-depth case
studies with 14 members of peasant farm enterprises, and conducted further in-depth
interviews with 11 rayon akims.
5
Selected characteristics of sample coverage are presented in table 5.1 for the RC survey
and in table 5.2 for the EH survey. In the case of rural committee heads, between 5 and 12
rural committees were surveyed in each oblast, and the committees were nearly evenly split
between former state and collective farms. In the majority of cases (62 percent), the head of
the rural committee was interviewed, but the respondents also included the deputy head or the
farm economist in 23 percent and 13 percent of the cases, respectively. In the case of the newly
formed enterprises, a greater proportion were created out of former collective farms. Peasant
farms (72 percent of overall sample) represented the most common model of reorganized farm
investigated in the study, followed by private farms (15 percent) and agricultural cooperatives
(12 percent).




Number of former collective and state farms interviewed by oblast:
     Djalal-Abad 5
     Issyk-Kul 6
     Naryn 6
     Osh 12
     Chui 12
     Talas 6
Total sample size 47
Type of former farm in sample (%):
     Collective farm 54
     State farm 44
     Specialized 2
Current position of respondent (%  of total sample):
     Head of rural committee 62
     Deputy head 23
     Farm economist of former enterprise 13
     Other 2
                                               
5 In addition to these case studies, 20–30 other interviews were held with rayon akims and household
members; however, these interviews did not achieve the status of formal case studies. See annex 4.1 for a
summary of the points learned from the rayon akim interviews.87










Number of new farming enterprises sampled: 40 24 53 117
Type of former farm in sample (%):
   Collective farm 82 58 57 66
   State farm 18 42 43 34
Type of new farming enterprise in sample (%):
   Peasant farm 75 67 72 72
   Private farm 7 25 17 15
   Cooperative 18 4 11 12
   Association of peasant farms 0 4 0 1
III. PROFILE OF SAMPLE STATE AND COLLECTIVE FARMS
Before the restructuring process began in 1991, the average size of state and collective farms
in the sample was quite large, over 20,000 hectares (table 5.3). The vast majority of this land
was pasture; less than 14 percent was arable. Most farms had a modest fleet of trucks and large
tractors as well as sizable livestock holdings, dominated by sheep and goats but also including
horses, cattle (both dairy and beef), and, in some cases, hogs and yaks. The former farms
supported an average population of over 6,500 individuals; of the working-age adults, over 80
percent were directly involved in farm production, with smaller numbers being employed either
as social service workers (16 percent) or as administrators.
Whether the land endowment is sufficient to accommodate all vested interests, principally
workers and their families from the former enterprise, is a key issue that will have an important
influence on the ultimate success and pace of the land and agrarian reforms. Farm activities on
smaller farming units are generally more labor intensive than on larger estates. Nevertheless,
the last question reported in table 5.3 is not encouraging. Many of the rural committees
interviewed indicated that the size of the work force on the former state or collective farm was
excessive for the farm labor that the land could support. This problem is exacerbated by the
government’s National Land Fund (NLF) policy, which requires that each rural committee set
aside 25 percent of arable holdings for future population growth or for outsiders who wish to
acquire landholdings. The NLF policy thus curtails the supply of land to workers and residents
on the former farm while, at the same time, the reform effort is increasing their demand for
private landownership.88
TABLE 5.3   Characteristics of former state and collective
farming enterprises in sample prior to restructuring,




Mean landholdings of former enterprise (ha): 20,335
     Arable (n=47) 2,814
     Hayfields (n=29) 703
     Pasture (n=39) 16,178
     Gardens (n=34) 76
     Orchards (n=19) 257
Mean livestock holdings (no.):
     Sheep and goats 12,333
     Cattle (beef) 815
     Cattle (dairy) 613
     Horses 359
     Hogs 150
     Yaks 59
Mean size of equipment fleet (number of vehicles):
     Tractors 53
     Trucks 39




     - Working age adults 2,496
     - Children 2,928
     - Pensioners 861
     - Other 301
Occupation of working age adults (%):
     - Administration 3
     - Farm production workers 81
     - Social service workers (doctors, shopkeepers,
       teachers)
16
Percentage of respondents indicating that the work force was
excessive for the farm work the land could support:
     Very excessive 31
     Slightly excessive 16
     About right 40
     Slightly inadequate 11
     Seriously inadequate 2
   a.  Maximum population: 24,500 persons; minimum: 770 persons.89
IV. ORGANIZATION OF RURAL COMMITTEES
Selected details on the structure and organization of rural committees are provided in table 5.4,
and on the longevity and function of the committees, in table 5.5. Most rural committees were
formed during the 1994 reform initiative (69 percent), though a few reportedly had been
formed previously and a significant number (almost 24 percent) were not formed until 1995.
Although the legislation requires a committee size of between three and seven individuals,
many committees contain either fewer than three or more than seven. The vast majority of
committee members are male, which is rather striking considering that women comprise a
major component of the farm labor force and are equal recipients of land and property shares.
The predominant role of appointments (rather than elections) in determining rural
committee membership is also worth noting. While regulations require that the director and
deputy director be appointed by the district administration, there are no such requirements
concerning other committee members. Although the rural committees may thus far have served
an important function in implementing the reforms, the risk in the longer term is that
appointments will act to entrench and perpetuate the power of the managers of former state
and collective farms and their control over resource use within the region. This concern is
underscored by the extensive planning functions mandated for the rural committee in
government regulations, which place a high demand on the skills of former managers to
implement the reforms. The tendency to carry over the power structure of the Soviet period
seems evident already: over 69 percent of rural committee heads were directors of the former
state or collective farm, while 84 percent of the deputy heads were either specialists or
administrators on the farm prior to reorganization. If the rural committee is to continue to
serve the greater public good, democratic processes of election should be expanded, and many
of the duties of the rural committees should be transferred to the rayon administrations or
eliminated (privatized) entirely.
6
Because of the substantial responsibilities of the rural committee, it is rather surprising that
almost one-third of rural committee members claim they receive no compensation for their
work. There may be honor and pride associated with serving on the committee. Yet many of
the tasks outlined in chapter 2 (section III.B)—subdividing land and property shares, managing
the national land fund, monitoring and enforcing rational land use, regulating land and water
use, considering grievances, reallocating land, keeping statistics on all economic activities, and
overseeing the registration of newly formed enterprises—are so demanding that it is
unreasonable and unrealistic to expect the committees to devote the necessary time simply out
of goodwill. The most obvious long-term solution is to reduce or eliminate the degree of land-
use planning and monitoring within the system so that only the most fundamentally required
services are rendered. Another solution would be to shift true public service functions, such as
                                               
6 At the 4–6 July 1995 workshop in which research findings were presented to the government, one rayon
akim strongly objected to such democratic processes. He felt, based on personal experience, that the rayon akim
needed the power of appointment to eliminate bad managers on the rural committee so that reforms could move
forward. However, while appointments might be desirable in the case of benevolent rayon akims who are good
governors, they nonetheless can be used by other rayon akims to perpetuate local autocracies and personal
power.90
the recording of land maps and land transfers, the hearing of grievances, and the keeping of
data, to local administrations, either to the rayon government or to rural councils. However, if
rural committees still have a valuable role to play after these reallocations and eliminations
have taken place, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food must pay their members accordingly.
Otherwise, rural committees themselves will begin to seek funding solutions through charges
and fees that risk compromising the coherency of the tax system in rural areas. There is already
some evidence of this occurring.
TABLE 5.4   Organization of the rural committee,




Date rural committee was formed:                                     1991 - 1993 7
(% of those formed, n=55)                                                 1994 69
                                                                                         1995 24
Size of rural committee (% of committees with):
     1-3 persons 29
     4-6 persons 28
     7-9 persons 28
     Other (one committee with 16 persons, or not yet formed) 15
Percentage of members who are male:
     Director 98
     Deputy director 90
     All other members on committee are male 54
Percent of committees on which the following are appointed (versus
elected):
     Director 69
     Deputy director 80
     All other members 71
Percent of heads who were directors of the former state or collective
farm:
68
Position of deputy heads before being appointed or elected (%):
     Farm administration or technical specialist 84
     Social service or farm worker 16
Percentage of rural committees whose members are paid (% yes): 68
Although the legislation specifies three-year terms for the rural committees, only 25
percent of the committees actually meet this requirement (table 5.5). The majority expect to
occupy longer terms: about 60 percent of rural committee heads expect their committees to
remain in effect until the “end” of reforms and/or indefinitely thereafter. In justifying the
continuation of their committees, they claim there are a variety of services that the committee91
is responsible for providing, including agribusiness services, land transfer coordination, farm
management advice, and assisting with input supply. The failure of rural committees to adhere
to legal requirements for committee termination and their perception of their roles as general
managers in the agrarian sector reflect, first, a tendency to cling to the central planning
mentality and, second, the slow development of the private sector, which should eventually
come to replace the rural committees as the main provider of agricultural services.
TABLE 5.5   Longevity and role of the rural committee,




How long are the terms (% of committees):
     3 years 25
     5 years 4
     Until end of the reforms 30
     Indefinite 30
     Uncertain 11
Percentage of respondents who feel the committee should be phased
out after land and property shares are completely distributed:
38
Percent of rural committee heads who see the long term role(s) of the
committee as: 
a
     Providing agribusiness services 69
     Coordinating land transfers 55
     Providing farm management advice 55
     Assisting with input supply 45
     Regulating irrigation water use and other 28
     Other (including various combinations of the above) 7
Percentage of respondents feeling that input supply and marketing are
best provided by the rural committee:
50
Most appropriate institution to hold land records and record land
transfers (% of committees responding):
     Rural committee 47
     Rural council 29
     Rayon administration 16
     Rural committee and rayon administration 7
     Other 2
   a. Based on those respondents who feel the committee should not be phased out
after land and property is distributed in prior question. Of those responding, 92 percent
replied with two or more answers (roles).92
Considerable confusion also exists as to which authority should hold land records and
record land transfers. Nearly 47 percent of the respondents felt that such functions ought to be
performed by the rural committee, 29 percent by the rural council, and 16 percent by the rayon
administration, among other groupings. Either local authorities themselves have begun to
compete for control over these functions, or duties are being relegated to those institutions
with localized strengths in personnel, material, or finances. Ideally, one public entity supported
by public tax revenues would control the land registration system, maintain the land cadastre
and register, and record land transfers.
A number of specific recommendations seem sensible:
R5.1 Local governance. The roles and responsibilities of various government entities
operating in rural areas, specifically the rural council, rural committee, and rayon
administration, must be delineated to eliminate overlap and minimize confusion. This
assessment should include an evaluation of public spending and should make sure
institutions are allocated sufficient funds to be able to fulfill their responsibilities. Key
concerns include land administration and registration.
 
R5.2 Elections. As far as possible, rural committee members should be elected by majority
vote of farming households. This will empower farmers by giving them greater control
over the decision-making process.
 
R5.3 Financing rural committee expenditures. Funding mechanisms must be devised for
rural committee members so that their commitment to their work is not compromised
(conditional on a review and rationalization of duties).
 
R5.4 Rural committee’s status. The legal status, longevity, and termination procedures for
rural committees need to be clarified and applied uniformly except in unusual cases.
 
R5.5 Service cooperatives. Provision of agribusiness services, farm management advice, and
input supply are not appropriate public functions, but slow private market development
continues to impede the supply of these services. Consideration should be given to
converting rural committees to full-service farm cooperatives, which are the backbone
of the rural farm economy in certain western economies (for example, the United
States). Such a transition, however, will not be possible without fully democratic
elections, a general cooperatives law, and development of a structure for incorporation
and management.93
V. LAND PRIVATIZATION
A. FARM RESTRUCTURING PROGRAM BETWEEN 1991 AND 1993
While any citizen of the Kyrgyz republic was theoretically eligible for land and property shares
under the 1991–1993 reforms, conditions on land grants tended to favor those with capital and
agricultural know-how (chapter 2, section II.B). Land grants were issued on a competitive
basis, and preference was given to those judged to have more farm experience, higher
qualifications, or greater management capabilities. While no explicit mention is made of
minimum capital requirements in the rules and decrees, this was nonetheless an important
factor in practice. Shareholders exiting the former state and collective farms were entitled to
land and property shares based on years of experience with the farm. However, the field
research indicates that a number of exiting enterprises either purchased additional land and
property to complement their existing holdings or, because of the lumpiness of certain capital
assets (buildings or machinery), paid for shares over and beyond the fraction to which they
were entitled.
According to rural committee heads, roughly 45 percent of the former state and collective
farms underwent some form of restructuring between 1991 and 1993 (table 5.6). The most
common entities (in terms of number of farms) emerging from this restructuring were private
farms, followed by peasant farms and peasant associations or cooperatives. Among state and
collective farms divesting land to individual families, an average of 96 private farms were
created, with an average of 4.8 hectares of irrigated land per farming unit. Where peasant
farms were created, land was divested to 29 farming units with an average of 23.6 hectares of
irrigated land per unit.
7 Farms that “reorganized” into peasant associations or cooperatives
essentially continued to function as state or collective farms: as the data show, only one such
unit emerged from each of the state or collective farms that chose this form of reorganization.
Although this unit might have been somewhat smaller than the former farm due to attrition
(individuals or groups splitting off into private or peasant farms), it continued to operate as a
collective. Average irrigated landholdings among these farms were high, over 400 hectares per
unit.
It is also interesting to compare the irrigated-land-per-household figures for the three
types of farm models. Cooperatives and peasant associations retained an average of 3.3
hectares of irrigated land per household. Peasant farms, on the other hand, received only 1.6
hectare of irrigated land per household, while private farms received 4.8 hectares on average.
The relatively large size of private farms is easy to explain: such farms originated during the
early stages of reform, mostly in 1991–1992, when individuals were allowed to request an
unlimited amount of land from the state or collective farm and to farm this land separately.
Often the individuals who could afford to do this were former managers, specialists, or
administrators of the state or collective farm who had both the money and the connections
necessary to operate individually in a collective economy.
                                               
7 Because the terms peasant farm and private farm have been redefined several times during the
restructuring period (see footnote 2, chapter 3), it is quite possible that respondents may sometimes have
confused the categories; the results should be interpreted accordingly.94
Table 5.6   Scope of 1991–1993 farm restructurings,




Percent of farms which privatized some land in 1991 to 1993: 45
Mean area of irrigated land divested by former state/collective farm
in total to (ha):
     Private farms (single family) 465.8
     Peasant farms (multiple families) 693.9
     Peasant associations or cooperatives 402.0
Mean area of irrigated land distributed per enterprise to (ha):
     Private farms (single family) 4.8
     Peasant farms (multiple families) 23.6
     Peasant associations or cooperatives 402.0
Mean area of irrigated land distributed per household to (ha):
     Private farms (single family) 4.8
     Peasant farms (multiple families) 1.6
     Peasant associations or cooperatives 3.3
Mean number of enterprises or units created (per former state or
collective farm) out of reorganization:
     Private farms (single family) 96
     Peasant farms (multiple families) 29
     Peasant associations or cooperatives 1
Mean number of households per enterprise in:
     Private farms (single family) 1
     Peasant farms (multiple families) 15
     Peasant associations or cooperatives 122
Percent of enterprises who received larger land shares in 1991-1993
than allowed under the February 1994 decree who fear losing land:
19
The relationship between enterprise type and landholdings per household is much more
difficult to explain when peasant farms are compared with cooperatives/associations of peasant
farms, the latter appearing to have almost two times as much land as the former. The
noticeably smaller land area per household in peasant farms remains constant throughout the
reform period (see the comparable question in table 5.7). Although one can speculate about
possible explanations—differences in land quality, mechanization status, location of farms to
urban centers, differences in land use (irrigated grain versus labor-intensive vegetables), and a
discriminatory bias by the former collective and state farm in giving land to peasant farms—the
data are not sufficiently robust to discern actual causes.95
Current regulations require that the shareholders of any farming unit which received larger
land shares in the 1991–1993 restructuring than allowed by the February 1994 decree pay
compensation to the rural committees equal to “the initial cost of a land use right,” and, if the
pooled shares exceed the maximum farm-size limit, the farming unit is required to return the
excess land to the rural committee for redistribution (chapter 2, section III.H). According to
survey results and case-study interviews, households are not genuinely worried about the
government’s enforcing such conditions, nor do local administrations appear to support this
policy. Any attempt to enforce such regulations would seriously undermine the government’s
credibility.
The farming community maintains that farms which split off from the state and collective
farms in 1991–1992 have had a significant advantage over farms which were created later.
Farmers who privatized early were eligible for farm machinery, spare parts, feed, farm
chemicals, building timbers, fuel and lubricants, seeds, and gas and electricity from the state
sector at wholesale prices set for the state and collective farms (chapter 2, section II.B). Such
farms were also able to obtain 1–2 years of experience operating as separate enterprises before
the state agricultural system began to deteriorate seriously in 1993. Lack of data precludes a
comparison of the profitability of early and late reform enterprises, but based on case study
interviews, the head start received by early reformers has given them a significant advantage in
dealing with the present economic crisis.
B. FARM RESTRUCTURING PROGRAM IN 1994 AND 1995
Compared with the more sporadic farm reorganizations of 1991–1993, the 1994–1995
restructuring program has affected almost all of the former state and collective farms (table
5.7). While some critics argue that this restructuring has been largely superficial, involving
name changes (for example, a state farm becomes an agricultural cooperative or an association
of peasant farms) but little substantive reorganization, the data in table 5.7 do not bear this out.
As in the 1991–1993 restructuring, quite a few private and peasant farms have emerged during
the 1994–1995 reorganization. Moreover, the patterns of irrigated land distribution appear to
be almost identical between the two periods. The mean number of enterprises created in each
category, the number of households per enterprise, and the amount of irrigated land per
household are all consistent from 1991 through 1995. This suggests that the farm restructuring
process has been a great deal more stable during this period than popular opinion allows. The
government’s tendency to issue decrees and large amounts of contradictory legislation has led
to a great deal of unnecessary confusion and unwarranted concern over the instability of the
reforms. In practice, the distribution of land shares appears to be progressing evenly over time.96
TABLE 5.7  Scope of 1994 and 1995 farm restructurings,




Percent of sample farms which restructured in 1994 or 1995: 92
Mean area of irrigated land divested by former state/collective farm in total to
(ha):
     Private farms (single family) 403.3
     Peasant farms (multiple families) 976.0
     Peasant associations or cooperatives 1209.3
     National Land Fund 669.5
Mean area of irrigated land distributed per enterprise to (ha):
     Private farms (single family) 3.7
     Peasant farms (multiple families) 24.4
     Peasant associations or cooperatives 403.1
Mean area of irrigated land distributed per household to (ha):
     Private farms (single family) 3.7
     Peasant farms (multiple families) 1.8
     Peasant associations or cooperatives 4.0
Mean number of enterprises or units created (per former state or collective farm)
out of reorganization in 1994 or 1995:
     Private farms (single family) 109
     Peasant farms (multiple families) 40
     Peasant associations or cooperatives 3
Mean number of households per enterprise in:
     Private farms (single family) 1
     Peasant farms (multiple families) 13
     Peasant associations or cooperatives 100
Percent of committees which gave land shares to the following:
     Administration, agricultural production workers, and pensioners 100
     Service workers and children 98
     Residents working off farm 87
Mean size of irrigated land shares received by the following (ha):
     Management and administrative staff .73
     Farm production workers and pensioners .71
     Service workers .67
     Children .66
     Residents working off farm .53
Percent of coefficients (shares) that were the same for men as for women: 98
Reasons for creating a peasant farming enterprise (versus a private farm) (%):
     Pool equipment or expertise 34
     Meet minimum farm size limits 13
     Mixed (minimum farm size limits, credit, and/or pool equipment) 24
     Instructed to do so by government or by decree 16
     Gain access to credit 3
     Pool equipment and gain access to credit 5
     Other 597
It is clear that the current categorization system does not begin to express the wide variety
of farm structures that have emerged in rural areas. By applying overly technical definitions,
the present system creates artificial divisions between farm types in a way that hinders coherent
debate on the restructuring process and provides little substantive information about the actual
nature of the enterprises. Although in legal terms a private farm contains only one family, a
number of private farms were visited that comprised multiple households, usually extended
family or kin, that are not greatly different than peasant farms which are legally defined as
multiple-family units.
8 Peasant associations and cooperatives, on the other hand, are relatively
similar, and according to many critics represent little more than a miniaturization of the former
state or collective farm.
Returning to distribution issues, the reforms appear relatively egalitarian both in terms of
land allocation to various classes of workers and in terms of gender. Every committee gave
land shares to managers, agricultural production workers, and pensioners of the former
enterprise. A high percentage of rural committees also gave land shares to service workers and
children and even to residents working off the farm. Technically, however, even if all segments
of the population received land shares, some groups could still receive larger land shares than
others. While this occurred to a some degree, management and administrative staff, farm
production workers, pensioners, service workers, and children all received between 0.66 and
0.73 ha/person on average. Only residents working off the farm received significantly smaller
land shares. Furthermore, the vast majority of rural committees allocated identically sized land
shares to both men and women.
Data in table 5.8, tabulated from the EH survey, give further details on the process of farm
reorganization. Households have generally pooled shares voluntarily in forming an enterprise
(78 percent of total sample), though the high percentage of missing values indicates that a
significant number of restructurings are still in progress. The majority of households
nationwide pooled the land shares of family and kin (52 percent), the land of households whose
residences were similarly located (19 percent), or the shares of friends or members of the same
neighborhood (16 percent). However, regional differences are apparent. Households in Naryn,
Talas, and Issyk-Kul tended to pool shares among family and kin, while households in Osh and
Djalal-Abad proved to be the most flexible in pooling the shares of nonrelated individuals
(friends, members of the same neighborhood, or members of the same production unit).
9
When land shares are distributed, households can choose with whom they would like to
pool their shares. There appear to be a variety of constraints which determine the optimal
number of households in any given enterprise. Enterprise heads indicated that they did not
exclude more households because they needed to meet minimum size requirements, to pool
equipment or expertise, or to accommodate all of their family and friends. In Osh and Djalal-
Abad, where farms tend to be smaller, the need to pool equipment or expertise was the major
                                               
8 The State Inspectorate on Land Engineering reports data only for “peasant farms,” which include both
private and peasant farms as legally defined, because of the difficulty in distinguishing the two farm types in
practice (see chapter 3)
9 A similar question was addressed to the heads of rural committees with similar results: Extent to which
families comprising peasant farms are related by birth or marriage (percent of national totals, Kyrgyzstan):
entirely so (18 percent), mostly (53 percent), and somewhat to about one-half (29 percent).98
factor cited by 42 percent of respondents, while in Chui oblast, the majority of peasant
enterprise heads (72 percent) accepted extra households to meet minimum farm size limits
imposed by the government.
TABLE 5.8   Process for pooling land shares,









Process households used to pool land shares
(%):
   Voluntarily sought out other members 80 71 79 78
   Lottery or administratively chosen 5 0 0 2
   No response 15 29 21 20
If voluntary, the criteria used to join families (%):
   Family or kin 34 47 67 52
   Land location relative to residence 13 23 21 19
   Friends or members of same neighborhood 28 18 7 16
   Members of same production unit 25 12 5 13
Why not fewer households pooled (%):
   Pooled shares to meet minimum farm size 29 72 30 38
   Needed to pool equipment or expertise 42 7 21 25
   Had to accommodate all family and friends 13 7 24 17
   Families chosen proportional to equipment 8 7 3 6
   Not applicable or no answer 8 7 22 14
Why not more households pooled (%):
   Numerous families too difficult to coordinate 63 88 50 61
   Accommodated only family 21 0 17 15
   Farm size could not exceed maximum limits 4 0 10 6
   Families chosen proportional to equipment 4 6 8 6
   Not applicable or no answer 8 6 15 12
Enterprise heads also said that they did not include more households simply because
numerous families in the enterprise are difficult to coordinate or manage (61 percent), or
because the enterprise wanted to accommodate family or kin, but no one else.
C. NATIONAL LAND FUND
As indicated in table 5.7, rural committees on average reserved 669.5 hectares for the national
land fund. Given that the mean arable landholding of the former state and collective farms was
2,813.5 hectares, the percentage of land reserved (24 percent on average) is very close to the
25 percent required by regulation. The various survey approaches used were not sufficiently
precise to determine the status of land use on and management of the NLF, but a significant99
percentage (perhaps as much as 48 percent)
10 appears to be either idle or farmed by the rural
committee itself. It is possible, given the newness of the reforms, that many committees have
not yet decided how to use or allocate this land. Nonetheless, there are important policy
questions that remain unanswered—whether NLF land is continuing the legacy of state
ownership over a sizable portion of the country’s irrigated land, whether certain committees
are using such land to continue the de facto operation of the former state farm or collective, or
whether overly bureaucratic rules governing land markets are causing excessive land
transactions costs that are reducing private land access. Answers to these questions require
further investigation, but the government policy of reserving NLF land for future population
growth or allocation to agricultural entrepreneurs has a number of shortcomings.
First, there are serious concerns about the efficiency of the rural committee acting as
lessor for NLF land. Little NLF land is presently being distributed on a long-term basis (only 7
of 47 rural committees in the survey had reassigned or redistributed NLF land, whereas 25
rural committees were renting such land) (table 5.9). The fact that rural committees must seek
MAF approval for subdivisions and long-term lease issuances limits the discretion of the rural
committee in land use and increases transactions costs in land market dealings (see chapter 2,
section III.C). Although the duration of rental terms ranged from 1 to 49 years, by far the
majority of rural committees are granting only one-year leases. The ability of the rural
committee to negotiate promptly and to monitor such annual rentals is highly questionable.
Families are capable of holding and managing land reserves to accommodate growth in their
own households and, within the bounds of certain types of regulation,
11 the land market is a
more efficient mechanism for redistributing land among households. The limited number of
reassignments is perhaps understandable given the short time that has elapsed since the reforms
began. Yet, if the number of assignments does not increase substantially within the next year or
two, this should be taken as a clear indication that problems exist.
Second, there are serious concerns whether the rural committee can mobilize the capital
resources necessary to maintain or improve land quality given the present liquidity crisis and
budgetary shortfalls facing local authorities. Only 36 percent of the 25 rural committees
renting-out land charged or collected monetary rent; cash rentals received average 529
som/hectare/year, but ranged from as little as 90 som/hectare/year to as much as 2,500
som/hectare/year.
12 It is thus difficult to envisage how the rural committee can cover the costs
of land administration associated with annual rentals, let alone the resources required to
improve or even maintain land quality.
                                               
10 Estimated from table 4.9 according to the formula: [(7)(464) + (25)(471)]‚[(47)(670)].
11 Adequate government monitoring and perhaps regulation to prevent land grabbing and land speculation
or marketed-assisted land distribution to help the poor and disadvantage.
12 An additional 9 (of 25) rural committees, or 36 percent, have allowed alternative arrangements
for NLF land use, usually accepting a percentage of the harvest and/or payment of the land tax on the
NLF plot in lieu of monetary rent. The remaining 7 (of 25) committees either are trying to figure out
what appropriate rent to charge (3) or are not presently collecting rent (4).100




Mean irrigated area set aside for National Land Fund (NLF) (ha): 
a 669.5
Number of rural committees in survey which set aside some NLF land
(out of 47):
40
NLF land reassigned to farm enterprises: 
a
     Number of rural committees indicating some reassignment 7
     Mean number of hectares reassigned by these committees, in total 463.7
     Mean number of enterprises receiving land 17
     Mean number of hectares reassigned per enterprise 27.3
NLF land being rented out: 
a
     Number of rural committees renting out land 25
     Mean number of hectares rented out by these committees, in total 470.8
     Mean number of enterprises renting land 14
     Mean number of hectares rented per enterprise 33.6
Type of farming enterprise renting (%):
     Private farms 8
     Peasant farms 32
     Co-ops 36
     Mixed 24
   a. Area of land permanently assigned to enterprises and rented-out can exceed the
mean area of NLF land set aside due to different population counts.
Third, farmers do not have adequate incentives to invest labor or capital on land where
they are assured access only to annual use rights. Rural committees have few incentives to
invest in land improvements or resource conservation, since their future is uncertain and their
revenue stream (from the rental market and taxes) is inadequate. This combination of low
investment demand by farmers and weak financial capacity of rural committees bodes ill for
long-term land improvements.
Fourth, the assignment of a large area of irrigated land to rural committees can act to
justify and prolong their existence and entrench former managers. In view of the valuable
nature of the land resource, local authorities will be inclined to retain skilled expertise
knowledgeable in farm management; land-use planning; irrigation water distribution; mainte-
nance and operation of communal orchards, windbreaks, watersheds, and the like. An
erroneous but self-fulfilling cycle is perpetuated where centralized control over national fund
land is thought to be needed, private landholders lacking secure rights fail to undertake
“recommended” cropping practices and investments, and administrators observing poor land
practices and weak investment demand justify the need for state oversight through the rural
committee to regulate, allocate, and manage NFL land.101
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
R5.6 Farm models. The present system of distinguishing farming units according to “private
farm,” “peasant farm,” cooperative, association of peasant farms, collective, or state
farm is confusing and fails to capture the rich variety of farm enterprises presently
emerging. Based on rural appraisals, there is little de facto difference in the operation of
a private versus a peasant farming enterprise. Peasant associations, cooperatives, and
collectives are also nondistinct in practice. The present ambiguity in these definitions is
leading to a muddled characterization of the agrarian structure. In the long run, data on
area and number of farms by farm-size category would be appropriate for most policy
uses. Further divisions between private, cooperative, and joint-stock companies would
be useful. The effect of the current land policy’s forcing multiple households into
farming units and miniaturizing former state and collective farms into peasant farms and
associations inevitably creates the need for multiple legal corporate definitions.
Removing these land policy distortions and rationalizing the system of farm
categorization is possible and advised.
13
 
R5.7 Minimum limits on farm size. Current administrative rules constrain optimal farm
choice. Present size limits were set arbitrarily without due consideration given to
allowable income targets or the dynamics of farm profitability created by the market. In
general, as indicated in chapter 2, government-imposed size limits create land-use
inefficiencies. Therefore, minimum farm-size limits should be eliminated immediately
for all categories of farming operation. The data clearly indicate that farmers would
choose more individualized farming arrangements if the minimum limit were eliminated
and they could obtain farm machinery appropriate for individual use.
14
 
R5.8 Maximum limits on farm size. At present, farmers are not particularly concerned
about maximum farm-size limits. However, peasant enterprises are turning to the
national land fund for land rentals to augment the size of their landholdings, and the
maximum size limits may become more of an issue over time. During the transition,
there is a risk that speculation in the land market and uneven distribution of resources
will result in excessive land concentration. As time passes, however, this risk
diminishes, and holding size can be indirectly regulated through a highly progressive
land-taxation system. Thus the maximum farm-size limits should be increased (perhaps
by 50 percent) to ensure that such limits do not constrain farm profitability while
controlling for excessive land accumulation. However, such ceilings should have a well-
defined closing date (five years); ideally, the ceilings should be terminated when the
land market begins to value property at levels close to use value and after a progressive
land-tax system becomes widely effective.
 
                                               
 
13 The new classification system introduced in January 1995 (see chapter 2, section III.I) eliminates the
category of association of peasant farms, but definitional problems remain between private and peasant farms
operating as individual farming units, or between peasant farm enterprises, agricultural cooperatives, and
collectives, which all contain multiple households per farming unit.
 
14 Either through smaller equipment sizes, reintroduction of draft power, or expanded use of machinery
rental services (for example, through full-service cooperatives or the private market.)102
R5.9 National land fund. The government should set a clear date (preferably within the
next five years) by which all NLF land will be permanently redistributed. Any land
remaining in the fund after this date should be auctioned off. The government must set
and advertise (particularly to people living outside the domain of the rural committee)
clear guidelines for the redistribution. In order to ensure that demand for and supply of
NLF land are relatively equal, the government should set minimum qualifications for
bids and may wish to give priority to current residents.
 
R5.10 Government redistribution of excess land. Newly formed enterprises are generally
unaware that they are legally subject to losing land if their land allocations exceed
current farm-size limits. The success of a private market economy depends on the
security of land rights. Even minor reversals by government resulting in land seizure
may undermine future confidence in the government. Therefore, the Kyrgyz
government should grandfather all land and property distributed in the 1991–1993
reforms, guaranteeing that the land will not be repossessed at any time in the future.
VI. CHARACTERISTICS OF NEWLY FORMED ENTERPRISES
A. POPULATION STRUCTURE
Because of differences in population density among oblasts, land shares per person are smaller
in some oblasts than in others. Combined with farm-size limits stipulated in the land policy, this
leads to considerable variation in membership size (number of households) among newly
formed enterprises. While enterprises in Osh and Djalal-Abad, the two most populous oblasts,
contain on average 391 individuals comprising 59 households, enterprises in Naryn, Talas,
Issyk-Kul, and especially Chui oblast contain significantly smaller numbers of individuals and
households (table 5.10). Despite these differences in population density, however, there appear
to be little migration between oblasts and little entry into or exit from new enterprises. This is
not surprising given the newness of the reforms. However, in time, as property rights are
clarified, as land markets develop, and as economic opportunities become more diversified
between oblasts, rates of migration and entry/exit will tend to rise followed by a corresponding
increase in the demand for land transactions.
B. FARM SIZE AND LAND SHARE CHARACTERISTICS
The higher population densities in Osh and Djalal-Abad have also resulted in smaller farm sizes
for newly formed enterprises in these regions than in other oblasts (table 5.11). Respondents in
Chui oblast claimed not only overall farm sizes twice as large as those in Osh/Djalal-Abad, but
also large tracts of pastureland, which is surprising considering that government regulations
reserve ownership of all pastureland for the state. In general, democratic mechanisms (lottery
and interhousehold negotiation) have been used to determine precise enterprise boundaries, but
a significant number of such boundaries, especially in Chui oblast, have been set by
administrative means, which again suggests that the old command structure and nondemocratic103
mentality are still very much in place.
15 While holding shares in two or more enterprises is
theoretically feasible, over 94 percent (unreported data) of enterprises heads in all oblasts
indicated that ownership in multiple enterprises was impossible, suggesting that stipulations of
one farm per family in earlier decrees are still in force.
TABLE 5.10   Characteristics of newly formed enterprises,









Number of households comprising new enterprise: 59 4 19 31
Population of new enterprise (mean no.): 391 20 98 180
   Children 258 8 52 111
   Adults (working age) 102 8 33 51
   Pensioners 28 5 12 16
   Others 4 0 2 2
Percent of households in enterprise that have
resided in the area for at least 3 years:
100 96 96 96
Number of new people or households moving into
the area now relative to the past (% rural
committee heads saying):
    Higher or a lot higher 21 13 8 13
    About the same 74 70 78 75
    Lower or a lot lower 5 17 14 12
Percent of enterprises which have had families:
     - join the enterprise since inception 15 4 4 8
     - exit the enterprise since inception 10 0 2 5
                                               
15 A similar question was asked of the heads of rural committees with similar results—what method was
used for determining the precise location of each enterprise’s irrigated land (% of rural committees):
determined by lottery (41 percent); negotiated by family heads (19 percent); allocated by rural committee (26
percent); not yet determined (9 percent); length of service, auction, and other (6 percent).104
TABLE 5.11   Farm resources and boundaries of new enterprises,



















































Method for determining location of private and
peasant farms (%):
   Lottery 31 9 68 44
   Negotiated among households 34 48 16 29
   Administratively determined 28 43 16 25
   First come, first serve 7 0 0 2
Percent of enterprises in which households know
the precise location of land belonging to them:
82 83 75 79
Extent to which boundaries of household
properties within enterprises are demarcated (%):
   Assigned by paper share only 19 23 18 19
   Demarcated on map of farm 24 50 48 41
   Measured on ground by tape/chain 16 18 6 12
   Surveyed and marked with boundary markers 41 9 28 28
   a.  Figures in parentheses are the area of irrigated land.
   b.  These 3 categories do not generally account for all land held by the enterprise; furthermore, in
some cases respondents double-counted the area in hayfields by including it also in the arable
category. Thus the figures in these columns may not add up to the total enterprise size listed in the
first row.
A surprisingly large number of individuals appear to know the precise location of their
land within the enterprise. Furthermore, the formal surveying and marking of land shares seems
to be progressing well, albeit with a great deal of regional variation. In Osh and Djalal-Abad,
for example, over 40 percent of the rural enterprise heads interviewed indicated that their plots
had in fact been surveyed and marked with boundary markers. In Chui, however, the figure is
much smaller (only 9 percent), and a large number of respondents indicated that their shares
have been assigned on paper only or drawn on a map of the farm with no formal survey taking
place (see section VII.C, for more discussion).105
Table 5.12  Organization and characteristics of rural enterprise,









Age (years): 47 42 43 44
Total size of head’s household (mean no. of
individuals):
10 7 8 9
Gender (% male): 100 92 98 97
Highest level of education received (%):
   Middle school 23 46 41 36
   Technical school or institute 33 25 19 25
   University undergraduate degree 3 4 2 3
   University graduate degree 41 25 38 36
Mean years worked for former farming enterprise: 21 17 18 19
Last position held in former farm (%):
   None 5 9 6 6
   Administration 28 30 33 31
   Technical specialist 20 26 39 30
   Production worker 40 22 22 28
   Social services 7 13 0 5
Leadership positions in the community (%):
   Rural council 13 4 13 11
   Rural committee or rayon administration 13 12 6 9
   Other 5 17 4 7
   None 69 67 77 73
Nationality (%):          Kyrgyz 83 79 94 87
                                   Russian 0 4 4 3
                                   Uzbek, Kazakh, other 17 17 2 10
Percentage of heads elected to position: 93 58 91 85
Process used to elect heads (%):
   Members of head’s enterprise 62 57 75 68
   Members of all production enterprises 22 14 23 21
   Village voting population 16 29 2 11
Process for choosing new head upon head’s
retirement or death (%):
   Head will choose 18 23 11 16
   Position rotates to another family 3 14 2 4
   By election 79 63 83 78
   Other 0 0 4 2106
C. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ENTERPRISE HEAD
The average new-enterprise head is a middle-aged, Kyrgyz male with a relatively high level of
education (>36 percent hold university graduate degrees). Most of them worked on the former
state or collective farm for many years (19 on average) prior to reorganization, and almost 61
percent were either administrators or technical specialists during that time. Since reorgani-
zation, few enterprise heads have maintained other leadership positions in the community,
though some are members of either the rural committee or the rural council in their area (table
5.12).
According to national averages, about 85 percent of enterprise heads were elected to their
current position by members of the enterprise or by members of all enterprises on the territory
of the former state or collective farm. The democratic principles implied by this should be
applauded and will lay a solid foundation for future reforms. However, it is again important to
note regional variation: while more than 90 percent of enterprise heads were elected in
Osh/Djalal-Abad and Naryn/Talas/Issyk-Kul, the figure drops significantly in Chui to only 58
percent, indicating a large number of appointments. Although there are valid reasons why
appointments might occur, there is a risk that the bureaucratic structure of the Soviet period is
being perpetuated through the reassignment of former officials and administrators to positions
of power in the new enterprises.
D. DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE
Enterprise heads generally have considerable decision-making power within the enterprise.
According to regulations (chapter 2, section II.B), the head of the peasant farming enterprise is
the person legally responsible for organizing production and marketing and for representing
farm interests in dealings with the state, in matters of registration, in the negotiation of
contracts, in property transactions, and in other legal activities that may apply. Because
families have placed their pooled land shares under the head’s control, the head has also
acquired de facto power to authorize land transfers and to dictate the terms under which those
transfers take place. Furthermore, while the majority of households claim to manage their own
holdings individually within the enterprise, it is clear that the enterprise head makes many of
the key management decisions for determining which crops are grown, how farm labor is
allocated, and where and on what terms farm produce is marketed (table 5.13). Any inclination
toward abuse of powers by the head may, however, be curbed by the democratic processes—
election or rotation—which have been established for choosing new heads in about 80 percent
of the enterprises interviewed.
More than one-third of enterprise heads indicated that they felt individual households
within their enterprises are satisfied with the present property and decision-making
arrangements of the enterprise. A few heads sensed a desire to return to some form of
centralized management, while another 39 percent indicated that they feel pressure to increase
individual ownership of land and/or individual control over land management. This pressure
seems strongest in the Naryn/Talas/Issyk-Kul region. However, even those heads who would
like to increase the degree of land privatization claim they are constrained by the inappropriate
scale of mechanization and the small size of enterprise landholdings. Without a more107
appropriate (that is, smaller and less expensive) scale of mechanization, or without machinery
rental markets or cooperative management of machinery divorced from land, farmers will
continue to experience difficulties in seeking private landownership.









Percent of individual households which:
   Manage own holdings 48 91 49 57
   Manage holdings cooperatively 45 9 45 38
   Manage holdings as an association 7 0 6 5
Entity responsible for planting decisions (%):
   Enterprise head 67 65 69 68
   Management of cooperative or association 21 5 17 15
   Individual households 9 26 14 15
   Rural committee 3 4 0 2
Entity responsible for farm labor decisions (%): 
a
   Enterprise head 73 80 72 74
   Management of cooperative or association 15 0 16 12
   Individual households 9 20 12 12
   Rural committee 3 0 0 1
Percent of enterprise heads indicating their
members would prefer:
   Present arrangements 43 45 31 39
   Individual ownership of land 19 18 36 26
   Centralized management 27 5 16 17
   Greater control over management 3 9 4 5
   Either individual ownership or greater control 8 23 13 13
If households would prefer another arrangement,
what prevents them from doing it (%):
   Tractors too large/expensive for small holdings 67 54 75 68
   Need large farm size for efficient management 30 38 15 24
   Landholdings not delineated for household use 0 8 5 4
   Instructed to do so and other 3 0 5 4
     a.  Another question—entity responsible for output sales decisions—generated nearly identical
results.
E. EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS
As in the rural committee head questionnaire, many rural enterprise heads indicated that the
size of their work force exceeds the work requirements of the enterprise’s land (table 5.14).
This feeling, not surprisingly, is especially pronounced in the most populous oblasts, Osh and
Djalal-Abad, and indicates that privatization has done little to alleviate the population pressures108
which were present on the former state and collective farms. Enhancing off-farm employment
is one strategy to reduce excess labor, but most enterprises indicate either static or lower off-
farm employment than in the past, and rates of full- or part-time off-farm employment are low
across regions. It is perhaps not surprising, then ,that only 17 percent of enterprises expect
sizable out-migration of households in the near future. What is surprising, however, is that
enterprise heads in the most densely populated areas anticipate the least future out-migration,
suggesting stronger dependence on agriculture as a way of life in these regions.
TABLE 5.14   Nonfarm employment opportunities,









Percent of adults employed off the farm:
   Full-time 2 6 5 3
   Part-time 2 1 2 2
Dependence on off-farm employment relative to
the past (% of enterprise heads responding):
   A lot higher 0 0 3 1
   Higher 18 0 10 11
   About the same 39 52 71 54
   Lower 18 0 10 11
   A lot lower 3 0 0 1
   No response 22 48 7 22
Extent to which number of workers is excessive
for the land available (% of enterprise heads
responding):
   Very excessive 36 4 14 19
   Slightly excessive 18 13 19 18
   About right 41 75 61 57
   Slight shortage 5 8 6 6
Percent of households expected to leave the
enterprise in the near future due to lack of
employment:
   None 59 42 38 46
   Very few 10 33 11 15
   Some 15 8 26 19
   Many 8 17 25 17
   No response 8 0 0 3
Problems of excess labor on farms and underemployment in the agricultural sector are
endemic. However, should macroeconomic policy act to widen the urban-rural wage gap,
households can be expected to depart enterprises in larger numbers and, with that event, will
come important questions about the private transfer of land and property shares and forms of
compensation.109
F. RECOMMENDATIONS
R5.11 Land surveying. Rayon administrations’ capacity to survey land and delineate
property boundaries on the ground should be augmented. Present systems of
demarcation by map and tape or chain will probably work well for the time being, but
the need for clearer boundaries will grow as the land market develops. The cost of
boundary delineation should be wholly or partly paid by private fees.
 
R5.12 Democratic processes of land distribution. For the most part, rural committees have
used equitable and democratic processes for distributing land to peasant enterprises.
Yet certain oblasts continue to rely heavily on administrative mechanisms. Such
mechanisms should be discouraged since they will tend to promote excessive land-use
planning and government controls.
 
R5.13 Job creation. Rayon akims in the course of interviews repeatedly pointed out the need
for commercial investment that emphasizes value-added agricultural processing—
cheese manufacturing, fruit preserving, sausages and meat processing, textile
manufacturing, and the like. In time, the creation of such businesses will help increase
farm incomes either through expansion of off-farm employment or through the
consolidation of households within the enterprise due to exit. Beyond issues of local
governance and the distribution of land and property shares, expansion of off-farm
employment may be the most critical issue now faced in rural areas. Priority should be
given to attracting foreign investment, focusing donor aid on the promotion of small-
scale enterprises, granting credit subsidies for business creation, and eliminating
bureaucratic red tape for business expansion.
 
R5.14 Indivisible capital inputs. Many former state and collective farms, even the most
progressive in carrying out reforms, have not completed property share distributions; in
many if not most cases, the intractability of subdividing lumpy capital inputs such as
tractors is exacerbating privatization efforts. In many other countries in the world
undergoing similar reforms, land shares have been kept strictly separate from property
ownership. Frequently, property has been pooled and operated on a profit-making
basis. Individual landholders rent equipment and property from the cooperative but
earn profits as shareholders. Government programs should be developed that
encourage if not stimulate similar organizational structures and forms of cooperative
management. This would ease the difficulties associated with property share
distribution and help conclude the current phase of the restructuring process.
VII. LANDOWNERSHIP AND BOUNDARY DEMARCATIONS
A. LAND RIGHTS
Both the rural committee heads and the heads of peasant enterprises were asked whether
households within enterprises had the right to rent and sell land shares, and again for physical110
land. Research findings for the rural committee survey are summarized in annex 5.2, while data
for the enterprise head survey are provided in table 5.15. A comparison of the two tables
indicates that similar answers were obtained from both sets of respondents.
TABLE 5.15   Land rights perceived by enterprise heads,









Percent of enterprises in which a household has
the following rights without need of authorization:
   Rent out its land share 72 95 80 80
   Rent out its physical land 67 84 74 73
   Sell its land share 64 58 77 69
   Sell its physical land 63 56 75 67
Percent of enterprises in which a household has
the following rights, but requires authorization:
   Rent out its land share 26 0 18 17
   Rent out its physical land 28 0 20 19
   Sell its land share 28 5 15 18
   Sell its physical land 29 0 15 17
Approval to sell a land share obtained from (%): 
a
   Head of enterprise 55 70 50 54
   Rural committee 26 10 28 25
   Other households in enterprise 3 10 17 11
   Rayon officials 16 10 5 10
Restrictions on rental of shares (% heads
saying):
b
   Unrestricted, can rent to anyone 89 93 87 89
   Priority given to other households in enterprise 8 0 4 5
   Priority given to residents of area 3 7 9 6
Restrictions on sale of shares (% heads saying): 
c
   Unrestricted, can rent to anyone 88 91 83 86
   Priority given to other households in enterprise 9 0 5 6
   Priority given to residents of area 3 9 12 8
     a.  Responses nearly the same for authorization to rent a land share, and rent and sell physical
land.
     b.  Responses nearly the same for restrictions on rental of physical land.
     c.  Responses nearly the same for restrictions on sale of physical land.
In general, rural committees appear to treat actual physical land the same as land shares
(see annex 5.2). The vast majority of rural committees permit farming enterprises to rent out
land shares or physical land, but only half as many committees permit the sale of land and land
shares, even with authorization.111
Comparable data on land rights as perceived by enterprise heads are presented in table
5.15. Like rural committees, most enterprise heads allow members to rent out physical land
and land shares. Unlike the rural committee heads, however, rural enterprise heads claim that
their members can also sell land and land shares. Sixty-seven percent of enterprise heads said
their members can sell physical land without authorization, and another 17 percent said sale is
allowed with authorization. The sum (84 percent) is significantly greater than the 55 percent of
rural committee heads who allow such rights. According to the general body of land law in
Kyrgyzstan, local administrations control both land use and land transfers to a large extent.
This would suggest that rural enterprise heads are overestimating the rights of their
enterprise members, especially in terms of sales. However, there is also a great deal of
ambiguity in the law about which types of land transfers are allowed and which are restricted
or prohibited. Rural enterprise heads, who may not be intimately familiar with the law,
probably interpret the lack of direct prohibition of land and land-share sales as permission for
such sales.
The transactions costs involved in a private land transfer will depend on the ambiguity of
rights obtained by the acquirer in the transaction and the costs incurred in negotiating the
contract, including formal and informal authorizations. Moreover, authorization may be benign
requiring only that authorities be notified to a more formal process culminating in approval or
rejection. Table 5.15 and annex 5.2 do not provide detailed data on the level of transactions
costs experienced. They nevertheless point to two problems that increase such costs: the lack
of certainty between rural committees and enterprise heads regarding which rights are actually
held, as discussed above, and the intervention of multiple actors in restricting land rentals and
sales via direct legal restrictions or their involvement in sanctioning or approving such
transfers.
According to the regulations governing land-share transfers (chapter 2, section III.H), any
household wishing to exit an enterprise must seek the approval of family members; that
approval might mean, depending on the situation, only household members or members of all
households within the enterprise (law on peasant farm enterprises; see chapter 2, section II.B).
This bifurcation of powers and responsibilities over land transfers has resulted in considerable
confusion on the ground. Rural committees, as indicated above, either believe private transfers
are illegal or think their institution is responsible for authorizing transfers. When enterprises
themselves were asked from whom authority must be obtained, the responses varied widely
(percent of total sample) from head of enterprise (54 percent), to rural committee (25 percent),
to other households in the enterprise (11 percent), to rayon officials (10 percent). Enterprise
heads thus seem to believe that they themselves must give approval to exiting members, while
rural committee heads claim that the committee must grant authorization.
Unlike the responses of the enterprise heads, above, which suggest a relatively unrestricted
land market, a different picture was obtained from individual families in the course of the case-
study interviews with households within enterprises. Families often expressed confusion and
uncertainty over the delineation of rights between the enterprise head and themselves. Some
interviewees asserted that enterprise heads hold too much veto power over land transfers.112
Others indicated that individual rights to sell property or to exit and form a separate farming
unit are overly compromised by the collective vote of other households within the enterprise.
Two general points stand out from this analysis. First, government fears about the adverse
equity effects of land markets has led to hesitation and vacillation over legal land rights. As a
result, rural committees, rural enterprise heads, and farming households are confused as to
which rights are held by whom. Second, both restrictions on sales and requirements for
authorization will impede the participation of outsiders in land transactions and thereby inhibit
the development of the land market. Such restrictions, whether legally grounded or not, will
bias land transfers toward inheritance, especially when combined with the natural hesitation of
outsiders to join an enterprise comprised of relatives or the reluctance of a peasant farm to
accept outsiders as shareholders.
B. LAND MARKETS
A priori, one might have expected the landholdings of peasant farming enterprises to have
changed little in the short time since restructuring. However, nearly one-third of enterprises in
the sample have acquired land since the time their farms were reorganized; in the densely
populated oblasts of Osh and Djalal-Abad, this figure is 40 percent (table 5.16). Most of these
enterprises acquired land through rental arrangements, through shareholders’ joining the
enterprise, or from the national land fund. Enterprises renting land have generally paid little or
nothing for the privilege. Unfortunately, the limited number of cash rental transactions
prohibited statistical analysis of beneficiaries of the rental revenue. But based on the limited
amount of data obtained, the rural committee receives the rent from NLF land, while the
enterprise head or all households within the enterprise receive the rental income from land
owned by the enterprise. Based on these results, individual households appear to receive few of
the private benefits of land rentals or sales. It is difficult to see how individuals can truly benefit
from the land reform unless they are entitled to full private compensation. Rights to such
benefits can be reinforced through legal reforms, but the elimination of minimum size limits
would also help individual enterprises separate their holdings from the collective or peasant
enterprise and achieve greater control over their land resource.
Few households see themselves selling land in the future. Many individuals (within
enterprises) in the case studies declared that they intend to hold on to their land at all costs; no
household interviewed appeared to want to sell its land shares or to engage in land speculation.
These findings are further born out in table 5.16, which shows that few enterprises have
disposed of land since the restructuring began, while one-third have acquired land. Hence,
some of the concerns expressed in government about distressed sales seem to be exaggerated.
The high incidence of families related by birth and marriage will theoretically help reduce
intrahousehold tensions, but such management forms will also offer outsiders little incentive to
buy shares unless they, too, are kin or they are able to separate land from the rest of the
enterprise. Because of the scarce supply of land in the domains of many rural committees, the
land market for the foreseeable future will likely be dominated by land rentals and
intergenerational inheritances. While it may be possible for a few well-connected individuals to113
acquire large tracts of land, the vast majority will have difficulty doing so. The practical
implication is that fears of land concentration or land grabbing leading to a highly unequal land
distribution are probably unrealistic.









Percentage of enterprises having:
   Disposed of land since the restructuring 3 0 0 1
   Acquired land since the restructuring 40 17 26 29
Principal mode of acquisition (% of cases):
   Rented-in land 44 25 42 40
   Shareholders joined enterprise 6 0 33 16
   Purchased land 0 0 0 0
   No response 50 75 25 44
Land was primarily obtained from (% of cases):
   Shareholders 19 0 33 22
   National land fund 37 0 33 31
   Other enterprises 0 0 9 3
   No response 44 100 25 44
Cash or barter received from transfer (% of cases):
   Barter 25 25 17 22
   Cash 13 0 33 19
   None 62 75 50 59
Overall, a number of general observations can be made about the role and importance of
the land market. First, the land rental market appears to be playing a valuable role in matching
the farm labor force and capital stocks of buildings and machinery with available land. Such
efficiency might even be greater if it were not for minimum farm-size regulations that restrict
the ability of households to downsize.
C. DEMARCATION OF BOUNDARIES AND PROCESSES FOR DETERMINING
PARCEL LOCATION
Most rural committees (60 percent) indicated that households within enterprises have been
issued “Certificates of the Right to Use a Land Share”; this shows that remarkable progress has
been made in the first stage of documentation since the main restructuring initiative began in
1994 (table 5.17). Rural committee heads also claim that the exact location of land for
individual families has already been determined in 80 percent of cases (79 percent in the case of
rural enterprise heads, see table 5.11). This figure appears high, yet it was confirmed time and
again in the case study interviews with individual households.114
TABLE 5.17   Delineation of property boundaries,




Percent of individual families within peasant enterprises having been
issued “Ownership Acts”: 60
Percent of rural committee heads indicating that individual families
within enterprises know the precise location of land belonging to them: 80
Extent to which property boundaries of peasant farming enterprises
have been demarcated (% of cases):
     Assigned on paper only 3
     Demarcated on cadastre map only 18
     Measured on ground by tape or chain 13
     Measured by a surveyor 66
Extent to which property boundaries of individual households within a
peasant farming enterprise have been demarcated (% of cases):
     Unknown 16
     Assigned on paper only 11
     Demarcated on cadastre map only 18
     Measured on ground by tape or chain 18
     Measured by a surveyor 37
Land maps showing property boundaries are kept by (% of cases):
     Rural committee only 48
     Rayon or oblast government 25
     Both rural committee and local government 18
     Rural council 7
     Rural committee and rural council 2
However, even though households claim to know which piece of land belongs to them, in
many cases the precise borders of the enterprise have not yet been formally surveyed, let alone
the precise borders of individual parcels. Of the rural committees interviewed, 66 percent
reported having formally surveyed the general boundaries of peasant enterprises with a
surveyor on the ground; others have measured the boundaries of enterprises by tape or chain
(13 percent); some have demarcated boundaries on a map only (18 percent); and 3 percent
have failed to make any demarcation on the ground, that is, have assigned shares on paper
only.
Far fewer boundaries of parcels held by individual households within the enterprise have
been surveyed. According to rural committees, only about 37 percent of such internal
boundaries have been formally surveyed on the ground by a surveyor, 18 percent by tape or
chain, 18 percent on cadastre maps, and 11 percent on paper only. In the remaining 16 percent
of cases the rural committees did not know whether boundaries had been demarcated for
individual households within the enterprise, suggesting that no boundaries of any sort have yet115
been drawn. Based on the earlier analysis of rural enterprise heads’ responses to this same
question (in table 5.11), it would appear that rural committee heads have overestimated the
extent to which boundaries of individual properties have been demarcated: 28 percent of these
boundaries have been formally surveyed on the ground and 12 percent by tape or chain, while
41 percent have been identified on maps only and 19 percent exist merely as paper shares. Of
the land maps that have been drawn, many are currently held by the rural committees (48
percent), but such maps are also held by various other public institutions at the local level.
Two important policy questions thus become apparent: What appropriate policy reforms
are needed to increase the legal certainty of property rights corresponding to household
ownership of land parcels on the ground? Which institutional reforms are needed in survey,
land mapping and land records that create a coherent and rational land-administration system?
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
R5.15 Land markets. For the sake of economic efficiency, the government should take steps
to strengthen rather than constrain the nascent land market. Specifically, the
government should eliminate minimum farm-size limits so that households can separate
at will from collectives or peasant farm enterprises; it should limit the interference of
the rayon government or rural committee (and government generally) in land market
regulation; it should distribute land from the national land fund so that rentals and sales
are handled efficiently by the private market; it should specify through legislation the
rights of lessees and lessors; it should limit the powers of the peasant enterprise head in
authorizing or controlling transfers; it should remove priorities of rental or sale of
household land to the enterprise head or other members within the enterprise; and it
should accelerate the formal surveying and registration of individual household land.
 
R5.16 Mortgages. The current restrictions on the sale of land and the difficulties faced by
outsiders who wish to buy into an enterprise will depress land prices for many years to
come. The mortgage value of land is also likely to be low given the tenuous nature of
farm profitability. While expansion of mortgages is an appropriate goal for the long
term, financial mechanisms in the short to intermediate terms will need to stress other
forms of guarantees, such as group guarantees, credit funneled through marketing
agents, cash reserves, and subsidized government credit. The rural committee, if
removed of many of its present responsibilities (land use monitoring, land record
keeping, map keeping), which are more appropriately carried out by the rayon
administration, could play an important role in facilitating agribusiness services and
guaranteeing group credit. Converting the rural committees to full service cooperatives,
as recommended earlier, would serve this function.116
VIII. PROPERTY PRIVATIZATION
A. STATUS OF PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
Although the majority of farms have carried out property valuations (table 5.18), actual
distribution of property shares to newly formed enterprises has lagged. Distribution of
indivisible inputs, such as buildings and tractors, has proceeded especially slowly, while
distribution of livestock, a more divisible asset, has progressed only slightly faster. Of the
newly formed enterprises that have received property, 68 percent now manage their livestock
individually while keeping “lumpy” assets (tractors and buildings) under communal
management. Surprisingly, 50 percent of rural committee heads indicated that property shares
will be allocated not just to workers on the basis of their labor contribution over the past ten
years as the legislation specifies, but to all members of the former state or collective farm.
TABLE 5.18  Status of property reorganization by rural committees,




Percent of former state and collective farms in sample which have
assessed the value of the property which remained on the farm
72
Percent of former farms in sample which have fully distributed
property to members: 
a
     Livestock 40 (4)
     Tractors and machinery 36 (4)
     Buildings (shops, barns, dairy parlors) 34 (6)
Percent of rural committees indicating that divested property is now
individually (as opposed to communally) managed:
     Livestock 68
     Tractors 16
     Buildings 16
Percent of former farms allocating property shares to:
     Workers only 50
     All family 46
     Adults only 4
     a.  Figures in parentheses indicate percent of former farms where distribution is
still in progress.
B. LIVESTOCK
Changes in livestock numbers since the beginning of the reforms are reported from two
different perspectives—rural committee heads, who report data on numbers of livestock on the
territories of the former farms prior to restructuring versus those held by newly formed117
enterprises at present (table 5.19); and changes in livestock holdings reported by the newly
formed enterprises between the time they received livestock and the present (table 5.20).
According to the rural committees (table 5.19), sizable changes in livestock numbers have
been experienced; large reductions have occurred among sheep and goats, beef cattle, and
hogs; dairy cattle have remained more or less the same while horses have increased slightly in
number. According to one official interviewed, the decline stems from former farm officials and
administrators appropriating large numbers of animals for themselves during the first stages of
the reforms. Rural committee heads, however, claimed that livestock were sold to pay
workers, farm expenses, and/or farm debt, or because of inadequate feed supply. Only 13
percent suggested the livestock might have been sold for personal gain.
TABLE 5.19   Changes in livestock numbers,




Mean number of livestock holdings on former state or collective farm:
     Sheep and Goats 12,333
     Cattle (beef) 815
     Cattle (dairy) 613
     Horses 359
     Hogs 150
Mean number presently held by landholders associated with the
former enterprise:
     Sheep and Goats 7,459
     Cattle (beef) 585
     Cattle (dairy) 594
     Horses 386
     Hogs 56
Reasons for the reduction in livestock numbers (% saying):
     Forced sale to pay workers 28
     Forced sale to pay farm expenses 25
     Inadequate feed supply 18
     Forced sale to pay back farm debt 10
     Animals sold before restructuring or sold for personal gain 13
     Other 5
Based on information gathered from the heads of newly formed enterprises (table 5.20),
both the initial distribution of livestock and changes in livestock numbers have varied
significantly across regions. The vast majority of animals distributed in all oblasts were sheep
and goats, followed distantly by horses and then cattle. However, newly formed enterprises in
Chui received far fewer animals on average than their counterparts in Naryn/Talas/Issyk-Kul
and even in Osh/Djalal-Abad, despite the very high population density of the latter region.
Horses and dairy cattle have increased slightly in number since the redistribution; sheep and118
goat herds have declined, but significantly more so in Djalal-Abad, Osh, and Chui. The reasons
offered for declining livestock herds (where applicable) vary widely, ranging from lack of
profitability, to inadequate feed supplies, to butchered or sold for capital, to need for cash to
pay for farm expenses or debt.
TABLE 5.20   Livestock holdings by newly formed enterprises,









Mean number of livestock received as part of the
restructuring (presently owned in parentheses):
































Reason for decline in livestock numbers (%):
   Livestock not profitable 0 0 41 26
   Inadequate feed supply 17 0 29 22
   Butchered or sold for capital 33 100 0 22
   Sold to pay farm expenses or debt 17 0 24 19
   Butchered for food or social events 33 0 6 11
Livestock communally/individually managed (%):
   Individually 52 21 44 43
   By enterprise 18 0 12 13
   Mixed or other 0 21 15 10
   Not applicable / no answer 30 58 29 34
Thus, in the case where livestock numbers have declined, two sets of factors seem to be at
play. First, prior to divestiture, the management of former enterprises sold livestock to cover
farm expenses and pay debt; in some cases management simply absconded with livestock or
funds. Second, after the divestiture, animals were sold because of depressed farm prices (no
doubt related to the first set of factors prior to restructuring) or to cover farm expenses or
debt, or butchered for social events.
Of the present herds, most appear to be managed either by individual families or by the
newly formed enterprises, though many respondents had received no livestock under the
reorganization or were simply unclear as to how their herds were now going to be managed.
Thus a discrepancy appears to exist between the rural committee data (table 5.18), which
shows that 68 percent of enterprises receiving livestock shares are now managing their animals
individually, and the rural enterprise data, which puts this figure at only 43 percent. However,119
if the 34 percent of respondents who did not answer the question in the rural enterprise head
survey are eliminated on the assumption that they received no livestock from the property
distribution, then the number of rural enterprise heads reporting individual management climbs
to 66 percent, which is very close to the number estimated by the rural committee heads.
C. BUILDINGS AND ORCHARDS
A relatively small number of enterprises (about one-fifth on average across the Kyrgyz
Republic) received buildings as part of their property share during the redistribution, and even
fewer received orchards (table 5.21). While the buildings thus redistributed tend to be
individually managed, however, orchards remain under collective control to a greater extent.
TABLE 5.21   Management of buildings and orchards,









Percent of enterprises that received property:
   Buildings 40 21 19 22
   Orchards 18 0 6 9
Buildings managed privately or collectively (%): 
a
   Collectively 20 0 50 27
   Individually by enterprise 73 100 40 67
   Don’t know 7 0 10 6
Orchards managed privately or collectively (%): 
a
   Collectively 57 0 33 50
   Individually by enterprise 43 0 67 50
Percent of enterprises distributing cooperative
benefits from buildings in the form of:
   Wages 13 0 0 7
   Dividends 20 0 0 10
   Output share 47 20 50 43
   Don’t know 20 80 50 40
Percent of enterprises distributing cooperative
benefits from orchards in the form of:
   Wages 14 0 0 10
   Dividends 14 0 0 10
   Output share 57 0 100 70
   Don’t know 15 0 0 10
Enterprise distributes orchards’ benefits to (%):
   Workers involved 43 0 33 40
   All households within enterprise 43 0 67 50
   No response 14 0 0 10
    a. Individually by enterprise or collectively with other enterprises.120
Many of the enterprises receiving buildings and/or orchards remain unclear as to how the
benefits from these assets will be distributed both within and between (in the case of
cooperative management) enterprises. The difficulty of managing large buildings built for a
highly centralized agricultural system is understandable and uncertainties over how to divide
benefits are to be expected. The limited information available suggests enterprises are being
very adaptive and flexible in their approach.
D. EQUIPMENT AND MACHINERY
Because of the problems rural committees have experienced in redistributing indivisible assets,
mentioned earlier, and the modest overall quantity of tractors, trucks, and other farm
equipment held by the former state and collective farms, it is not surprising so many newly
formed enterprises received little such equipment during the restructuring (table 5.22).
TABLE 5.22   Stock of tractors and machinery on new enterprises,










Number of workable vehicles received as part of
restructuring (versus presently in parentheses):
























Useful life assuming spare parts:
   Tractors 3.2 .1 2.0 2.2
   Trucks 2.8 .1 1.6 2.1
   Grain combine or picker 3.8 0 4.5 4.1
Tractor fleet owned is sufficient to farm all land
currently held (% yes):
3 13 4 6
Strategy will pursue, if fleet is inadequate (%):
   Try to rent tractor services 59 60 71 65
   Rent out land 10 25 9 13
   Buy more equipment 17 0 9 10
   Revert to horse power 7 5 2 4
   Other or not sure 7 10 9 8
Moreover, further reductions in the number of workable farm vehicles have occurred since the
reorganization, and the useful life of the remaining equipment, even assuming the availability of
spare parts, is very low. For almost 94 percent of enterprises nationally, the current stock of
tractors is insufficient to farm all of the land held. Enterprises in response are resorting to a
variety of alternatives to obtain the equipment that they need. The predominant strategy for121
alleviating mechanization constraints appears to be tractor rental. This suggests a strong
potential demand for tractor rental services, yet the capacity of the market to provide such
services on a large scale is questionable due to capital constraints and illiquidity in the capital
and commodity subsectors. Some enterprises also anticipate renting out their land as a means
of alleviating mechanization constraints, a strategy which demonstrates the flexibility that a
land market gives to enterprises in adjusting resource levels to market conditions.
E. DEBT AND TAXATION
According to current legislation, most of the remaining debt of the former state and collective
farms (50 percent of the former’s debts and 75 percent of the latter’s) will be distributed by the
rural committee to the newly formed enterprises to be paid back over a fifteen-year period
beginning 1 January 1997. The remaining 50 percent/25 percent of the debt will be written off
by the government. As seen in table 4.23, the average debt owed (1.7 million som) by the rural
committees (who currently hold all the debt of the former state and collective farms) at the end
of 1994 is considerable and nearly five times greater than their accounts receivable (359,882
som); the former figure is partially skewed upward by the accrued interest that has
accumulated from high nominal interest rates in recent years.
16 Most of this money is owed to
banks, fuel and energy providers, and the government. Considering that most had a sizable
amount owed to them by other debtors (principally small enterprises, cooperatives, and
processors) at the time of the restructuring, the writing off a portion of the debt seems fair and
justified compensation. There nonetheless remains a great deal of confusion as to who is
ultimately responsible for paying the debt: about half the rural committee heads feel that the
newly formed enterprises should be responsible for the repayment, while the remainder feel it is
the responsibility of the rural committee.
There has been some debate as to whether the proposed plan of distributing old debts to
newly formed enterprises is sensible; another alternative would be to assign the debt to the
rayon administration, which could then recoup those debts through the tax system. On the
other hand, it is unreasonable for enterprises to expect free land and property (they currently
pay nothing for their land shares and only sometimes pay for property shares) and to expect to
be exempt from debt and debt servicing as well. With the current high rate of inflation,
however, and with the emergence of a scissors phenomenon (rapidly increasing input costs and
stagnant or declining commodity prices) in the agricultural sector, placing a heavy debt burden
on newly formed enterprises may undermine their economic viability during the early stages of
reform, when confidence in privatization is most needed. If the government wishes to proceed
with the current plan of assigning debt to the enterprises rather than instituting land and
property share fees and reassigning the debt to the rayon administration, then it should make
sure that the interest rate assigned to enterprises is low enough and the grace period long
enough to allow the enterprises and reforms to get off to a healthy start. Fortunately, present
                                               
16 In the case of one former state farm, credit to the farm came to a halt in 1993. Cash receipts from the
farm’s operations, after paying for salaries and farm inputs, left no funds remaining for credit payback. The
farm debt nonetheless continued to accrue interest, at the rate of 50 percent at the beginning of 1993, and
reaching as high as 393 percent by June 1994. Of the farm’s present debt load (617,000 som in February 1995),
70 percent is estimated to be accrued interest.122
methods used to prorate debt to the newly formed enterprises appear sensible and indicate that
rural committees may already be adapting policy to local conditions.




Mean credit owed by the rural committee (in som) at the end of 1994: 1,704,428
Mean debt owed to the rural committee (in som) at the end of 1994: 359,882
Percent of rural committees responding who listed one of their
principal creditors as (multiple responses possible): 
a
     Bank 77
     Fuel and energy providers 32
     Ministry of Agriculture or Government 26
     Taxes 19
     Social fund, input suppliers, pension fund 12
Percent of rural committees responding who listed one of their
principal debtor(s) as (multiple responses possible): 
b
     Small enterprises or coops 57
     Processors 39
     Other 34
Entity responsible for paying remaining debt (% claiming):
     New enterprises 48
     Rural committee 46
     Other (including rayon administration) 6
If new enterprises, how will the debt be distributed (% claiming):
     According to land shares 67
     According to earnings 19
     According to population 9
     According to property share 5
   a. Twelve respondents (out of 47) listed no creditors.
   b. Eighteen respondents (out of 47) listed no debtors.
F. RECOMMENDATIONS
R5.17 Acceleration of property distribution. The process of property distribution must be
accelerated. For livestock, an effort must be made to distribute as many animals as
possible before they can be siphoned off by parties from the former state and collective
farm. For equipment and buildings, three options should be considered: (1) pooling
buildings and machinery into cooperatives (households must pay for services, but as
shareholders they reap the profits); (2) privatizing equipment to one or more peasant
farming enterprises; and/or (3) temporarily subsidizing the creation of mechanized
rental services. Option 1 seems the most viable at this stage of the restructuring.123
R5.18 Pastureland. According to the regulations, grazing land in the Kyrgyz Republic is a
common resource and is, therefore, exempt from land-share distributions. Thus far in
the restructuring period the absence of clear rights and responsibilities governing the
use of pasturelands has not been overly problematic because of the significant
reductions in herd sizes that have taken place since 1991. However, it would be
unrealistic and unwise to ignore the potential dampening effect of 70 years of central
planning on the evolution or reintroduction of customary grazing rules. The most
practical advice at present might simply be to undertake studied observation of grazing
rates and forms of tenure emerging in mountainous areas, in recognition that
overgrazing problems and grazing conflicts are a risk. Wholesale privatization of
pastureland is both unnecessary and impractical for the time being, yet it does seem
sensible to give rayon administrations the autonomy to demarcate pastureland on a
case-by-case basis.
IX. SEVERITY OF AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS
Both the rural committee heads and the rural enterprise heads were asked to rank the
seriousness of eleven agricultural problems on a five-point scale, from not serious to extremely
serious. The responses of rural committee heads are presented in table 5.24, and for the heads
of newly formed enterprises, in annex 5.3.
TABLE 5.24   Severity of agricultural problems,


















Slow progress on demarcating and
documenting land rights of
households within enterprises
59 16 5 14 7
Slow progress on demarcating and
documenting land rights of
peasant farming enterprises
57 15 7 13 9
Lack of knowledge on how to farm 48 26 7 11 9
Irrigation water distribution 20 24 28 15 13
Lack of farm extension or veterinary
advice or service
13 4 33 16 33
Lack of seeds 26 20 20 22 13
Lack of markets for farm output 7 9 24 17 44
Lack of credit 7 7 20 17 50
Lack of fertilizer and farm chemicals 4 7 13 26 50
Lack of fuel 0 7 13 15 65
Lack of spare parts or equipment 0 2 11 13 74124
The most severe problems in the agricultural sector—lack of markets, credit, farm
chemicals, fuel, and spare parts and equipment—stem from macroeconomic factors. While
these problems in the agrarian sector are pressing, there appears to be a sense that the actual
reorganization process has proceeded well and that no overwhelming problems have yet
emerged. The demarcation of property boundaries and the documentation of land rights of
peasant farming enterprises and individual households are considered relatively minor problems
at present. But as macroeconomic problems ease and as farmers become better acquainted with
the meaning of true property ownership, such problems will become increasingly important.
For the time being, the fact that farmers are not particularly concerned with problems of land
rights suggests that the government has a large window of opportunity in which to design and
implement a land registration program. However, since this window will narrow rapidly as
markets develop and as the other macroeconomic problems (credit, input supplies, equipment
availability) are solved, the government would be well advised to begin on a pilot basis the
design and testing of new registration system program as soon as possible.
X. ASSESSMENT OF FARM RESTRUCTURING TO DATE
Overall, both farm enterprise heads and rural committee heads appear relatively pleased with
the reforms to date (tables 5.25 and 5.26, and annex 5.4). The main explanations given for this
satisfaction include greater independence, greater individual control over resources and
destiny, and greater private benefits for work expended. Social service workers and pensioners,
whose economic positions have been somewhat undermined by the reforms, seem less positive
about the restructuring. Those displeased with the reforms tend to blame macroeconomic
factors beyond the scope of farm restructuring. However, especially among the rural enterprise
heads, there is a sense that the reforms are proceeding too slowly. Not unexpectedly, very few
heads of the rural committees, which are responsible for implementing the reforms, admitted
that the pace of reform is not as fast as it could be.
Clearly a variety of problems continues to challenge the agricultural sector. Past livestock
liquidations have depleted the capital stock and wealth of many households. Tight liquidity is
hampering purchasing power, while the slow development of private markets has hampered the
supply of farm inputs and marketing outlets. Newly formed enterprises and the remnants of
former collective farms have excess labor endowments that risk seriously prolonging under- or
unemployment. Newly formed enterprises have not yet reached their optimal farm size, due
partially to government farm-size restrictions that have curbed downsizing; uncertainty and
instability will continue to heavily influence decisions in the intermediate planning horizon.
Landownership and transfer rights are insecure and of inadequate duration, particularly for
individual households within collectives or comprising peasant farms. Diseconomies in scale of
buildings and equipment are hampering the privatization of property. The fate of property
rights in as much as 25 percent of privatized land (national land fund) remain unclear and
uncertain, as do the appropriate roles and longevity of local institutions—rayon governments,
rural councils, rural committees, agrocombinats, and centers for land and agrarian reforms.125
TABLE 5.25   Assessment of farm restructuring to date,













Former production workers 4 56 9 27 4
Rural committee head 9 50 9 28 4
Former farm specialists or
managers
7 51 4 36 2
Former service workers 4 42 13 38 2
Pensioners 4 33 22 38 2
TABLE 5.26   Reasons for satisfaction or dissatisfaction with




Most important reasons why certain groups are pleased or very
pleased with the reforms (% of respondents):
     People get land 28
     People are independent 26
     Labor efficiency or productivity is improved 14
     Higher farm income 7
     People directly benefit from the fruits of their labor 2
     Able to market own products 2
     Other 21
Most important reasons why certain groups are dissatisfied or very
dissatisfied with the reforms (% of respondents):
     No machinery/fuel 20
     Economic hardships 17
     No credit 15
     People not yet ready for the reforms 7
     No markets for products 7
     No taxes are generated 5
     No wages for social workers 5
     Slow pace of reform 2
     No help from government 2
     Other 20126
On the other hand, a number of elements of the restructuring have progressed remarkably
well:
u Land distribution has been fairly equitable: all inhabitants of former farms have received
land, and distribution has been relatively equal across occupations and gender.
 
u The identification and documentation of individual land shares is well advanced: most
inhabitants of the former state or collective farm have legal documents guaranteeing their
land share, and a large majority of them know the actual location of their land within the
newly formed enterprise to which they belong.
 
u The demarcation of enterprise boundaries has been proceeding rapidly: many rural
enterprises have already had a formal survey conducted to determine the precise
boundaries of their land. This is a key step in the development of a land market.
 
u Democratic tendencies are clearly evident in a number of areas: in the election of
enterprise heads, in the assignment of land to specific enterprises, and in the
determination of precise boundaries between enterprises.
 
  All of these factors suggest that substantial progress has been made in the last five years
toward restructuring the agricultural sector. Perhaps the most important factor at this point of
the restructuring program, however, is that popular opinion favors the reforms and continued
privatization. Contrary to the pessimism that seems to pervade all levels of government, there
is widespread satisfaction in the countryside with the pace and scale of reforms. The major
stumbling blocks lie not with the land reforms and privatization per se, but with the way the
reforms have been sequenced (land reform before solid macroeconomic fundamentals were in
place) and the macroeconomic problems that are currently exacerbating problems of low farm
profitability. Unless substantial headway is made in increasing rural incomes and in broadening
and documenting the scope of individual land and property rights in the not to distant future,
there is considerable risk that local support for the reforms will wane. Once this process of
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u Reform procedures. One major improvement in the 1994 reforms over previous initiatives was that
clear procedures were provided for rayon administrations to follow, which made implementation
much easier.
 
u Akim roles. Most akims perceive their main task to be promoting private ownership and
discouraging collective ownership. Some akims in addition feel they are responsible for providing
technical advice to farmers and assisting them with input supply and marketing.
 
u Private ownership. As implied above, most akims interviewed favor private landownership or at
least lengthening the 49-year lease.
 
u Farm-size limits. Many akims do not agree with the present minimum and maximum farm-size
limits because these limits fail to take into account regional differences in climate, soils, and
production systems.
 
u National policy. Akims would like to have more influence over policy development since they are
ultimately charged with implementing policy and, moreover, are best informed about the practicality
of various options.
 
u National land fund. Views on the national land fund land vary significantly: some are happy with
the current system of renting-out land to private farmers, some would like to use it to increase land
shares, and some prefer to reserve it for future population growth.
 
u Surveys and registration procedures. Land surveys are conducted sometimes by the rural
committee and sometimes by the land survey service of the rayon. Akims emphasize that survey
procedures need to be standardized and that surveyors should be certified professionals. Procedures
for acquiring and registering land seem complicated—any transaction must be registered with the
land commission, the tax inspectorate, and the statistical committee, and then must be notarized by
the rayon notary service.
 
u Tax revenues. Some akims claim that the reforms have led to lower tax revenues. The emergence of
a large number of small enterprises engaged in subsistence production is reducing (or is expected to
reduce) revenues collected. In most rayons, 80–90 percent of tax revenue has been generated from
agriculture in the past. Thus significant reductions in revenues collected from this sector are making
it difficult to pay for social services. Akims want to attract more value-added processing to their
rayons to increase the revenue base.
 
u Debt and tax delinquency. A crisis is coming where many farms will be unable (or will simply
refuse) to make debt and/or tax payments. The rayon administration should have the right to
confiscate land and property if the borrower is delinquent in payments.128
ANNEX 5.2
LAND RIGHTS ALLOWED BY RURAL COMMITTEE HEAD,




Percent of new peasant enterprises in which head has the following
rights without need for authorization (rights with authorization in
parentheses):
     Rent-out land shares 84    (9)
     Sell land shares 44   (15)
     Rent-out physical land 86    (9)
     Sell physical land 40   (15)
Of those indicating that authorization to rent/sell land shares
(physical land) is needed, from whom (%):
     Head of peasant farm 35   (36)
     Rural committee 41   (39)
     Rayon officials 14   (14)
     Mixed 10   (11)
Peasant farm land shares (physical land) can only be transferred to (%):
     No response or not clear 13   (15)
     Anyone, no priorities 55   (53)
     Peasant farm member 17   (17)
     Village residents 15   (15)
Percent of rural committees indicating that individual families within
the new peasant farming enterprise have the right to (rights with
authorization in parentheses):
     Rent-out land shares 84   (11)
     Sell land shares 40   (18)
     Rent-out physical land 81   (12)
     Sell physical land 37   (18)129
ANNEX 5.3
SEVERITY OF AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS,










Slow progress on demarcating and documenting
land rights of individual households within
enterprises
1.4 1.8 1.2 1.4
Lack of knowledge on how to farm 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.4
Slow progress on demarcating and documenting
land rights of peasant farming enterprises
1.5 1.8 1.3 1.5
Irrigation water distribution 1.9 3.0 2.4 2.4
Lack of markets for farm output 2.2 2.2 3.0 2.5
Lack of seeds 2.0 3.5 2.8 2.7
Lack of farm extension or veterinary services 2.4 2.4 3.6 3.0
Lack of fertilizer and farm chemicals 3.2 4.5 4.0 3.8
Lack of fuel 3.4 4.0 3.9 3.8
Lack of spare parts or equipment 4.1 4.3 4.1 4.1
Lack of credit 3.8 4.1 4.5 4.2
     a.  Figures are weighted averages of the following scale: 1 = not a serious problem, 2 = problem
is somewhat serious, 3 = problem is serious, 4 = problem is very serious, and 5 = problem is
extremely serious.130
ANNEX 5.4
REASONS FOR SATISFACTION OR DISSATISFACTION
WITH FARM RESTRUCTURING,









General degree of satisfaction with the farm
restructuring to date: 
a
   Farm enterprise head 3.8 3.5 3.3 3.5
   Most individual households within enterprise 3.7 3.3 3.3 3.4
   Social service workers 3.7 3.3 3.0 3.3
   Pensioners 3.6 3.4 2.9 3.3
Most important reasons why certain groups are
pleased or very pleased with the reforms (%):
   People are independent 50 50 56 52
   People able to get land of their own 17 25 38 25
   People see the fruits of their labor 14 17 6 12
   Labor efficiency/productivity improves 19 8 0 11
Most important reasons why certain groups are
dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the reforms
(%):
   Economic hardship 50 42 39 43
   Machinery problems 14 17 27 21
   Slow pace of reforms 9 25 27 21
   No credit 9 16 5 8
   No wages for social service workers 14 0 0 4
   People not ready 4 0 2 3
   a.  Figures are weighted averages of the following scale: 5 = very pleased, 4 = pleased, 3 =
indifferent, 2 = dissatisfied, 1 = very dissatisfied.